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NEW YORK LAW OF EVIDENCE*
I. JuiucIAL NOTICE
A. Definition: Process by which a judge takes notice of a fact or
law without requiring evidence thereof.
People v. Langlois, 122 Misc. 2d 1018, 1021, 472
N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (Suffolk County Ct. 1984); People v.
Finkelstein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 308, 183 N.E.2d 661, 665,
229 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373 (1962); RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE
§ 8, at 6 (10th ed. 1985).
B. Facts: Judicial notice may be taken of facts which are either
notorious or manifest.
1. Notorious: Facts which are part of common knowledge
within the community (from which the jury is selected).
Some examples of notorious facts which have been judi-
cially noticed: the size and height of the human body,
Hunter v. New York, Ontario & Western R.R., 116 N.Y.
615, 621, 23 N.E. 9, 10 (1889), affd, 130 N.Y. 669, 29
N.E. 1034 (1891); the average human gestation period is
280 days, In re Wells, 129 Misc. 447, 454, 221 N.Y.S.
714, 722 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1927); what con-
stitutes an alcoholic beverage, People v. Leonard, 8
N.Y.2d 60, 167 N.E.2d 842, 201 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1960);
and that barriers should be used when working on scaf-
foldings Rohlfs v. Weil, 271 N.Y. 444, 448, 3 N.E.2d 588,
589 (1936).
2. Manifest: Facts ascertainable by unquestionably accu-
rate sources. Some examples of manifest facts which
have been judicially noticed: the time when the sun sets,
People v. Genn, 144 Misc. 2d 596, 602, 545 N.Y.S.2d 478,
483 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989); blood tests used to
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disprove paternity, Commissioner v. Costonie, 277 A.D.
90, 92, 97 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (1st Dep't 1950); principles
underlying HLA blood testing, Lorraine M. v. Linwood
H.S., 115 Misc. 2d 922, 929, 455 N.Y.S.2d 48, 53 (Family
Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
3. Judicial notice may only be taken of matters which a
judge knows in his or her capacity as a judge. Gibson v.
Von Glahn Hotel Co., 185 N.Y.S. 154, 156 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1st Dep't 1920); In re Bommer, 159 Misc. 511, 513,
288 N.Y.S. 419, 423 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1936); Peo-
ple v. Dow, 3 A.D.2d 979, 979, 162 N.Y.S.2d 960, 961
(4th Dep't 1957).
4. Practice: Before the judge may take judicial notice of
fact, it must be requested by one of the parties. Walton
v. Stafford, 14 A.D. 310, 313 (1st Dep't 1897), affd, 162
N.Y. 558, 57 N.E. 92 (1900). However, obvious facts
may be judicially noticed for the first time on appeal,
even to reverse a lower court judgment. People v. Santi-
ago, 64 A.D.2d 355, 357, 409 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (1st
Dep't 1978).
C. Law: N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4511 is the authority for this
area.
1. Mandatory: The court must judicially notice the follow-
ing laws, even without pleading or proof:
a. Federal Public Law-the United States Constitu-
tion, treaties, federal case law, public acts of Con-
gress. People v. Jackson, 89 A.D.2d 697, 701, 453
N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (3d Dep't 1982); People v. Vitale,
80 Misc. 2d 36, 39, 360 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (Nassau
County Ct. 1974).
b. State Public Law- common law, constitutions, and
public statutes of New York and all other states.
Sega v. State, 89 A.D.2d 412, 414, 456 N.Y.S.2d
856, 858 (3d Dep't 1982), affd, 60 N.Y.2d 183, 456
N.E.2d 1174, 469 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1983).
c. Codes, rules and regulations of New York except
those relating solely to the organization of a state
agency.
[Vol. 9:289
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N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4511(a) (McKinney 1993);
Cruise v. New York State Thruway Auth., 28 A.D.2d
1029, 1030, 283 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (3d Dep't 1967),
affd, 26 N.Y.2d 1037, 260 N.E.2d 553, 311 N.Y.S.2d
924 (1970); Roberts v. Community Sch. Bd., 66
N.Y.2d 652, 655, 486 N.E.2d 818, 820, 495 N.Y.S.2d
960, 962 (1985).
d. Local laws and county acts.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4511(a) (McKinney 1993);
Chanler v. Manocherean, 151 A.D.2d 432, 433, 543
N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (1st Dep't 1989); Pellicio v. Axel-
rod, 131 A.D.2d 650, 651, 516 N.Y.S.2d 940, 945 (2d
Dep't 1987); Industrial Refuge Sys. v. O'Rourke, 70
N.Y.2d 610, 516 N.E.2d 1223, 522 N.Y.S.2d 110
(1987) (Westchester County law); Franklin v.
Krause, 49 A.D.2d 740, 740, 372 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226
(2d Dep't), affd, 37 N.Y.2d 813, 338 N.E.2d 329,
375 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1975) (Nassau County law).
2. Permissive: Pursuant to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4511,
the court may judicially take notice of the following laws
on request or on its own motion:
a. A private act or resolution of U.S. Congress and of
the New York legislature.
Atkacus v. Terker, 30 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. Queens County 1941).
b. The laws of foreign countries or their political sub-
divisions.
Lerner v. Karageorgis Lines, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 479,
487, 488 N.E.2d 824, 827, 497 N.Y.S.2d 894, 897
(1985) (court did not abuse discretion by not judi-
cially noticing potentially applicable foreign laws
without party's request); Dresdner Bank v.
Edelmann, 129 Misc. 2d 686, 688, 493 N.Y.S.2d
703, 704 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y. County 1985), affd
without op., 117 A.D.2d 1024, 499 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st
Dep't 1986) (German law relied upon); Weston
Banking Corp. v. Bankasi, 57 N.Y.2d 315, 329, 442
N.E.2d 1195, 1202, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684, 691 (1982)
(Turkish court order and decrees judicially
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noticed).
c. The "ordinances and regulations of officers, agen-
cies or governmental subdivisions of the state or of
the United States."
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4511(b) (McKinney 1993);
Medical Malpractice Ins. Ass'n v. Super-intendent
of Ins., 72 N.Y.2d 753, 764, 533 N.E.2d 1030, 1036,
537 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1080 (1989); Rex Paving Corp. v. White, 139 A.D.2d
176, 183, 531 N.Y.S.2d 831, 836 (3d Dep't 1988).
3. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4511(b) allows permissive judi-
cial notice to become mandatory if a party (1) requests
it; (2) gives the court sufficient information; and (3) noti-
fies each adverse party of the request.
In re Will of Duysburgh, 154 Misc. 2d 82, 85, 584
N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1992).
4. Role of Court: The court, via the charge, informs the
jury of what is judicially noticed.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4511(c) (McKinney 1992);
Cohen v. Gilbert, 12 A.D.2d 301, 302, 210 N.Y.S.2d
895, 896 (1st Dep't 1961).
a. The court may use any information, whether
furnished by a party or discovered on its own.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4511(d) (McKinney
1992).
II. REAL EVIDENCE
A. Definition: Presentation, based upon the judge's discretion,
to court and jury of an object that appeals to the senses.
People v. Diaz, 111 Misc. 2d 1083, 1084, 445 N.Y.S.2d
888, 889 (1975) (body itself used as real evidence).
1. Trial court has broad discretion as to the admissibility
of real evidence.
Uss v. Town of Oyster Bay, 37 N.Y.2d 639, 641, 339
N.E.2d 147, 149, 376 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (1975).
B. Rule: Object must be relevant.
People v. Early, 191 A.D.2d 807, 809, 594 N.Y.S.2d 849,
851 (3d Dep't 1993). Even if relevant, object may not be
[Vol. 9:289
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presented if it is:
1. Physically inconvenient; or
2. Indecent;
People v. Herk, 179 Misc. 450, 452, 39 N.Y.S.2d 246,
248 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942); or
3. Potentially prejudicial and of low probative value.
Allen v. Stokes, 260 A.D. 600, 601, 23 N.Y.S.2d 443,
444 (1st Dep't 1940); People v. Bell, 63 N.Y.2d 796,
797, 471 N.E.2d 137, 138, 481 N.Y.S.2d 324, 325
(1984).
C. Jury may not consider physical resemblance in determining
family relationships. Such evidence is neither accurate nor
reliable.
Bilkovie v. Loeb, 156 A.D. 719, 721, 141 N.Y.S. 279, 281
(1st Dep't 1913); Dep't of Public Welfare of the City of
New York v. Hamilton, 282 A.D. 1025, 1025, 126
N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (1st Dep't 1953); Commissioner of
Welfare v. Leroy C., 45 A.D.2d 963, 963, 359 N.Y.S.2d
341, 342 (2d Dep't 1974).
D. Observation by the jury may be used to determine age.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4516 (McKinney 1993); Wel-
lington Assocs. v. Vandee Enter. Corp., 75 Misc. 2d 330,
332, 347 N.Y.S.2d 788, 791 (Civil Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
E. Grisly, shocking objects will more likely be permitted in crim-
inal rather than civil cases.
People v. Singer, 300 N.Y. 120, 122, 89 N.E.2d 710, 710
(1949); People v. Cruz, 176 A.D.2d 953, 953, 575
N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (2d Dep't 1991).
F. Inspection of Premises-Criminal Case: The jury may be
ordered by the court to inspect the premises where a material
fact occurred.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 270.50(1) (McKinney 1993); People v.
Morton, 189 A.D.2d 488, 494, 596 N.Y.S.2d 783, 790 (1st
Dep't 1993).
1. Defendant, absent waiver, has an absolute right to see
and hear everything the jury sees and hears.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 270.50(2) (McKinney 1993);
1993]
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People v. Morton, 189 A.D.2d 488, 494, 596
N.Y.S.2d 783, 789 (1st Dep't 1993).
2. Juror may not view the scene without permission of the
court and an unauthorized view can be grounds for a
mistrial.
People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 279, 229 N.E.2d
211, 214, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526, 530 (1967); People v.
Crimmins, 26 N.Y.2d 319, 323, 258 N.E.2d 708,
709, 310 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (1970).
G. Inspection of Premises-Civil Case: During the course of a
trial, the court may, in its discretion, order a viewing or
observation by the jury.
N.Y. Civ. PR.c. L. & R. § 4110-C (McKinney 1993).
H. Exhibition of injured part of body allowed when done to show
nature and extent of injury.
Dictz v. Aronson, 244 A.D. 746, 746, 279 N.Y.S. 66, 67
(2d Dep't 1935) (throat); People v. Dananel, 183 A.D.2d
778, 778, 584 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (2d Dep't), appeal
denied, 80 N.Y.2d 902, 588 N.Y.S.2d 820, 602 N.E.2d
236 (1992) (chest and stomach).
I. Plaintiff Demonstrating Effect of Injuries-Left to the trial
judge's discretion.
Harvey v. Mazal American Partners, 79 N.Y.2d 218, 223,
590 N.E.2d 240, 226, 581 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (1992)
(plaintiff permitted to appear before jury and answer
questions designated to demonstrate extent of brain
damage).
J. Experiments: Conditions must be similar to the time at issue,
unless the experiment is within the jurors' everyday exper-
iences.
People v. Andrew, 156 A.D.2d 978, 979, 549 N.Y.S.2d
268, 269 (4th Dep't 1989).
K. Photographs and Movies
1. A photograph is admissible if relevant, if a proper foun-
dation is laid, and if not unduly prejudicial. Any wit-
ness familiar with the circumstances may testify as to
the photograph's fairness and accuracy to help lay the
proper foundation.
[Vol. 9:289
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People v. Perez, 300 N.Y. 208, 90 N.E.2d 40 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1950); People v.
Blagrone, 183 A.D.2d 837, 837, 584 N.Y.S.2d 86, 87
(2d Dep't 1992).
a. In a criminal case, photographs are admissible if
their probative value outweighs potential to arouse
the emotions of the jury and to prejudice the
defendant.
People v. Wood, 79 N.Y.2d 958, 960, 591 N.E.2d
1178, 1179, 582 N.Y.S.2d 992, 993 (1992).
2. Movies are usually not excluded even if other sufficient
evidence exists. However, the court places restrictions
on admission:
a. Left to trial judge's discretion;
Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, 523, 423
N.Y.S.2d 694, 698 (3d Dep't 1979), affd, 52 N.Y.2d
114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
b. Must not cause delay; and
c. Cannot be sensational;
Boyarsky v. G.A. Zimmerman Corp., 240 A.D. 361,
365, 270 N.Y.S. 134, 138 (1st Dep't 1934).
L. X-Rays: Several statutory requirements for admissibility.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4532-a (McKinney 1993);
Vanderwel v. Palozzo, 155 A.D.2d 387, 388, 548
N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (1st Dep't 1989).
M. It is discretionary as to what exhibits jury will be allowed to
take with them while deliberating.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 310.20 (McKinney 1993); Rayn-
olds v. Vinier, 125 A.D. 18, 20, 109 N.Y.S. 293, 295 (4th
Dep't 1908).
III. AUTHENTICATION OF WRITINGS
A. Two General Rules:
1. No writing can be read to the jury to prove its content
unless it is formally offered into evidence.
1993]
296 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
Blackwood v. Chemical Corn Exch. Bank, 4 A.D.2d
656, 659, 168 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (1st Dep't 1957),
rev'd, 5 N.Y.2d 884, 156 N.E.2d 459, 182 N.Y.S.2d
830 (1959).
2. In order to be accepted into evidence, the writing must
be proven to the judge's satisfaction to be genuine.
B. Methods of proving a writing's genuineness:
1. Obtain an admission by a notice to admit under N.Y.
CIv.
PRAc. L. & R. § 3123 (McKinney 1993).
2. Have writer identify the writing from the stand.
3. Call someone who witnessed the execution of the writ-
ing.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4537 (McKinney 1993).
4. Use statutory authority, which may make some writings
genuine in the eyes of the court.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4538 (McKinney 1993).
a. Even so, opposing party may still attack the genu-
ineness with court's permission.
Albany Cty. Sav. Bank v. McCarty, 149 N.Y. 71, 79,
43 N.E. 427, 429 (1896).
5. Testimony of a handwriting expert.
People v. Yu, 166 A.D.2d 249, 249, 564 N.Y.S.2d
300, 301 (1st Dep't 1990), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d
992, 565 N.E.2d 530, 563 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1990).
6. Circumstantial evidence of genuineness:
a. Solicited Reply Doctrine-When a party sends
another party a letter requesting a response, the
responsive letter can be admitted into evidence
without further proof that it is genuine.
People v. Dunbar, 215 N.Y. 416, 109 N.E. 554
(1915).
This doctrine also applies to the case where one
party calls a second party and the second party
sends back a letter. However, this doctrine is not
used to authenticate the second party's voice on the
[Vol. 9:289
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telephone.
Mankes v. Fishman, 163 A.D. 789, 149 N.Y.S. 228
(3d Dep't 1914).
b. Ancient Document Rule: A writing is considered
authentic if it is 30 years old or older and is located
in a place where it should naturally be found.
(1) However, in cases dealing with real property,
proof of possession is required along with the
document itself.
Porter v. State, 5 Misc. 2d 28, 34, 159 N.Y.S.2d
549, 556 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
7. Official documents: in New York, a certified copy is suf-
ficient.
N.Y. Civ. PiAc. L. & R. § 4540 (McKinney 1993).
IV. BEST EVIDENCE RULE
A. Requires party to produce the original document whenever
party must prove the contents of the writing.
Trombley v. Seligman, 191 N.Y. 400, 403, 84 N.E. 280,
281 (1908); Clark v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 174 A.D.2d
268, 273, 580 N.Y.S.2d 221, 225 (1st Dep't 1992).
Three situations in which best evidence rule applies:
1. Where witness knows a fact only because he or she read
it somewhere.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 233, at 708 (3d ed.
1984).
2. Where the writing is a legally operative instrument.
Kain v. Larkin, 141 N.Y. 144, 151, 36 N.E. 9, 10
(1894).
3. Where the witness refers to a writing and tries to sum-
marize it.
B. An oral confession may be testified to, even though later writ-
ten and signed, as long as the oral and written confessions do
not differ in substance from each other.
People v. Giro, 197 N.Y. 152, 160, 90 N.E. 432, 435
(1910).
C. In a civil case, testimony of a witness from a prior trial
1993]
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between the same parties may be admitted without the min-
utes of the prior trial, as long as the witness's testimony is
material to the issue at hand.
McRorie v. Monroe, 203 N.Y. 426, 430, 96 N.E. 724, 725
(1911).
1. However, in a criminal case, a transcript is needed.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 670.20 (McKinney 1993).
D. Theoretically, the rule should apply to any chattel with writ-
ing on it.
In re New York City, 73 A.D.2d 932, 933, 423 N.Y.S.2d
686, 688 (1st Dep't 1980).
E. The original of the writing is the copy which the parties
intended to be effective. A carbon copy is not valid unless
signed.
Sarasohn v. Kamaiky, 193 N.Y. 203, 215, 86 N.E. 20, 24
(1908).
F. For secondary evidence, a party must show:
1. Document once existed;
2. Document was genuine, if genuineness is at issue; and
3. Excuse for non-production.
Rosenbaum v. Podolsky, 97 Misc. 614, 618, 162
N.Y.S. 227, 229 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1916); Fal-
cone v. Edo Corp., 141 A.D.2d 498, 529 N.Y.S.2d
123 (2d Dep't 1988).
G. Excuses: The rationale behind allowing excuses for failure to
produce the actual document is the belief that the need for
relevant evidence takes precedence over the dangers of inac-
curacy and fraud, which are left to the trier of fact in deter-
mining probative value. Some acceptable excuses are:
1. Physical inconvenience in producing the writing;
2. Loss of document by client. In this case, the document
must be searched for in good faith.
Kearny v. Mayor, 92 N.Y. 617 (1883).
3. Destruction of document by client. In this case, the doc-
ument must have been destroyed in good faith.
People v. Betts, 272 A.D.2d 737, 741, 74 N.Y.S.2d
[Vol. 9:289
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791, 794 (1st Dep't 1947), affd, 297 N.Y. 1000, 80
N.E.2d 456 (1948).
4. If document is in the possession of a third party. In this
case, it must be subpoenaed.
People v. Burgess, 244 N.Y. 472, 479, 155 N.E. 745,
748 (1927).
5. Writing on file in a public place is proved by a certified
copy.
Masten v. State, 14 Misc. 2d 119, 120, 179 N.Y.S.2d
93, 95 (Ct. Cl. 1958), affd, 11 A.D.2d 390, 206
N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dep't 1960), affd, 9 N.Y.2d 796,
175 N.E.2d 166, 215 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1961).
6. Expert testimony as to the content of voluminous docu-
ments.
People v. Weinberg, 183 A.D.2d 932, 934, 586
N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dep't 1992).
H. A document labelled "collateral" is not subject to the best evi-
dence rule. A "collateral" document is relatively unimportant
to the issues at hand.
Wolper v. New York Water Serv. Corp., 276 A.D. 1106,
1107, 96 N.Y.S.2d 647, 649 (2d Dep't 1950).
V. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
A. Leading Questions: Questions which, because of their phras-
ing or because of the friendly posture of the witness, suggest
the desired response.
Becker v. Koch, 104 N.Y. 394, 400, 10 N.E. 701, 703 (1887);
People v. Sexton, 187 N.Y. 495, 501, 80 N.E. 396, 400 (1907);
People v. Seligman, 35 A.D.2d 591, 592-93, 313 N.Y.S.2d 593,
597 (2d Dep't 1970); People v. Marshall, 144 A.D.2d 1005, 534
N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (4th Dep't 1988)
1. Whether a leading question should be allowed is to be
determined by the trial court in the exercise of its dis-
cretion.
2. As a matter of precedent, leading questions will be
allowed in the following instances:
a. If asked by the court.
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Zinman v. Black & Decker, Inc., 983 F.2d 431, 436
(2d Cir. 1983) (questioned expert in order to clarify
evidentiary picture for benefit of jury); People v.
Purdie, 174 A.D.2d 298, 299, 571 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299
(1st Dep't), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 972, 580
N.E.2d 424, 574 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1991) (questioned
complainant-clarified issues); People v. Arthur, 186
A.D.2d 661, 663, 588 N.Y.S.2d 881, 883 (2d Dep't
1992) (questioned witnesses-clarified issues); Peo-
ple v. Glover, 185 A.D.2d 458, 459, 585 N.Y.S.2d
873, 875 (3d Dep't 1992) (questioned 13-year-old
rape victim about rape trauma syndrome); People v.
Alexander, 190 A.D.2d 1052, 1053, 593 N.Y.S.2d
661, 662 (4th Dep't 1993) (questioned brief which
elicited information already in evidence).
b. On cross-examination.
c. On direct examination:
(1) If used to elicit trivial, introductory matter.
(2) If the witness is hostile or unwilling to testify.
Becker v. Koch, 104 N.Y. 394, 400 (1887); People
v. Sexton, 187 N.Y. 495, 501 (1907); People v.
Walker, 125 A.D.2d 732, 510 N.Y.S.2d 203 (2d
Dep't 1986), appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 887, 507
N.E.2d 1106, 515 N.Y.S.2d 1036 (1987); People
v. Marshall, 144 A.D.2d 1005, 534 N.Y.S.2d
623, 624 (4th Dep't 1988).
(3) Where the physical or mental weakness or
immaturity of the witness requires its use.
People v. Greenhagen, 78 A.D.2d 964, 966, 433
N.Y.S.2d 683, 685-86 (4th Dep't 1980) (child);
People v. Tyrrel, 101 A.D.2d 946, 946, 475
N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (3d Dep't 1984) (child).
(4) Where the witness's recollection has been
exhausted.
Cheeney v. Arnold, 15 N.Y. 345 (1857).
B. Use of Memoranda by Witness: The witness cannot read his
testimony from a previously prepared memorandum. She
may, however, use a memorandum in connection with her
[Vol. 9:289
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testimony in the following instances:
1. To refresh her recollection.
a. If the witness had personal knowledge of a relevant
fact, but cannot recall the fact, she can refresh her
recollection by the use of any memorandum (or any-
thing else, for that matter).
Huff v. Bennett, 6 N.Y. 337, 338 (1857); People v.
Ferrar, 293 N.Y. 51, 56, 55 N.E.2d 861, 863 (1944);
Badr v. Hogan, 75 N.Y.2d 629, 636, 554 N.E.2d
890, 894, 555 N.Y.S.2d 249, 253 (1990) (confession
of judgment against plaintiff not admitted for other
reasons); Nappi v. Gerdts, 103 A.D.2d 737, 477
N.Y.S.2d 202, 203 (2d Dep't 1984) (grand jury testi-
mony); People v. Fross, 115 A.D.2d 247, 248, 496
N.Y.S.2d 313, 314, appeal denied, 67 N.Y.2d 761,
491 N.E.2d 290, 500 N.Y.S.2d 1033 (4th Dep't 1985)
(police report not used on other grounds); People v.
Abair, 134 A.D.2d 743, 744, 521 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562
(3d Dep't 1987), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 1003, 521
N.E.2d 1081, 526 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1938) (prior victim
statement); People v. Gittens, 165 A.D.2d 750, 564
N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (1st Dep't 1990).
b. The adversary has the right on cross-examination
to inspect the memorandum and to question with
respect to it.
People v. Gezzo, 307 N.Y. 385, 393-94, 121 N.E.2d
380, 384 (1954); Slotnick v. State, 129 Misc. 2d 553,
554, 493 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (Ct.Cl. 1985) (extended
rule to disclosure of documents used by witness at
pretrial examination); E.R. Carpenter Co. v. ABC
Carpet Co., 98 Misc. 2d 1091, 1092, 415 N.Y.S.2d
351, 353 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).
c. Although the proponent may not offer the memo-
randum in evidence, the adversary may.
d. The best evidence rule is inapplicable.
e. It makes no difference when the memorandum was
made.
People v. Ramos, 141 Misc. 2d 930, 935, 535
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N.Y.S.2d 663, 667 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988); Peo-
ple v. DiLoretto, 150 A.D.2d 920, 921, 541 N.Y.S.2d
260, 262 (3d Dep't 1989), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d
739, 545 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1989).
f. Even a document which is inadmissible may be
used to refresh a recollection.
Collins v. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co., 497 F.2d
1296, 1298 (2d Cir. 1974).
2. As a "past recollection recorded."
a. A writing is admissible, as evidence auxiliary to the
testimony of the witness, if:
(1) It was made "at or about" the time of the event
recorded.
Howard v. McDonough, 77 N.Y. 592, 593
(1879); Calandra v. Norwood, 81 A.D.2d 650,
651, 438 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (2d Dep't 1981).
(2) The witness can testify to its accuracy.
Downs v. New York Cent. R.R., 47 N.Y. 83, 87
(1871); People v. Fields, 151 A.D.2d 598, 599,
542 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (2d Dep't 1989); Iannielli
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 75 A.D.2d 223, 228,
428 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476 (2d Dep't 1980).
(3) The witness had personal knowledge of the
event, does not recall it, and the memorandum
does not refresh her recollection.
People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 598 N.E.2d
693, 696, 586 N.Y.S.2d 545, 548 (1992); Russell
v. Hudson River R.R., 17 N.Y. 134, 140 (1858);
Calandra v. Norwood, 81 A.D.2d 650, 438
N.Y.S.2d 381, 384 (2d Dep't 1981).
b. The best evidence rule applies.
3. As a summary of numerous items:
a. Where a witness testifies to numerous items (e.g.,
inventory of articles), she will normally refresh her
recollection by the use of a memorandum. After
she testifies, the memorandum is admissible, not as
evidence, but as a convenient statement of her tes-
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timony.
Howard v. McDonough, 77 N.Y. 592, 593 (1879).
C. Opinion Evidence-General Rule: A witness is required to
state facts, not conclusions or opinions.
Morehouse v. Matthews, 2 N.Y. 514, 515 (1849); People
v. Adorno, 128 Misc. 2d 389, 393, 489 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. Queens County 1984).
D. Lay Witness Exception: A lay witness may testify to an opin-
ion or conclusion where it is unreasonable to expect her to
describe all the facts which would permit the jury to draw the
conclusion.
People v. Kenny, 36 A.D.2d 477, 478-79, 320 N.Y.S.2d
972, 973 (3d Dep't 1971), affd, 30 N.Y.2d 154, 282
N.E.2d 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1972).
1. Thus, a lay witness may state her opinion or conclusion
as to:
a. The emotions of another.
Blake v. People, 73 N.Y. 586, 586-87 (1878).
(1) But she may not testify that two people
appeared to be in love.
Pearce v. Stace, 207 N.Y. 506, 512, 101 N.E. 434
(1913); In re Sanchez, 141 Misc. 2d 1066, 1067,
535 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (Family Ct. Bronx
County 1988).
2. Matters of taste and smell; e.g., that a particular liquid
tasted was water or whiskey.
3. The speed of a moving vehicle.
a. Testimony that the vehicle was going "fast" or "very
fast" has been held proper.
Pieniewski v. Benbenek, 56 A.D.2d 710, 392
N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (4th Dep't 1977) (foundation for
testimony must first be established); Marcucci v.
Bird, 275 A.D. 127, 128, 88 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (3d
Dep't 1949); Larsen v. Vigliarolo Bros., 77 A.D.2d
562, 429 N.Y.S.2d 273, 275 (2d Dep't 1980) (witness
not allowed to testify about speed of motorcycle);
Swoboda v. We Try Harder, Inc., 128 A.D.2d 862,
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863, 513 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783 (2d Dep't 1987) (testi-
mony regarding speed of motorcycle not allowed
where foundation witness not qualified).
4. Identification of another's voice.
a. A foundation must first be laid to show a basis for
the identification; e.g., that the witness heard the
person speak on another occasion, and for this rea-
son, recognized the voice at the time in question.
Mankes v. Fishman, 163 A.D. 789, 799, 149 N.Y.S.
228, 235 (3d Dep't 1914).
5. The witness's own intent where that is relevant.
People v. Levan, 295 N.Y. 26, 33-34, 64 N.E.2d 341, 345
(1945); People v. Rivera, 101 A.D.2d 981, 981, 477
N.Y.S.2d 732, 733-34 (3d Dep't 1984), afftd, 65 N.Y.2d
661, 481 N.E.2d 253, 491 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1985).
6. The genuineness of another's handwriting.
a. The witness must first lay a foundation by showing
sufficient familiarity with the signature of the per-
son in question.
People v. Corey, 148 N.Y. 476, 484, 42 N.E. 1066,
1074 (1896) (foundation must first be established);
People v. Clark, 122 A.D.2d 389, 389, 504 N.Y.S.2d
799, 800 (3d Dep't 1986).
7. The value of his own services. He must be an expert to
testify to the value of the services of a third person.
Mercer v. Vose, 67 N.Y. 56, 58 (1876).
8. There are two cases in which a lay witness is permitted
to state an opinion, but is expected to follow an estab-
lished formula:
a. The irrational conduct of another.
(1) A lay witness, not subscribing to a will, may not
express his opinion of the sanity of another. He
is permitted to describe the acts and to testify
to the declarations of the person in question,
and then to state whether these acts and decla-
rations impressed him as being rational or irra-
tional. A subscribing witness to a will is
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competent to express an opinion as to the testa-
tor's sanity. In other words, a lay witness may
characterize the acts, but not the actor; a sub-
scribing witness may characterize the actor.
People v. Pekarz, 185 N.Y. 470, 481, 78 N.E.
294, 297 (1906); Gomboy v. Mitchell, 57 A.D.2d
916, 916, 395 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (2d Dep't 1977);
In re Estate of Vickery, 167 A.D.2d 828, 828, 561
N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (4th Dep't 1990).
(2) Lay witness may only state whether conversa-
tions or conduct was rational or irrational but
not the general soundness or unsoundness of a
person's mind.
People v. Clark, 94 A.D.2d 846, 847, 463
N.Y.S.2d 601, 603 (3d Dep't 1983).
b. A lay witness may testify that another person was
intoxicated.
People v. Eastwood, 14 N.Y. 562, 566 (1856); Ellison
v. N.Y C. Transit Auth., 63 N.Y.2d 1030, 1030, 484
N.Y.S.2d 797, 797 (1984); Lipp v. Saks, 129 A.D.2d
681, 683, 514 N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (2d Dep't 1987);
Allan v. Keystone Nineties Inc., 74 A.D.2d 992, 992,
427 N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (4th Dep't 1980).
(1) But one court went as far as to require the wit-
ness to preface this conclusion with a statement
of the constitutive facts ("his eyes were glazed,
his speech was slurred, among other things"),
and then to state that the person was drunk.
People v. Kessler, 16 Misc. 2d 179, 180, 183
N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson County
1959).
F. Expert Witness Exception: An expert may be permitted to
express an opinion where three conditions are met:
1. The facts or the inferences to be drawn from the facts
depend "upon professional or scientific knowledge or
skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelli-
gence."
People v. Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d 430, 432, 458 N.E.2d
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351, 352, 470 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (1983); Dougherty
v. Milliken, 163 N.Y. 527, 533, 57 N.E. 757, 759
(1900).
a. An expert in the marketing of fruit was permitted
to testify as to how much money a decedent would
probably have earned if he had lived, although an
expert could not testify as to the monetary loss
occasioned by the simultaneous death of the dece-
dent's wife.
Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 A.D.2d
155, 158, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (1st Dep't 1966).
Notably, the holding of this case was rejected by the
Fourth Department in Delong v. County of Erie, 89
A.D.2d 376, 380, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887, 894 (4th Dep't
1982), affd, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469
N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983).
2. The expert must first be qualified. Whether the witness
is qualified is a question for the trial court to determine
in the exercise of its discretion.
Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389,
398, 34 N.E.2d 367, 372 (1941); Werner v. Sun Oil
Co., 65 N.Y.2d 839, 840, 482 N.E.2d 921, 922, 493
N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (1985); Hong v. County of Nas-
sau, 139 A.D.2d 566, 566, 527 N.Y.S.2d 66, 66 (2d
Dep't 1988); Goldman v. County of Nassau, 170
A.D.2d 648, 648, 567 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (2d Dep't
1991).
3. The expert must have "reasonable certainty" as to his
conclusion, but an expert is not required to state specifi-
cally, that he is reasonably certain. However, an expert
is no more entitled to speculate than a layman.
Matott v. Ward, 48 N.Y.2d 455, 460-61, 399 N.E.2d
532, 534-35,423 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647-48 (1979) (medi-
cal opinion); Sitaris v. James Ricciardi & Sons,
Inc., 154 A.D.2d 451, 453, 545 N.Y.S.2d 937, 939
(2d Dep't 1989), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 708, 553
N.E.2d 1343, 554 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1989) (accident
reconstruction expert).
G. Expert-Form of Testimony: The general rule is that the
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expert may state his opinion without first specifying the data
upon which his opinion is based.
1. Expert does not have to state facts or data before stating
an opinion.
N.Y. Civ. PFic. L. & R. § 4515 (McKinney 1993);
People v. Youngs, 151 N.Y. 210, 218-19 (1896); Peo-
ple v. DiPiazzi, 211 N.Y.2d 342, 351, 248 N.E.2d
412, 417, 300 N.Y.S.2d 545, 552 (1969).
2. Upon cross-examination expert may be required to spec-
ify the data and other criteria supporting the opinion.
Caton v. Doug Urban Constr. Co., 65 N.Y.2d 909,
911, 483 N.E.2d 128, 129, 493 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454
(1985).
3. In a criminal matter, an expert who relies on necessary
facts not contained on the record is required to testify to
those facts prior to rendering the opinion.
People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427, 430, 539 N.E.2d 96,
98, 541 N.Y.S.2d 340, 342 (1989).
H. Expert-The Hypothetical Question: Prior to September 1,
1963, a hypothetical question was necessary in New York
when the expert lacked personal knowledge of the facts upon
which his opinion rested. CPLR 4515 now provides: "Unless
the court orders otherwise, questions calling for the opinion
of an expert witness need not be hypothetical in form, and the
witness may state his opinion and reasons without first speci-
fying the data upon which it is based. Upon cross-examina-
tion, he may be required to specify the data and other criteria
supporting the opinion."
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4515 (McKinney 1993);
Tarlowe v. Metropolitan Ski Slopes, Inc., 28 N.Y.2d 410,
414, 271 N.E.2d 515, 516, 322 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (1971).
1. Note that the hypothetical question may still be used
and the court may even direct its use.
2. A hypothetical question must specify each assumption
of fact which the expert is to consider. Every assumed
fact must be in evidence, but there are two occasions
where the expert may rely on facts that are not admissi-
ble:
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People v. Keough, 276 N.Y. 141, 145, 11 N.E.2d 570,
572 (1937); People v. Samuels, 302 N.Y. 163, 171,
96 N.E.2d 757, 761-62 (1951); People v. Jones, 10
Misc. 2d 1067, 1075, 171 N.Y.S.2d 325, 333-34
(N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1958); Livreri v.
Berliner, 123 A.D.2d 670, 670-71, 507 N.Y.S.2d 41,
41 (2d Dep't 1986); Natale v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp., 135 A.D.2d 955, 957, 522 N.Y.S.2d
364, 365 (3d Dep't), appeal denied, 71 N.Y.2d 804,
524 N.E.2d 149, 528 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1989).
a. When the facts are "of a kind accepted in the pro-
fession as reliable .. ." or
Hambsch v. New York City Transit Auth., 63
N.Y.2d 723, 726, 469 N.E.2d 516, 518, 480 N.Y.S.2d
195, 197 (1984); People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427,
430, 539 N.E.2d 96, 97, 541 N.Y.S.2d 340, 341
(1989); People v. Fitzgibbon, 166 A.D.2d 745, 747,
563 N.Y.S.2d 518, 521 (3d Dep't 1990), appeal
denied, 77 N.Y.2d 838, 568 N.E.2d 655, 567
N.Y.S.2d 2061 (1991).
b. When the facts come "from a witness subject to full
cross-examination on the trial."
People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 459, 323 N.E.2d
169, 172, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923, 927 (1974); People v.
Wilson, 133 A.D.2d 179, 183-84, 518 N.Y.S.2d 690,
693 (2d Dep't 1987).
I. Handwriting Expert: A handwriting expert compares the dis-
puted writing with a standard and states his opinion as to
whether both documents were written by the same hand.
The "standard" is any writing proved to the satisfaction of the
court to be the genuine handwriting of the person whose sig-
nature is in question.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4536 (McKinney 1994); People
v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 320-21, 61 N.E. 286, 304-05
(1901); Heller v. Murray, 112 Misc. 2d 745, 749, 447
N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (N.Y.C. Civ Ct. Queens County 1981),
affd, 118 Misc. 2d 508, 464 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 2d Dep't 1983).
J. Expert Cross-Examination: An expert may be cross-examined
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by the use of textbooks which contradict him only where the
expert has acknowledged the authority of the textbook or its
author.
Hastings v. Chrysler Corp., 255 A.D. 316, 316-17, 7
N.Y.S.2d 524, 527 (1st Dep't 1948); Florence v. Goldberg,
48 A.D.2d 917, 919, 369 N.Y.S.2d 794, 798-99 (2d Dep't
1977), affd, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 736, 404
N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978).
K. Expert-Subpoena: Experts may be subpoenaed to testify to:
1. Facts within their knowledge and physical observations,
but not to matters which require their expertise, educa-
tion, judgement, or opinion.
In re Estate of Atkinson, 103 A.D.2d 960, 960, 479
N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (3d Dep't 1984).
2. If it cannot be determined if the witness is being called
to testify about general custom and usage, or for the
particular incident.
Waters v. East Nassau Medical Group, 92 A.D.2d
893, 893, 460 N.Y.S.2d 98, 99 (2d Dep't 1983); In re
Estate of Atkinson, 103 A.D.2d 960, 960, 479
N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (3d Dep't 1986).
L. Cross-Examination-In General: A party has the absolute
right to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
1. If a party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-
examine, the direct examination will usually be
stricken.
People v. Cole, 43 N.Y. 508, 512 (1871); Diocese of
Buffalo v. McCarthy, 91 A.D.2d 213, 219-20, 458
N.Y.S.2d 764, 768 (4th Dep't 1983); People v.
Ramistella, 306 N.Y. 379, 383-84, 118 N.E.2d 566,
568-69 (1954).
2. The proper scope of cross-examination covers:
a. Matters brought out on direct examination and the
implications flowing therefrom.
But see People v. Bethune, 105 A.D.2d 262, 484
N.Y.S.2d 577 (2d Dep't 1984) (party to criminal
case proves through cross-examination any rele-
vant proposition irrespective of scope of direct
1993]
310 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
examination once redirect and recross inquiry lim-
ited to new matters brought out on preceding exam-
ination).
b. Matters affecting the witness's credibility.
3. If the cross-examiner goes into "new matter," with or
without permission of the court, the cross-examiner
makes the witness his own witness, and thus loses the
right to impeach him.
Bennett v. Crescent Athletic-Hamilton Club, 270
N.Y. 456, 1 N.E.2d 963 (1936).
M. Impeaching One's Own Witness: A party may not impeach his
own witness, except:
1. By contradictory statements provided they were in writ-
ing and subscribed, or made under oath. See CPLR
4514. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.35 is to the same general
effect, but permits this only where the witness has
affirmatively hurt the party who called him and not
where he has simply disappointed the party who called
him.
Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)
(state evidence rule may not unduly intrude into
right to present effective defense under Sixth
Amendment). But see Grochulski v. Henderson, 637
F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1983) (confined Chambers hold-
ing to reliable confession); Crawford v. Nilan, 289
N.Y. 444, 450, 46 N.E.2d 512, 515 (1943); Carriage
House Motor Inn, Inc. v. Watertown, 136 A.D.2d
895, 895-96, 524 N.Y.S.2d 930, 931-32 (4th Dep't),
affd, 72 N.Y.2d 990, 531 N.E.2d 295, 534 N.Y.S.2d
663 (1988).
2. Where the witness is a compulsory witness, e.g., a sub-
scribing witness to a will. In re Cottrell, 95 N.Y. 329,
333-34 (1884). In this instance, the witness may be
impeached as if he had been called by the adversary.
3. A witness who is called by the court may also be
impeached by any party.
4. This rule applies where a party calls his adversary as
his own witness. Such an adversary-witness may be
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led, but he may not be impeached. As noted in section 1,
supra, the party's admissions may be used as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.
Cross v. Cross, 108 N.Y. 628, 629, 15 N.E. 333, 334
(1888).
N. No Advance Accreditation: Until a witness has been
impeached, the party who called him may not accredit him.
Thus, the party may not put in proof of the witness's good
reputation for truth and veracity, or proof of prior consistent
statements, until the witness has been attacked.
People v. Jung Hing, 212 N.Y. 393, 405, 106 N.E. 105,
109 (1914).
Exceptions:
1. The timely complaint of the victim of a forcible rape,
assault, or robbery may be shown if the complainant
testifies in the subsequent criminal prosecution.
People v. McDaniel 81 N.Y.2d 10, 16, 611 N.E.2d
265, 268-69, 595 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367-68 (1993).
2. When identification of the defendant is in issue, a wit-
ness who has on a previous occasion identified the
defendant may testify to such previous identification.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.30 (McKinney 1992).
a. Except as noted in 2(d), infra, only the person who
made the previous identification may testify to it on
trial.
People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471, 476, 113
N.E.2d 841, 843 (1953).
b. The prior identification must have been of the
defendant in person and not by selection from a
"mug book" (People v. Cioffi, 1 N.Y.2d 70, 73, 133
N.E.2d 703, 705, 150 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (1956)) or a
police artist's "composite sketch" (People v. Griffin,
29 N.Y.2d 91, 92-93, 272 N.E.2d 477, 477-78, 323
N.Y.S.2d 964, 964-65 (1971)).
c. The lineup must have been conducted without vio-
lating the defendant's constitutional rights.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1966);
Gilbert v. United States, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
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d. If a witness, who has identified the defendant on an
earlier occasion, is unable to identify the defendant
in court, the witness may testify to the prior identi-
fication, so long as he can swear that he is pres-
ently certain that the man he saw on the prior
occasion (e.g., at a lineup) is the man who commit-
ted the crime. Testimony of other witnesses (e.g.,
police) would be required to prove that the man the
witness identified on the prior occasion is the
defendant.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.25 (McKinney 1994); People
v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 41, 45, 611 N.E.2d 760, 762,
595 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (1993).
0. Impeachment of Adversary's Witness by Evidence of Bias,
Interest, or Hostility:
1. The fact that the adversary's witness is biased in favor
of the party calling him can be shown. For this purpose,
it is competent to show among other matters, that:
a. The witness has been bribed.
b. The witness is being paid a fee to testify.
c. The witness is related to the party calling him.
Coleman v. New York City Trans. Auth., 37 N.Y.2d
137, 142, 332 N.E.2d 850, 853, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663,
668 (1975).
d. The witness was injured simultaneously with the
plaintiff, but the witness settled his claim, and is
now testifying for the defendant.
Thompson v. Korn, 48 A.D.2d 1007, 1008, 368
N.Y.S.2d 923, 926 (4th Dep't 1975).
2. Where the witness has been attacked on the grounds of
interest or bias, the party calling him is entitled to
prove any fact which tends to show the absence of such
interest or bias.
Ryan v. Dwyer, 33 A.D.2d 878, 879, 307 N.Y.S.2d
565, 566 (4th Dep't .1969).
3. Under common law, a person was incompetent to tes-
tify, if interested in the event, on the presumed ground
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that he or she was unworthy of belief. However, for the
most part and under statute, interest as a disqualifica-
tion has been abolished.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4512 (McKinney 1993);
Coleman v. New York City Trans. Auth., 37 N.Y.2d
137, 141, 332 N.E.2d 850, 852, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663,
667 (1975).
a. A lingering vestiga of the common law remains
under the "Dead Man's" statute.
N.Y. Crv. PRic. L. & R. § 4519 (McKinney 1993).
4. The hostility of the adversary's witness towards the
party against whom he is testifying, may be shown
either on cross-examination by calling other witnesses
to testify to hostile acts and or declarations.
People v. McDowell, 9 N.Y.2d 12, 14, 172 N.E.2d
279, 210 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (1961); People v. Brooks,
131 N.Y. 321, 325, 30 N.E. 189, 190 (1889); People
v. Champen, 97 Misc. 2d 176, 178, 411 N.Y.S.2d
113, 115 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); People v.
Miranda, 176 A.D.2d 494, 495, 574 N.Y.S.2d 563
(1st Dep't 1991), appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 861, 588
N.E.2d 768, 580 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1992); People v. Jus-
tice, 172 A.D.2d 851, 851-52, 569 N.Y.S.2d 456
(1991), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 923, 577 N.E.2d
1068, 573 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1991).
5. The extent, however, to which a party may use this
method-as in all forms of impeachment-rests in the
discretion of the court. But the court may not refuse to
admit all such evidence.
People v. McDowell, 9 N.Y.2d 12, 15, 172 N.E.2d
279, 280, 210 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (1961); People v.
Brooks, 131 N.Y. 321, 325, 30 N.E. 189, 190-91
(1889); People v. Champen, 97 Misc. 2d 176, 411
N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
6. It is not necessary to first ask the adversary's witness
on cross-examination about an alleged act or statement
of hostility in order to prove it through other witnesses.
People v. McDowell, 9 N.Y.2d 12, 15, 172 N.E.2d
279, 210 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (1961).
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P. By Evidence of Conviction: The fact that the adversary's wit-
ness had previously been convicted of a crime may be shown
either by the record or by eliciting an admission on cross-
examination.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4513 (McKinney 1993); CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 60.40 (McKinney 1994).
1. An inquiry on cross examination as to an arrest or
indictment is improper.
2. Only convictions may be asked. While in a criminal pro-
ceeding a witness may be impeached by proof that he
has been convicted of a mere violation, e.g., harassment
(People v. Gray, 41 A.D.2d 125, 126, 341 N.Y.S.2d 485,
486 (3d Dep't 1973), affd, 34 N.Y.2d 903, 316 N.E.2d
719, 359 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1055 (1974); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.40(3) (McKin-
ney 1992)), it has long been the rule in civil actions that
only convictions of crimes may be mentioned. Derrick v.
Wallace, 217 N.Y. 520, 525, 112 N.E. 440, 442 (1916);
Dance v. Southampton, 95 A.D.2d 442, 452-53, 467
N.Y.S.2d 203, 210 (2d Dep't 1983). In no case may traf-
fic infractions be mentioned. Upon adjudication as a
youthful offender, no youth shall be denominated a
criminal by reason of such determination, nor shall such
determination be deemed a conviction. However, the
acts underlying these convictions, if immoral or vicious,
may be inquired into by the adversary. People v. Vidal,
26 N.Y.2d 249, 253-54, 257 N.E.2d 886, 889, 309
N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (1970). Any crime may be inquired
into, even though it does not involve moral turpitude.
Witness must also answer questions as to prior convic-
tions asked during pretrial examinations. Goberman v.
McNamara, 76 Misc. 2d 791, 793, 93 N.Y.S.2d 369, 371
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974); Guarisco v. E. J. Milk
Farms, 90 Misc. 2d 81, 82, 393 N.Y.S.2d 883, 884
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1974).
3. Historically, the same rules applied to a defendant who
elected to testify in a criminal case because this would
chill the desire of a defendant with a prior record to tes-
tify in a criminal prosecution, People v. Sandoval, 34
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N.Y.2d 371, 375, 314 N.E.2d 413, 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849,
854 (1974), announced a new rule: in a criminal action
the court has the discretion to grant a motion (normally
made before trial) to prevent the prosecution from men-
tioning defendant's prior convictions for crimes (e.g.,
murder, rape, assault) that do not significantly reflect
upon the defendant's inclination to tell the truth.
a. The Sandoval rule does not apply to anyone but the
defendant in a criminal prosecution; thus, it does
not extend to a party in civil litigation nor even to a
witness in a criminal case.
People v. Duffy, 44 A.D.2d 298, 300, 354 N.Y.S.2d
672, 673 (2d Dep't 1974), affd, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 326
N.E.2d 804, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 861 (1975); People v. Smoot, 59 A.D.2d 898,
899, 399 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (2d Dep't 1977).
Q. Cross-Examination as to Previous Specific Acts of Miscon-
duct: The adversary's witness, on cross-examination, may be
asked about any immoral, vicious, or criminal act performed
by him in the past, if the act evidences moral turpitude.
Badr v. Hogan, 75 N.Y.2d 629, 634, 554 N.E.2d 890,
892, 555 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (1990).
1. The extent to which the cross-examiner may go rests in
the discretion of the court. People v. Schwartzman, 24
N.Y.2d 241, 244, 247 N.E.2d 642, 644, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817,
820, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969). The cross-exam-
iner must act in good faith. People v. Kass, 25 N.Y.2d
123, 125-26, 250 N.E.2d 219, 221, 302 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809
(1969).
2. An inquiry on cross-examination as to specific acts of
misconduct is an inquiry into a collateral matter. This
means that the cross-examiner is precluded by the wit-
ness's answer, and thus, cannot disprove it by calling
other witnesses or by introducing other evidence. People
v. Zabrocky, 26 N.Y.2d 530, 535, 260 N.E.2d 529, 532,
311 N.Y.S.2d 892, 896 (1970).
3. A witness may be examined as to these acts even though
he was not convicted or even arrested for them. Con-
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versely, the fact that the witness was convicted does not,
as a general matter, preclude an examiner's inquiry into
the details of the crime. If, however, the prosecution
knows that the witness was tried and acquitted of the
act, it is reversible error to inquire into it. If the prose-
cution, in good faith, does not know of the acquittal, the
error may be harmless. Generally, evidence of prior
uncharged criminal conduct may not be admitted as
part of the prosecution's case if its only purpose is to
establish the propensity of the accused to engage in
criminal activities. People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 200,
93 N.E.2d 637, 639 (1950) (permitted to cross-examine
as to other crimes committed by defendant); People v.
Santiago, 15 N.Y.2d 640, 641, 204 N.E.2d 197, 198, 255
N.Y.S.2d 864, 864 (1964) (lower court decision permit-
ting cross-examination regarding criminal charge of
which defendant was acquitted reversed as prejudicial);
People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 250-51, 247
N.E.2d 642, 647, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 825-26, cert. denied,
398 U.S. 846 (1969) (documentary evidence of other mis-
representations of defendant during cross-examination
permissible to show intent to defraud and did not consti-
tute improper impeachment on collateral matter); Peo-
ple v. Mapp, 39 A.D.2d 968, 969, 333 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542
(2d Dep't 1972) (prosecution rebuttal evidence which
tended to establish other crimes not charged in indict-
ment which contradicted defendant's direct answers).
4. Subject to the limitations of the Sandoval case (3,
supra), these rules apply to a defendant in a criminal
case when he elects to testify. People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y.
198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950). But the scope of the inquiry
is limited by its purpose: to impugn the defendant's
credibility. The inquiry may not degenerate into an
attack upon the defendant's character as a person
inclined towards a life of crime of which he stands
indicted. See People v. Moore, 20 A.D.2d 817, 817, 248
N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (2d Dep't 1964) (in manslaughter
case, error for district attorney to offer evidence that
defendant committed two prior assaults in same man-
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ner as one for which he was being prosecuted).
People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 305-306, 61
N.E. 286, 294, 299 (1901); People v. Santarelli, 49
N.Y.2d 241, 247, 401 N.E.2d 199, 202, 425 N.Y.S.2d
77, 81 (1980).
5. In sex offense cases, e.g., rape, the victim may not be
generally impeached by asking about her sexual conduct
unless the conduct is with the defendant.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney 1994);
People v. Williams, 81 N.Y.2d 303, 312, 614 N.E.2d
730, 733, 598 N.Y.S.2d 167, 170 (1993).
R. By Inconsistent Statements: The adversary's witness may be
shown to have made statements inconsistent with a material
part of his testimony on trial.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4515 (McKinney 1993); Milton
Roberts, Annotation, Impeachment of Defense Witnesses
in Criminal Cases By Showing Witness' Prior Silence or
Refusal to Testify, 20 A.L.R. 4th 245 (1992); Larkin v.
Nassau Electric R.R., 205 N.Y. 267, 268-69, 98 N.E. 465,
466 (1912) (plaintiffs witness gave material testimony
in plaintiffs favor, signed and sworn statement contra-
dicting testimony admissible); People v. Dawson, 50
N.Y.2d 311, 318, 406 N.E.2d 771, 775, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914,
919 (1980) (district attorney had right to attempt to
impeach credibility of defendant's alibi witness by cross-
examination on latter's prior failure to come forward to
exculpate her son).
1. A foundation must first be laid.
a. If the inconsistent statement was made orally, the
witness must first be asked on cross-examination if
he made the statement, specifying the time, place,
person to whom made, and substance of language
used. If witness denies making the statement, a
proper foundation is laid.
Loughlin v. Brassil, 187 N.Y. 128, 134, 79 N.E. 854,
856 (1907); People v. Duncan, 46 N.Y.2d 74, 80, 385
N.E.2d 572, 576, 412 N.Y.S.2d 833, 838, cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979).
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b. If the inconsistent statement is in writing, the writ-
ing must be shown to the witness, and the witness
asked whether he wrote or signed it.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.35 (McKinney 1994);
Rometze v. East River National Bank, 49 N.Y. 577,
579 (1872); People v. Cartagena, 160 A.D.2d 608,
554 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253 (1st Dep't 1990).
c. If the inconsistent statement is that of a party, no
foundation is required since the statement is then
admissible as an admission.
2. Types of prior inconsistent statements admissible:
a. Statements made in pleadings or affidavits by an
agent of a party within the scope of his authority.
People v. Rivera, 58 A.D.2d 147, 148, 396 N.Y.S.2d
26, 28 (1st Dep't 1977), affd, 45 N.Y.2d 989, 385
N.E.2d 1073, 413 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1978).
b. Statements given and signed by a witness to a
detective.
Robbins v. New York City Trans. Auth., 105 A.D.2d
616, 617, 481 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350 (1st Dep't 1984).
c. Witness's prior inconsistent statements made by
him at an earlier trial.
Millington v. New York City Trans. Auth., 54
A.D.2d 649, 649, 387 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867 (1st Dep't
1976).
3. The traditional rule has been that these prior state-
ments are admissible only to impeach the witness and
not to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein.
Cf Letendre v. Hartford Accid. & Indem. Co., 21 N.Y. 2d
518, 523-24, 236 N.E.2d 467, 470, 289 N.Y.S.2d 183, 188
(1968) (in action by employer against fidelity insurer to
recover for employee defalcation, admissions by
employee that he stole money admissible to prove theft,
not merely to impeach employee who subsequently
denied theft at trial); Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d
211, 224-25, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 131 (2d Dep't 1975).
4. In a criminal trial, the defense has the right to inspect
and to use on cross-examination any pretrial statement
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given by the witness to the authorities, provided the
statement relates to the witness's testimony, and "that
the necessities of effective law enforcement do not
require that the statement be kept secret or confiden-
tial."
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 1994);
People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 290, 173 N.E.2d
881, 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, 451, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 866 (1961).
a. The Rosario rule has been extended in many
instances.
People v. Fasano, 11 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 184 N.E.2d
289, 293, 230 N.Y.S.2d 689, 696 (1969) (grand jury
minutes); People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 158-59,
480 N.E.2d 361, 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750 (1985)
(taped statements given to private parties, not
involved in law enforcement or prosecution); People
v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 90-91, 349 N.E.2d 694,
697, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70 (statements of prosecution
witness at suppression hearings); People v. Gilli-
gan, 39 N.Y.2d 769, 770, 349 N.E.2d 879, 879, 384
N.Y.S.2d 778, 778 (notes and reports of investigat-
ing officers); People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446,
453, 354 N.E.2d 801, 804, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65
(1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977) (prosecu-
tors work sheets); In re Kelvin D., 40 N.Y.2d 895,
896, 357 N.E.2d 1005, 1006, 389 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351
(1976) (family court juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings).
b. This is a matter of right only after the witness has
testified.
People v. Giles, 31 Misc. 2d 354, 354, 220 N.Y.S.2d
905, 906-07 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1961);
Vartanesian v. Purcell, 57 Misc. 2d 217, 217, 292
N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (1968) (declined to extend Rosa-
rio to civil actions).
c. In People v. Damon, 30 A.D.2d 640, 291 N.Y.S.2d
287 (4th Dep't 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 24
N.Y.2d 256, 247 N.E.2d 651, 299 N.Y.S.2d 830
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(1969), this principle was extended to defendant's
witnesses. After such a witness has testified, the
prosecution is entitled to any statements made by
that witness which the defendant may have. This
has been held not to violate the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights. See United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975).
S. By Reputation Evidence: The adversary's witness may be
shown to have a bad reputation for truth and veracity.
Carlson v. Winterson, 147 N.Y. 652, 656 (1895); People v.
Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 291, 451 N.E.2d 210, 221, 464
N.Y.S.2d 458, 462 (1983).
1. The witness testifying to the bad reputation of another
must first be qualified in generally the same manner as
a character witness is qualified.
People v. Barber, 74 N.Y.2d 653, 655, 541 N.E.2d
394, 395, 543 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (1989).
2. The reputation witness, on direct examination, may not
refer to specific acts committed by the attacked witness,
nor may he give his own personal opinion of the
attacked witness's reliability. He must limit himself to
reporting the witness's reputation, although he is then
permitted to answer the question: "Based upon your
knowledge of this reputation, would you believe the wit-
ness under oath?"
Elmendorf v. Ross, 221 A.D. 376, 377, 222 N.Y.S.
737, 738 (3d Dep't 1927); People v. Streitferdt, 169
A.D.2d 171, 175, 572, N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1st Dep't),
appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 1015, 581 N.E.2d 1069,
575 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1991).
a. New York along with a majority of jurisdictions,
holds that it is improper to allow inquiries as to the
general moral character, as distinguished from spe-
cific immoral acts, of the witness for the purposes of
impeaching his credibility.
b. General Rule: witness by taking the stand, puts in
issue his character or reputation for truthfulness
and may be impeached by testimony of other wit-
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nesses.
Carlson v. Winterson, 147 N.Y. 652, 656, 42 N.E.
347, 348 (1895); People v. Hinksman, 192 N.Y. 421,
430, 85 N.E. 676, 679 (1908); People v. Pavao, 59
N.Y.2d 282, 291, 451 N.E.2d 216, 221, 464 N.Y.S.2d
458, 462 (1983).
T. By Evidence of Intoxication, Insanity: Mental or physical
weakness of the adversary's witness at the time of the event
or at the time of the trial may be shown on cross-examination
or by other witnesses, or by both.
People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73, 81-82, 34 N.E. 730, 732
(1893); Ellarson v. Ellarson, 198 A.D. 103, 105-06, 190
N.Y.S. 6, 9 (3d Dep't 1921); People v. Freshley, 87 A.D.2d
104, 110, 451 N.Y.S.2d 73, 77 (1st Dep't 1982).
1. That the witness is a drug addict is admissible to
impeach the witness; but a psychiatrist may not add
that all "mainliners" are pathological liars, incapable of
telling the truth.
People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 18, 24-25, 159 N.E.2d
549, 551-53, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, 755-56 (1959); Peo-
ple v. Freeland, 36 N.Y.2d 518, 526, 330 N.E.2d
611, 615, 369 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (1975).
2. That the witness is an alcoholic is not admissible unless
there is some evidence that he was intoxicated at the
time about which he is now testifying.
Tinney v. Neilson's Flowers, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 717,
717-18, 305 N.Y.S.2d 713, 714 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County), affd, 35 A.D.2d 532, 314 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d
Dep't 1969).
U. Rehabilitation of Witness-Admissibility of Previous Consis-
tent Statements: The general rule is that a witness cannot
corroborate the testimony which he gives on the trial by
showing he made statements of the same tenor before trial.
People v. McClean, 69 N.Y.2d 426, 428, 508 N.E.2d 140,
141, 515 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (1987); People v. Davis, 44
N.Y.2d 269, 277, 376 N.E.2d 901, 905, 405 N.Y.S.2d 428,
432 (1978).
1. But where the witness's testimony has been attacked as
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a recent fabrication, he may show prior consistent state-
ments made at a time when there was no motive to mis-
represent.
People v. McDaniel, 81 N.Y.2d 10, 18, 611 N.E.2d
265, 270, 595 N.Y.S.2d 364, 369 (1993).
a. This method of rehabilitation may be used only
where the cross-examiner suggested a motive
which would lead the witness to lie at trial.
People v. Baker, 23 N.Y.2d 307, 322-23, 244 N.E.2d
232, 239, 296 N.Y.S.2d 745, 755 (1968).
V. Scientific Truth Determinants: The result of a lie detector test
(Sowa v. Looney, 23 N.Y.2d 329, 334, 244 N.E.2d 243, 245,
296 N.Y.S.2d 760, 764 (1968); People v. Periera, 35 N.Y.2d
301, 306-07, 319 N.E.2d 413, 416-17, 361 N.Y.S.2d 148, 152-
53 (1974)) or the so-called truth serums (People v. Brownsky,
35 Misc. 2d 134, 134-35, 228 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477-78 (1962)) are
inadmissible for any purpose.
VI. HEARSAY
A. Definition: Evidence of an out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
People v. Egan, 78 A.D.2d 34, 35, 434 N.Y.S.2d 55, 77
(4th Dep't 1980); People v. Edwards, 47 N.Y.2d 493, 392
N.E.2d 1229, 419 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1979); People v. Caviness,
38 N.Y.2d 227, 342 N.E.2d 496, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695
(1975).
1. Hearsay evidence may be oral or written, or may even
take the form of conduct.
Egan, 78 A.D.2d at 35, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 57; People v.
Nieves, 67 N.Y.2d 125, 131 n.1, 492 N.E.2d 109, 112
n.1, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 n.1 (1986); Caviness, 38
N.Y.2d at 230, 342 N.E.2d at 498, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
698; Boshen v. Stockwell, 224 N.Y. 356, 120 N.E.
728 (1918); James K Thompson Co. v. Interna-
tional Compositions Co., 191 A.D. 553, 181 N.Y.S.
637 (1st Dep't 1920).
2. A hearsay risk is created any time the jury is required to
rely on the testimonial attributes of a declarant in order
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to find a fact as true, and yet, the declarant is not pres-
ent in court for cross-examination. If cross-examination
of the declarant would be of no use because his state-
ment is not being used assertively, then there is no
hearsay risk.
3. A declarant is a person who makes a statement.
People v. Harding, 37 N.Y.2d 130, 135, 332 N.E.2d
354, 358, 371 N.Y.S.2d 493, 497 (1975) (Cooke, J.,
concurring).
4. Hearsay that does not fall within an exception must be
excluded from evidence.
People v. Jardin, 154 Misc. 2d 172, 174, 584
N.Y.S.2d 732, 733-34 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County)
("Absent a demonstrated applicable exception, any
out-of-court statement offered in court to establish
the truth of the facts asserted therein constitutes
inadmissible hearsay.").
a. If there are several links in the chain of hearsay
(e.g., A told B, who repeated it to C, who then
passed it on to D), each link will have to be inde-
pendently justified as an exception to the hearsay
rule.
B. Categories of Non-Hearsay: The hearsay rule does not exclude
evidence offered to prove the fact that a statement was made
rather than to prove the fact asserted by the statement.
1. Verbal Acts: the utterance of the words is treated as a
physical act, and thus, the truth or falsity of the words
is irrelevant. Verbal acts are generally of two types:
a. Material verbal acts: words, the utterance of which
the pleadings make an issue in the case; e.g, a wit-
ness's testimony as to the defamatory words
uttered by the defendant, words of an offer, of an
acceptance, of a bribe, among other things.
b. Words as the springboard of an inference: X said
"the light is red," when offered, not to prove the
color of the light, but simply to prove that X could
talk (assuming that X's ability to talk is relevant).
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2. Words which would have a relevant effect on the state of
mind of the listener: where the listener's belief is rele-
vant. For example, threats made to the defendant by
the victim of a homicide.
Fgerrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 19-20, 152
N.E.2d 249, 251, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (1958)
(plaintiff's testimony that dermatologist told her
she had cancer from allegedly improper x-ray treat-
ments was admissible to show basis for cancer pho-
bia); People v. Gilmore, 66 N.Y.2d 863, 866, 489
N.E.2d 721, 723, 498 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (1985)
(defendant improperly prevented from testifying
about conversation with his mother-in-law, purpose
of which was to show that his flight may have been
motivated by facts other than consciousness of
guilt).
3. Words which indicate circumstantially the state of mind
of the speaker: a statement made without regard for its
truth, may indicate circumstantially the state of mind of
the speaker.
People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 102 N.E. 546 (1913);
Loetsch v. NYC Omnibus Corp., 291 N.Y. 308, 52
N.E.2d 448 (1943).
a. All statements which are used to indicate circum-
stantially the speaker's knowledge, reason, belief,
intent, emotion or other state or condition of mind
are not hearsay. See People v. Reynoso, 73 N.Y.2d
816, 534 N.E.2d 30, 537 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1988); Peo-
ple v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 102 N.E. 546 (1913);
Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N.Y. 157 (1854). When
the statements are offered, not as testimony to the
fact asserted, but to indicate circumstantially the
state of mind of the speaker, they are not rendered
inadmissible by the hearsay rule, provided that
such declarations were made spontaneously natu-
rally, and under circumstances free from suspicion.
See Kynast v. Dora Holding Corp., 21 A.D.2d 865,
250 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1st Dep't 1964); Bergstein v.
Board of Ed., 34 N.Y.2d 318, 313 N.E.2d 767, 357
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N.Y.S.2d 465 (1974).
b. Statements of X's intention may be admissible as
circumstantial evidence that X performed the
intended act. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon,
145 U.S. 285 (1892). Additionally, if the circum-
stances are appropriate, X's declaration of intent to
participate in conduct with Y is admissible as evi-
dence that Y also engaged in the conduct in ques-
tion. See People v. Malizia, 92 A.D.2d 154, 460
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1st Dep't 1983), affd, 62 N.Y.2d 755,
465 N.E.2d 364, 476 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 932 (1984). But see People v. Slaughter, 189
A.D.2d 157, 596 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dep't 1993) (X's
statement "Y is going to kill me," cannot be used as
proof of Y's intent or conduct or both because state-
ment did not reveal any intent on part of declar-
ant).
c. The failure of other persons to complain about the
quality of food is inadmissible in an action for
breach of warranty when offered to prove that the
food was wholesome.
James K Thompson Co. v. International Composi-
tions Co., 191 A.D. 553, 181 N.Y.S. 637 (1st Dep't
1920).
EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE
C. Admission of Former Testimony:
1. In a civil case, CPLR 4517 states that the following ele-
ments are necessary to introduce former testimony into
evidence:
a. Both actions must involve the same parties or their
representatives;
b. Both actions must involve the same subject matter;
(1) Note: The requirement that the parties and the
subject matter be the same is intended "to
insure that the party against whom the testi-
mony is now offered had an adequate opportu-
nity to cross-examine the witness" in the prior
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proceeding. See Healey v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d
202, 208-209, 173 N.E.2d 777, 780, 213
N.Y.S.2d 44, 48-49 (1961). Therefore, testi-
mony given by a now-deceased witness in a
criminal proceeding is admissible against the
defendant in a subsequent civil action involving
the same subject matter. See Healey, supra.
(2) It is, of course, unnecessary that the precise
cause of action be the same in both proceedings.
See In re White's Will, 2 N.Y.2d 309, 141 N.E.2d
416, 160 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1957).




(3) physical or mental illness;
(4) absence beyond the jurisdiction of the court to
compel appearance;
(5) absence because the proponent of his statement
does not know and with reasonable diligence
has been unable to ascertain his whereabouts;
or
(6) because the witness has become incompetent to
testify by virtue of CPLR 4519, the "deadman's"
statute.
Comment: the Rule provides that the former testi-
mony may not be used if the witness's unavailabil-
ity was procured through the culpable neglect or
wrongdoing of the party offering the evidence.
d. Although CPLR 4517 is comprehensive in its state-
ment of the former testimony exception to the hear-
say rule, there exists, side-by-side with the statute,
a common-law exception for former testimony. The
CPLR covers testimony given "at a former trial."
The common-law exception extends to testimony
given under oath and subject to cross-examination,
even though there was no former "trial." This
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would apply to former administrative hearings and
may apply to arbitration hearings. See Fluery v.
Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334, 200 N.E.2d 550, 251
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1964). The common-law exception,
however, does not apply to criminal cases, which
continue to be governed solely by CRIM. PROC. LAw
§ 670.10. See People v. Harding, 37 N.Y.2d 130,
332 N.E.2d 354, 371 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1975).
e. The former testimony may be read against a person
who is in privity with a party to the first action.
The term "privity" is still given its narrow, com-
mon-law definition: mutual or successive interest
in the same property. The following are in privity:
grantor-grantee; testator-executor; life tenant-
remainderman; joint tenants.
2. Criminal Procedure Law §§ 670.10 & 670.20 govern the
admissibility of former testimony in criminal actions.
See N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAw §§ 670.10 and 670.20 (McKin-
ney 1992). The elements required under this section
are:
a. The same defendant must be involved;
b. There must be the same charge;
c. The witness must be unavailable because of death,
illness or incapacity, or because the witness cannot
with due diligence be brought before the court.
(1) Comment: If the witness's presence can be com-
pelled, even though he is outside the state, it is
a violation of the defendant's sixth amendment
right of confrontation to read in the former tes-
timony. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968).
d. Criminal Procedure Law § 670.20 requires advance
notice that the testimony is to be used and a copy of
the testimony must be furnished to the other side
before it is read in court.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 670.20 (McKinney 1992).
3. Comments:
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a. Former testimony is subject to all objections to
admissibility "other than hearsay."
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4517 (McKinney 1992).
b. If the court during a former trial lacked jurisdic-
tion, or if the adversary had no opportunity to
cross-examine, the testimony may not be read at a
subsequent trial. In a criminal case, the absence of
counsel is tantamount to a denial of opportunity to
cross-examine. Testimony taken against defendant
without counsel could not thereafter be used
against defendant.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
D. Admissions: An admission is an act or declaration of a party
which is inconsistent with his position at trial. See Dlugosz v.
Exchange Mutual Ins. Co., 176 A.D.2d 1011, 574 N.Y.S.2d
864 (3d Dep't 1991); Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E.
737 (1899). It is received at trial as evidence-in-chief as an
exception to the hearsay rule. See Iannieli v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 75 A.D.2d 223, 227, 428 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (2d
Dep't 1980). Unlike a declaration against interest (E, infra),
the statement need not be against the interest of the party at
the time it is made.
1. The weight of an admission is for the jury. However, as
a matter of policy, an admission alone is not sufficient to
prove certain issues; e.g., in an action brought to annul a
marriage, "the declaration or confession of either party
to the marriage is not alone sufficient as proof." See
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 144 (McKinney 1992). Addition-
ally, the admission of a decedent is deemed the weakest
kind of evidence in an action against his estate.
2. Explanation of admissions: When an act or declaration
of a party is received in evidence as an admission, the
party against whom it is admitted has the right to offer
an explanation.
Chamberlain v. Iba, 181 N.Y. 486, 74 N.E. 481
(1905); Ando v. Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, 168
N.E.2d 520, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1960); Xerox v. Kuhn,
133 Misc. 2d 1107, 509 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1986).
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3. Classification of admissions: Admissions are either judi-
cial or extrajudicial.
a. Judicial admissions are admissions made on the
record of, or in connection with judicial proceed-
ings.
b. Extrajudicial admissions are admissions made
outside the course of, or unconnected with judicial
proceedings.
c. Judicial admissions are either formal or informal.
(1) A formal judicial admission is one made by the
pleadings, stipulations, or a formal notice to
admit (CPLR 3123). See East Egg Associates v.
Diraffaele, 158 Misc. 2d 364, 600 N.Y.S.2d 999
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. New York County 1993)
(unqualified statements in pleadings constitute
formal judicial admissions). A formal judicial
admission (e.g., plea of guilty to an indictment,
or an admission in an answer) is conclusive of
the facts in the action in which it is made. See
People v. Rivera, 45 N.Y.2d 989, 385 N.E.2d
1073, 413 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1978).
(2) An informal judicial admission (e.g., one made
at an examination before trial, or on the stand
in court) are not conclusive but are merely evi-
dence of the fact or facts admitted. See Hill v.
King Kullen Grocery Co., 181 A.D.2d 812, 581
N.Y.S.2d 378 (2d Dep't 1992). As a general
rule, judicial admissions are only binding and
conclusive in the proceeding in which they are
made. In other separate actions, they are con-
verted to informal judicial admissions, receiva-
ble in evidence as an admission, but subject to
being contradicted or explained away. See Peo-
ple v. Jacobs, 149 A.D.2d 112, 544 N.Y.S.2d
1011 (3d Dep't 1989); Ando v. Woodberry, 8
N.Y.2d 165, 168 N.E. 2d 520, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74
(1960) (defendant's plea of guilty to traffic
infraction is admissible against him as an infor-
1993]
330 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
mal judicial admission in later civil action aris-
ing out of same facts). A formal judicial
admission, which is withdrawn, may in that
same action become an informal judicial admis-
sion. McNulty v. Zaganos, 255 A.D.2d 274, 7
N.Y.S.2d 446 (1st Dep't 1938) (statements in
original answer are admissible although super-
seded by amended answer). A withdrawn plea
of guilty is, however, not admissible against
defendant on the trial arising from his substi-
tuted plea of not guilty. See People v. Spitaleri,
9 N.Y.2d 168, 173 N.E.2d 35, 212 N.Y.S.2d 53
(1961).
d. Extrajudicial admissions are sometimes called ordi-
nary or evidential admissions. The legal effect of
an extrajudicial admission and of an informal judi-
cial admission is exactly the same: some evidence of
the truth of the matters admitted.
4. An admission may be receivable against a party even
though it appears that the party did not have personal
knowledge of the facts admitted. See Reed v. McCord,
160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737 (1899). The reason for the
rule that a party's admission may be receivable even
though he does not himself have first-hand knowledge of
the facts, is that it is highly improbable that a party will
admit anything against himself unless it is true. See
Reed, supra; Cox v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 693, 698-99, 148
N.E.2d 879, 881-82, 171 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (1958).
a. The admission of a child too young to comprehend
the obligation of an oath is still admissible if the
child possesses other testimonial attributes.
Gangi v. Fradus, 227 N.Y. 452, 125 N.E. 677
(1920).
5. Admission by conduct: Conduct of a party which is
inconsistent with the position maintained by the party
in court is admissible as an admission by conduct.
Walden v. Walden, 41 A.D.2d 664, 340 N.Y.S.2d 709
(2d Dep't 1973). E.g., in a homicide case, defendant
was found burying the body; in a civil action,
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defendant disposed of most of his assets during the
litigation.
6. Silence as an admission: Failure to answer a charge will
be regarded as an admission if the person to whom the
charge was made understood it, had the opportunity to
respond, and would naturally have responded if the
statement was untrue.
a. In order for silence to be construed as an admis-
sion, the following requirements must be satisfied:
(1) The statement must have been made in the
presence of the person charged, see People v.
Harcourt, 89 Misc. 262, 153 N.Y.S. 5 (N.Y.C.
Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1915), and must have
been fully heard and comprehended. See People
v. Prince, 192 A.D.2d 903, 244 N.Y.S.2d 820 (2d
Dep't 1963). Accordingly, presumption of acqui-
escence arises where a person is asleep, intoxi-
cated, deaf, or a foreigner unable to understand
the language in which the statement was made.
See People v. Koerner, 154 N.Y. 355, 48 N.E. 730
(1897); People v. Lourido, 70 N.Y.2d 428, 522
N.Y.S.2d 98, 516 N.E.2d 698 (1987) (held error
to admit testimony that defendant when told of
nature of accusation against him responded by
shrug of shoulders where it was not shown that
he understood English).
(2) The person to whom the charge was made must
have been physically and mentally capable of
replying to the charge.
People v. Koerner, 154 N.Y. 355, 48 N.E. 730
(1897); People v. Kennedy, 164 N.Y. 449, 58
N.E. 652 (1900); People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222,
225, 90 N.E.2d 48, 51 (1949); People v. Benanti,
158 A.D.2d 698, 551 N.Y.S.2d 963 (2d Dep't
1990).
(3) The circumstances must be such as would natu-
rally call for contradiction or reply from persons
similarly situated.
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People v. Rhodes, 96 A.D.2d 565, 465 N.Y.S.2d
249 (2d Dep't 1983) (was reasonable for defend-
ant to remain silent rather than respond to
statements and thereby incur additional wrath
from obviously hostile crowd); People v. Egan,
78 A.D.2d 34, 434 N.Y.S.2d 55 (4th Dep't 1980)
(wife's silence, when she would naturally be
expected to deny her husband's accusation, was
tacit admission of its truth).
b. A person placed under arrest is under no obligation
to make a statement. Therefore, his silence in face
of an accusation is not an admission. He may not be
asked on cross-examination why he never told his
version of the facts until the trial.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); People v. Rutig-
liano, 261 N.Y. 103, 184 N.E. 689 (1933).
c. As a general matter, a party is not obligated to
answer a letter mailed by his adversary.
Viele v. McLean, 200 N.Y. 260, 93 N.E. 468 (1910);
Learned v. Tillotson, 97 N.Y. 1 (1884).
7. Persons against whom an admission is receivable:
a. An admission is receivable against the party who
made the statement.
Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737 (1899);
Mindlin v. Dorfman, 197 A.D. 770, 189 N.Y.S. 265
(1st Dep't 1921).
b. The declaration of an agent is receivable against
his principal as an admission only if made within
the scope of his authority; i.e., when the declaration
was authorized by the principal, expressly or
impliedly.
Spett v. President Monroe Bldg. & Mfg. Corp., 19
N.Y.2d 203, 225 N.E.2d 527, 278 N.Y.S.2d 826
(1967); Risoli v. Long Island Lighting Co., 195
A.D.2d 543, 600 N.Y.S.2d 497 (2d Dep't 1993).
(1) Authority to perform an act (e.g., to drive a
truck) does not imply authority to make state-
ments about the act.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 286.
(2) An admission made by any partner concerning
partnership affairs within the scope of his
authority is binding upon his copartners,
because as to such matters each partner is
deemed the agent of the others.
N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAw § 22 (McKinney 1988);
see also Vogt v. Tully, 53 N.Y.2d 580, 428
N.E.2d 847, 444 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1981); Caplan v.
Caplan, 268 N.Y. 445, 198 N.E. 23 (1935).
(3) Coconspirators are "partners in crime." Hence,
an admission of one coconspirator is admissible
against another coconspirator as long as those
statements were made during the course of and
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
People v. Salko, 47 N.Y.2d 230, 391 N.E.2d 976,
417 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1979); People v. Liccione, 63
A.D.2d 305, 407 N.Y.S.2d 753 (4th Dep't 1978),
affd, 50 N.Y.2d 850, 407 N.E.2d 1333, 430
N.Y.S.2d 36 (1980); People v. Davis, 56 N.Y. 95
(1874).
(4) In all the foregoing cases, the agency or conspir-
acy must be proven independently of the
"agent's" extra-judicial declarations that he is
an "agent."
People v. Bac Tran, 80 N.Y.2d 170, 179, 603
N.E.2d 950, 589 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850 (1992).
c. An admission is also admissible against a person in
privity with the person making the admission. See,
e.g., Hayes v. Claessens, 234 N.Y. 230, 137 N.E. 313
(1922) (admission of one joint owner admissible
against other); Chadwick v. Fonner, 69 N.Y. 404
(1877) (admission of former owner of real property
made at time he held title or apparent title was
admissible against those who claimed under him).
Privity in this context, generally means the same
as in the hearsay exception for former testimony
(see C. 1. e., supra). However, certain extensions
have occurred.
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(1) A statement by an employee that he stole
money has been admitted in his employer's
action against an insurer on a fidelity bond.
Letendre v. Hartford Accid. & Indem. Co., 21
N.Y.2d 518, 236 N.E.2d 467, 289 N.Y.S.2d 183
(1968).
d. If there are two or more parties, the admission of
one is receivable against him, but in the absence of
authority, not against his coparty.
(1) However, in a contested will probate case where
there are two or more legatees, the admission of
one is not receivable even against the legatee
who made it. Since the will must stand or fall
as a unit, it is not possible to limit the effect of
the admission to the party who made it.
In re Meyer, 184 N.Y. 54, 76 N.E. 920 (1906); In
re Kennedy, 167 N.Y. 163, 60 N.E. 442 (1901);
In re Esterheld, 173 Misc. 1056, 19 N.Y.S.2d
572 (Yates County Ct. 1940).
e. An admission by a nominal party is not receivable
against a real party; e.g., an admission by a guard-
ian ad litem is not admissible against the infant.
See Hermace v. Slopey, 32 A.D.2d 573, 299 N.Y.S.2d
38 (3d Dep't 1969). Nevertheless, an admission by
the real party is receivable against the nominal
party.
(1) An executor is not regarded as a nominal party
within the above rule. See Strang v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 263 N.Y. 71, 188 N.E. 161 (1933). An
admission made by an executor within the
scope of his authority is, therefore, admissible
against the estate.
f. A declaration concerning real property made by a
person at a time when he had actual or apparent
interest in the property is receivable against all
subsequent possessors except where the declara-
tion would tend to destroy record title.
Chadwick v. Fonner, 69 N.Y. 404 (1877).
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g. A declaration concerning personal property made
by a person at a time when he had actual or appar-
ent interest in the property is not receivable
against a subsequent purchaser or assignee for
value.
Merkle v. Beidleman, 165 N.Y. 21, 58 N.E. 757
(1900).
E. Declarations Against Interest:
1. Unlike an admission, which may be used only against
the party who made it or his privies in interest, a decla-
ration against interest may be introduced in evidence
"by or against anyone."
People v. Brensic, 70 N.Y.2d 9, 14-15, 509 N.E.2d
1226, 1228, 517 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (1987); Kelleher
v. F.M.E. Auto Leasing Corp., 192 A.D.2d 581, 596
N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dep't 1993).
a. Theory underlying the admission of declarations
against interest: Assurance that the evidence is
reliable flows from the belief that a person ordina-
rily does not reveal facts that are contrary to his or
her own interest.
People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 295, 385 N.E.2d
1245, 1248, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319 (1978).
2. A declaration against interest may be received if the fol-
lowing conditions are satisfied:
a. The declarant is unavailable.
(1) In Alexander Grant's Sons v. Phoenix Assur.
Co., 25 A.D.2d 93, 267 N.Y.S.2d 220 (4th Dep't
1966), the court held that death is not the only
ground for unavailability. In this case, the court
held that unavailability due to absence from
jurisdiction, and unavailability due to a wit-
ness's refusal to testify on the ground of privi-
lege against self-incrimination, satisfied the
first element.
Accord People v. Shortridge, 65 N.Y.2d 309, 480
N.E.2d 1080, 491 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1985); People v.
Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308
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N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970).
b. The declaration must have been against proprie-
tary, pecuniary, or penal interest when made.
(1) Prior to People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257
N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970) a declara-
tion against penal interest, as distinguished
from pecuniary or proprietary interest, did not
fall within the declaration against interest
exception. However, in Brown, the Court of
Appeals modernized the New York rule, and
held that a declaration against penal interest
would be admissible "where material."
(2) A declaration which indicates that the declar-
ant is liable for civil damages is against pecuni-
ary interest.
Letendre v. Hartford Accid. & Indem. Co., 21
N.Y.2d 518, 236 N.E.2d 467, 289 N.Y.S.2d 183
(1968).
c. The declarant must have had competent knowledge
of the facts (this was not a requirement for admis-
sions).
d. The declarant must have had no motive to misrep-
resent the facts.
People v. Shortridge, 65 N.Y.2d 309, 312, 480
N.E.2d 1080, 1082, 491 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (1985)
(presence of strong motivation to fabricate or
absence of supporting evidence may, without more,
be sufficient to render declaration against penal
interest inadmissible as matter of law); Mills v.
Davis, 113 N.Y. 243, 21 N.E. 68 (1889).
e. At least when the statement is against the declar-
ant's penal interest, some proof is needed
"independent of the declaration itself, which tends
to confirm the truth of the facts asserted therein."
See People v. Shortridge, 65 N.Y.2d 309, 312, 480
N.E.2d 1080, 1082, 491 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (1985);
People v. Riccardi, 73 Misc. 2d 19, 21, 340 N.Y.S.2d
996, 998 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1972).
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3. Comments:
a. A declaration against interest is admissible even as
against strangers. There is no requirement of priv-
ity between the declarant and the party against
whom or in whose favor the evidence is being
offered.
People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308
N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970); Thompkins v. Fonda Glove
Co., 188 N.Y.261, 80 N.E. 933 (1907); Livingston v.
Arnoux, 56 N.Y. 507 (1874).
b. Collateral facts connected with the declaration
against interest are also admissible.
Livingston v. Arnoux, 56 N.Y. 507 (1874).
c. Declarations against interest may be oral, written,
or may consist of acts.
People v. Kennedy, 122 A.D.2d 225, 504 N.Y.S.2d
756 (2d Dep't 1986).
d. The declarant must be aware that the declaration
is against interest at the time he makes the state-
ment.
People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 298, 385 N.E.2d
1245, 1250, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 321 (1978);
Ellwanger v. Whiteford, 15 A.D.2d 898, 225
N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st Dep't 1962), affd, 12 N.Y.2d
1037, 190 N.E.2d 24, 239 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1963).
F. Dying Declarations:
1. Dying declarations are admissible in homicide cases as
an exception to the hearsay rule because they are
believed reliable and necessary. Necessity flows from
the unavailability of the declarant due to death. Relia-
bility is found in the belief "that the fear of impending
death is at least as conducive to producing the truth...
as an oath is to tell the truth."
People v. Nieves, 67 N.Y.2d 125, 132, 492 N.E.2d
109, 113, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1986); People v. Lic-
cione, 63 A.D.2d 305, 314, 407 N.Y.S.2d 753, 758
(4th Dep't 1978), affd, 50 N.Y.2d 850, 407 N.E.2d
1333, 430 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1980).
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2. Elements:
a. The declarant must be in extremis.
b. The declarant must have spoken under a sense of
impending death and with no hope of recovery.
c. The declarant must have been one who, if he were
alive, would have been a competent witness.
3. Comments:
a. A dying declaration is admissible only in prosecu-
tions for homicide where the death of the declarant
is the subject of the charge. Only those declara-
tions which bear upon the facts and circumstances
of the declarant's death are admissible.
People v. Little, 83 Misc. 2d 321, 323, 371 N.Y.S.2d
726, 729 (Yates County Ct. 1975).
b. The declaration may be made orally, by acts or in
writing.
In re Limberg, 277 N.Y. 129, 13 N.E.2d 605 (1938)
(written declaration of testator admissible); People
v. Madas, 201 N.Y. 349, 94 N.E. 857 (1911).
c. It is for the jury to determine what weight will be
given to the dying declaration. See People v. Little,
83 Misc. 2d 321, 329, 371 N.Y.S.2d 726, 734 (Yates
County Ct. 1975). However, whether such a decla-
ration was made under circumstances which entitle
it to be admitted into evidence is a preliminary
question for the court to decide. See People v.
Ludkowitz, 266 N.Y. 233, 239, 194 N.E. 688, 690
(1935); People v. Smith, 104 N.Y. 491, 10 N.E. 873
(1887).
(1) The trial court is required to charge, upon
request, that the dying declaration is not
regarded as having the same value as sworn
testimony given in open court.
People v. Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 161, 81 N.E.2d
65, 69 (1948).
G. Business Records: CPLR 4518(a) provides that an entry of an
act, transaction, occurrence, or event is admissible in evi-
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dence if it was made in the regular course of any business, it
was the regular course of such business to make such an
entry, and the entry was made at the time of the event or
within a reasonable time thereafter. "All other circum-
stances of the making of the memorandum or record, includ-
ing lack of personal knowledge by the maker, may be proved
to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility."
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4518(a) (McKinney 1992).
1. The rationale for admissibility is that business records
are generally reliable and trustworthy because busi-
nesses depend upon the accurate recording to function
effectively. As the Court of Appeals expressed in People
v. Kennedy, 68 N.Y.2d 569, 579, 503 N.E.2d 501, 507,
510 N.Y.S.2d 853, 859 (1986): "[R]ecords systematically
made for the conduct of the business as a business are
inherently trustworthy because they are routine reflec-
tions of day-to-day operations and because the entrant's
obligation is to have them truthful and accurate for pur-
poses of the conduct of the enterprise."
2. The term "business" includes a business, profession,
occupation, and calling of any kind.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4518(a) (McKinney 1992);
see also People v. Kennedy, 68 N.Y.2d 569, 503
N.E.2d. 501, 510 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1986); People v.
Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136, 497 N.E.2d 657, 506
N.Y.S.2d 290 (1986); People v. Farrel, 58 N.Y.2d
637, 444 N.E.2d 978, 458 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1982).
a. A purely private document is not considered a
"business" document (e.g., a personal diary is not a
business record, no matter how regularly kept).
See People v. Kennedy, 68 N.Y.2d 569, 577, 503
N.E.2d 501, 506, 510 N.Y.S.2d 853, 858 (1986)
(writing falls outside scope of CPLR 4518(a) if it
records purely personal acts or events); Paretta v.
Yuhas, 298 N.Y. 756, 83 N.E.2d 155 (1948) (bro-
ker's diary inadmissible although he recorded busi-
ness information therein). Also beyond the scope of
the rule are business papers received from another
business entity, even if the recipient regularly files
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the papers. See Standard Textile Co. v. National
Equipment Rental, Ltd., 80 A.D.2d 911, 437
N.Y.S.2d 398 (2d Dep't 1981). But see Prestige
Fabrics v. Novik & Co., 60 A.D.2d 517, 399
N.Y.S.2d 680 (1st Dep't 1977).
3. If the requirements of CPLR 4518(a) are met, the fact
that the records may be those of an illegal enterprise is
itself of no consequence.
People v. Kennedy, 68 N.Y.2d 569, 576, 503 N.E.2d
501, 505, 510 N.Y.S.2d 853, 857 (1986) (holding
loan shark's records of his transactions could qual-
ify for hearsay exception).
4. If the document qualifies as a business record, then it
may be admitted without calling as a witness the person
who made the record.
Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389,
34 N.E.2d 367 (1941).
a. It makes no difference that the record is "self-serv-
ing."
United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969); Pub-
lisher's Book Bindery, Inc. v. Ziegelheim, 184 Misc.
2d 559, 560-61, 54 N.Y.S.2d 798, 800 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1st Dep't 1945) (fact that business record is self-
serving affects only weight, not admissibility).
b. However, a self-serving record prepared by a party
specifically for the purposes of litigation may be
excluded. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 27 N.Y.2d 47,
261 N.E.2d 389, 313 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1970); Galanek
v. New York City Transit Auth., 53 A.D.2d 586, 385
N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st Dep't 1976). Accident reports have
traditionally been excluded as business records,
primarily because they are litigation oriented. See
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). However,
some more recent cases have accepted accident
reports which are routinely kept. See, e.g., Toll v.
State, 32 A.D.2d 47, 299 N.Y.S.2d 589 (3d Dep't
1969); Bishin v. New York Central R.R., 20 A.D.2d
921, 249 N.Y.S.2d 778 (2d Dep't 1964). Where the
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accident report is prepared by a person or business
unrelated to either of the parties to the litigation,
there is little doubt that the report is admissible as
a business record. See Vaccaro v. Alcoa S.S. Co.,
405 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1968).
5. The record must have been made at the time of the act,
transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable
time thereafter. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4518(a)
(McKinney 1992). This requirement serves to protect
the trustworthiness of the record by ensuring against
inaccuracy due to lapse of memory. The Appellate Divi-
sion, Third Department, has suggested that a record
should be considered timely if it was made "while the
memory of the event was still fresh enough to be fairly
reliable." See Toll v. State, 32 A.D.2d 47, 50, 299
N.Y.S.2d 589, 592 (3d Dep't 1969) (report made 15 days
after event held timely).
6. The statute presents no difficulty when applied to ordi-
nary business transactions.
Warner-Quinlan Co. v. Ben Charat, Inc., 143 Misc.
443, 257 N.Y.S. 722 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't
1932); Publisher's Book Bindery v. Ziegelheim, 184
Misc. 559, 54 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1945).
7. Difficulty of application is encountered when it is sought
to be applied to noncommercial entries. The question in
all such cases is whether there was a business obliga-
tion to record the specific matter which is being offered.
a. A certified hospital record is admissible under
CPLR 4518(c) to show the date of entry of the
patient, date of discharge, symptoms observed,
treatment given, and the diagnosis by the physi-
cian. See People v. Kohlmeyer, 284 N.Y. 366, 31
N.E.2d 490 (1940). However, entries concerning
the patients history come within the business
records exception only if they were medically ger-
mane, i.e., relevant to diagnosis or treatment. See
Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d
417 (1955); People v. Conde, 16 A.D.2d 327, 228
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N.Y.S.2d 69 (3d Dep't 1962), affd, 13 N.Y.2d 939,
194 N.E.2d 130, 244 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1963).
b. If the requirements of CPLR 4518(c) are satisfied,
the record is "prima facie evidence" of the truth of
the facts contained therein. See Laduke v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 158 A.D.2d 137, 557 N.Y.S.2d 221
(4th Dep't 1990). "Prima facie evidence," under
CPLR 4518(c), has been interpreted by the Court of
Appeals as creating a permissive inference rather
than a presumption. See People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d
136, 148, 497 N.E.2d 657, 663, 506 N.Y.S.2d 290,
296-97 (1986). Thus, according to the Court of
Appeals, the jury is permitted, but not required, to
accept the truthfulness of the record, even in the
absence of contradictory evidence. Id.
8. Where the person who made the record (the "recorder")
has personal knowledge of the facts and records pursu-
ant to business routine in which he is engaged, there is
a problem of only simple hearsay, and the record will
usually be admitted under CPLR 4518. However, where
the recorder makes his entry based upon what a third
person (the "informant") tells him, there is multiple
hearsay. Under the general rule (see A. 4. a., supra),
each link of hearsay must be separately justified. See,
e.g., Murray v. Donlan, 77 A.D.2d 337, 346, 433
N.Y.S.2d 184, 189 (2d Dep't 1980).
a. If the informant and the recorder are part of the
same business enterprise, they may be treated as
one person.
Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 127, 170 N.E. 517,
518 (1930) (entry made by policeman in police blot-
ter inadmissible where informant was unknown
third person under no business obligation to pres-
ent information to police officer).
(1) Although CPLR 4518(a) does not provide that
an informant must be under a business duty to
supply such information, such a requirement,
however, was read into the statute by the Court
of Appeals in Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124,
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127, 170 N.E. 517, 518 (1930). See RICHARDSON
ON EVIDENCE § 299 (10th ed. 1973). Thus,
where the recorder makes his entry based upon
what an informant tells him, it must be demon-
strated that the informant had personal knowl-
edge of the event, and that he was under a
business duty to report it to the recorder. See
In re Leon R.R., 48 N.Y.2d 117, 123, 397 N.E.2d
374, 378, 421 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (1979); Clark v.
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 174 A.D.2d 268, 580
N.Y.S.2d 221 (1st Dep't 1992) (if maker of busi-
ness record lacks personal knowledge but was
acting pursuant to business duty, record may
be admissible if it contains (1) statement made
by another person with business duty to report
to maker; or (2) statement that qualifies under
a separate hearsay exception).
b. If the informant and the recorder are not business
related and the informant is not under a business
duty to impart the information, the statement in
the business record may be separately justified
under some other exception to the hearsay rule.
In re Leon R.R., 48 N.Y.2d 117, 122-23, 397 N.E.2d
374, 377-78, 421 N.Y.S.2d 863, 866-67 (1979); Clark
v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 174 A.D.2d 268, 580
N.Y.S.2d 221 (1st Dep't 1992); Toll v. State, 32
A.D.2d 47, 49-50, 299 N.Y.S.2d 589, 592 (3d Dep't
1969); Zaulich v. Thompson Square Holding Co., 10
A.D.2d 492, 496, 200 N.Y.S.2d 550, 555 (1st Dep't
1960) (entry made by policeman in police blotter
admissible where informant was party and state-
ment was admission).
(1) However, if the informant is a party and the
information imparted to the police officer is con-
sistent with his in-court testimony, the police
blotter is inadmissible.
Mahon v. Giordano, 30 A.D.2d 792, 792, 291
N.Y.S.2d 854, 854 (1st Dep't 1968).
9. CPLR 4518(b) provides that a certified hospital bill is
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admissible in evidence except in an action in the Surro-
gate's Court or an action instituted by the hospital to
recover payment for services or supplies furnished.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4518(b) (McKinney 1992).
10. CPLR 4533-a makes any itemized bill of $2,000 or less
admissible in any action, as prima facie evidence of the
reasonable value and necessity of services or repairs
itemized therein. The bill must be marked paid, be prop-
erly certified, and contain a statement that no part of
the bill is to be refunded and the amount charged is the
customary charge. Additionally, the bill must be served
on the adversary at least ten days before trial.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4533-a (McKinney 1992).
H. Public Documents: Where a public officer is required or
authorized by law to make an entry concerning a fact ascer-
tained by him in the course of his official work and to file or
deposit it in a public office of the state, the entry is admissi-
ble as prima facie evidence of the fact stated.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4520 (McKinney 1992).
1. It is not necessary that a public document be available
for public inspection.
People v. Nissinoff, 293 N.Y. 597, 59 N.E.2d 420
(1944), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 745 (1945).
2. Common-law exception:
a. The common-law exception is much broader than
CPLR 4520.
Consolidated Midland Corp. v. Columbia Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 42 A.D.2d 601, 601, 345 N.Y.S.2d
105, 106 (2d Dep't 1973) (although exhibits could
not be admitted under CPLR 4520, they should
have been admitted under common law hearsay
exception rule for official written statements, often
called "official entries" or "public documents" rule).
b. Trustworthiness of public records as an exception
to the hearsay rule is found in the belief that such
records are usually made by officials "having no
motive to distort the truth or manufacture evi-
dence, and are made in the discharge of a public
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Chesapeake & Del Canal Co. v. United States, 240
F. 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1917), affd, 250 U.S. 123
(1919).
c. Most courts have agreed that the common-law rule
has not been superseded by CPLR 4520.
Consolidated Midland Corp. v. Columbia Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 42 A.D.2d 601, 601, 345 N.Y.S.2d
105, 106 (2d Dep't 1973); People v. Hoats, 102 Misc.
2d 1004, 1009, 425 N.Y.S.2d 497, 501 (Monroe
County Ct. 1980) (authorized reports by police
officers, while inadmissible under CPLR 4520, may
be admissible under the much broader common-law
exception).
3. Absence of Public Record: CPLR 4521 creates a hearsay
exception for a signed and certified statement under
seal by an authorized public employee that after a dili-
gent search of official records over which she has legal
custody, she has found no record or entry of a specified
nature. Once these requirements are satisfied, the
statement is "prima facie evidence" that no such record
or entry exists.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4521 (McKinney 1992).
I. Res Gestae: Although this term has been rejected by the
Court of Appeals, the so-called res gestae rule includes a
number of separate doctrines which are outlined below:
1. Declarations of Pain and Suffering: Involuntary moans
and groans are admissible whenever made. See Roche v.
Brooklyn City & Newton R.R., 105 N.Y. 294, 297, 11
N.E. 630, 631 (1887). Voluntary statements of pain and
suffering are however, excluded under the hearsay rule
unless:
a. The statement was made to a physician for pur-
poses of treatment. See Roche v. Brooklyn City &
Newton R.R., 105 N.Y. 294, 11 N.E. 630 (1887). The
trustworthiness of such statements is generally
assured by the patient's belief that the treatment
received may depend upon the accuracy of the
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information provided.
(1) Even in this situation, only statements of pres-
ent pain and suffering are admissible. See
Roche v. Brooklyn City & Newton R.R., 105 N.Y.
294, 11 N.E. 630 (1887). Declarations of past
pain, as well as narrative statements as to the
cause of illness or injury are not admissible,
even though made to a physician for purposes of
treatment. See Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N.Y.
228, 237, 30 N.E. 573, 576 (1892).
b. Or where the declarant is dead.
Rosenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 148
A.D.2d 337, 538 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1st Dep't 1989);
Tromblee v. North American Accident Ins. Co., 173
A.D. 174, 158 N.Y.S. 1014 (3d Dep't 1916), affd,
226 N.Y. 615, 123 N.E. 892 (1919).
c. Or where the declaration falls under some other
exception to the hearsay rule; e.g., the spontaneous
declaration doctrine.
Kennedy v. Rochester City & Brighton R.R., 130
N.Y. 654, 29 N.E. 141 (1891).
2. Declarations evidencing the declarant's present state of
mind are also admissible whenever state of mind is rele-
vant, e.g., declarations showing reason, motive, feeling,
intent.
People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 709, 398 N.Y.S.2d
503, 504 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1977).
a. A declaration of intention is also admissible (even
though intent is not an issue) as some evidence that
the act intended was attempted or done.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295
(1892); United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373,
377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961).
3. Spontaneous Declarations: If a startling event precipi-
tates an involuntary declaration, the declaration is
admissible under this rule. See People v. Del Vermo, 192
N.Y. 470, 483, 85 N.E. 690, 695 (1908). The rationale
underlying this exception is expressed in People v. Cavi-
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ness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 230-31, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695, 699, 342
N.E.2d 496, 499 (1975):
It is established that spontaneous declarations
made by a participant while he is under the stress
of nervous excitement resulting from an injury or
other startling event, while his reflective powers
are stilled and during the brief period when consid-
erations of self-interest could not have been
brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection and
deliberation, are admissible as true exceptions to
the hearsay rule... They are admitted because, as
the impulsive and unreflecting responses of the
declarant to the injury or other startling event,
they possess a high degree of trustworthiness, and,
as thus, expressing the real tenor of said declarants
belief as to the facts just observed by him, may be
received as testimony of those facts.
Id.; People v. Brown, 70 N.Y.2d 513, 518, 517 N.E.2d
515, 517, 522 N.Y.S.2d 837, 839 (1987); People v. Marks,
6 N.Y.2d 67, 71-72, 160 N.E.2d 26, 27-28, 188 N.Y.S.2d
465, 467-68 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960);
Taft v. New York City Transit Auth., 193 A.D.2d 503,
597 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1993).
a. The tendency in New York is to construe this doc-
trine narrowly.
People v. Boodle, 47 N.Y.2d 398, 404, 391 N.E.2d
1329, 1332, 418 N.Y.S.2d 352, 356 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979) (depending on circum-
stances, even brief period of time may render a dec-
laration unspontaneous); Handel v. New York City
Rapid Transit Corp., 252 A.D. 142, 297 N.Y.S. 216
(2d Dep't 1937), affd, 277 N.Y. 548, 13 N.E.2d 468
(1938).
b. The spontaneous declaration exception also applies
to statements made by bystanders.
People v. Brown, 70 N.Y.2d 513, 517 N.E.2d 515,
522 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1987); People v. Caviness, 38
N.Y.2d 227, 231, 342 N.E.2d 496, 499, 379 N.Y.S.2d
695, 699 (1975); Taft v. New York City Transit
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Auth., 193 A.D.2d 503, 597 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1993).
c. No narrative statements are permitted. The state-
ment must concern the immediate facts of the star-
tling occurrence.
Rosenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 148
A.D.2d 337, 538 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1st Dep't 1989);
Waldele v. N.Y Central R.R., 95 N.Y. 274 (1884).
d. A declaration made in response to a question may
be regarded as spontaneous.
People v. Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 85 N.E. 690
(1908); People v. Edwards, 47 N.Y.2d 493, 392
N.E.2d 1229, 419 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1979) (since state-
ments were uttered under stress of nervous excite-
ment without opportunity for reasoned reflection,
inadmissibility will not be judged on fact that ques-
tions were posed by person coming to victim's aid).
4. Present Sense Impression: This exception permits a
court to admit hearsay testimony of a statement that
describes or explains an event or condition that is made,
while or immediately after the declarant observes or
perceives the event.
People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 734, 610 N.E.2d
369, 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700 (1993); Berger v.
New York City, 157 Misc. 2d 521, 597 N.Y.S.2d 555
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
a. The rationale for admissibility under the present
sense impression exception to the hearsay rule is
that the statement is reliable because it is contem-
poraneous in time with the event or occurrence and
no time for reflection, faulty recollection or deliber-
ate misrepresentation has elapsed.
Berger v. New York City, 157 Misc. 2d 521, 522, 597
N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
b. Under this exception, spontaneous descriptions of
events made contemporaneously with the observa-
tions are admissible if the descriptions are suffi-
ciently corroborated by other evidence.
People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 734, 610 N.E.2d
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369, 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700 (1993).
c. Present sense impression statements may be
admitted even though the declarant was not a par-
ticipant in the events and is an unidentified
bystander.
People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 735, 610 N.E.2d
369, 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696, 701 (1993).
d. Present sense impression evidence is admissible in
civil as well as criminal actions.
Berger v. New York City, 157 Misc. 2d 521, 523, 597
N.Y.S.2d 555, 557 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
e. Difference between present sense impression and
excited utterance: Present sense impression evi-
dence differs from the traditional spontaneous dec-
laration exception because the latter exception
requires "the shock and/or excitement of an inci-
dent or event that triggered the outburst."
Berger v. New York City, 157 Misc. 2d 521, 522, 597
N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993) (cit-
ing Rosenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,
148 A.D.2d 337, 538 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1st Dep't 1989)).
J. Pedigree Declarations: Evidence admissible under the pedi-
gree exception to the hearsay rule includes declarations relat-
ing to birth, death, marriage, or legitimacy, for example.
In re Esther T., 86 Misc. 2d 452, 382 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sur.
Ct. Nassau County 1976); In re Hayden, 176 Misc. 1078,
1080, 29 N.Y.S.2d 852, 854 (Sur. Ct. New York County
1941).
1. The admission of declarations pertaining to pedigree is
subject to the following conditions:
a. The declarant is dead.
Aalholm v. People, 211 N.Y. 406, 412-13, 105 N.E.
647, 649-50 (1914); In re Esther T., 86 Misc. 2d 452,
455, 382 N.Y.S.2d 916, 919 (Sur. Ct. Nassau
County 1976).
b. The declarant must have been related by blood or
affinity to the family of which he speaks.
Aalholm v. People, 211 N.Y. 406, 412-13, 105 N.E.
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647, 649-50 (1914); In re Esther T., 86 Misc. 2d 452,
382 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1976).
(1) This relationship must be established by
independent evidence, although only slight evi-
dence is necessary.
Aalholm v. People, 211 N.Y. 406, 413, 105 N.E.
647, 649-50 (1914); In re Tim's Estate, 6 Misc.
2d 47, 159 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1956).
c. The declaration must have been made ante litem
motam (at a time when there was no motive to dis-
tort the truth).
Aalholm v. People, 211 N.Y. 406, 412-13, 105 N.E.
647, 649-50 (1914); In re Esther T., 86 Misc. 2d 452,
454-55, 382 N.Y.S.2d 916, 919 (Sur. Ct. Nassau
County 1976).
(1) Pedigree declarations may be oral, written, or
may consist of conduct.
In re Tim's Estate, 6 Misc. 2d 47, 159 N.Y.S.2d
520 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1956) (oral pedigree
declarations admissible as exception to hearsay
rule); In re Floyd-Jones Estate, 154 N.Y.S.2d
668, 670 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1955) (writ-
ten declaration in form of book admissible
under pedigree exception to hearsay rule).
K. Ancient Documents:
1. Under the common law ancient documents rule, a rec-
ord or document is sufficiently trustworthy to be admit-
ted for the truth of its contents if it is found to be:
a. Thirty or more years old;
b. In the proper custody; and
c. Free from any indication of fraud or forgery.
Tillman v. Lincoln Warehouse Corp., 72 A.D.2d 40,
423 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1979) (where certified
inventory and appraisal was received as "some evi-
dence" against defendant that collection was placed
in its warehouse).
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2. While all ancient documents are self-authenticating, it
is unclear which ancient documents are also admitted
as an exception to the hearsay rule.
3. CPLR 4522 provides that maps, surveys, and official
records affecting real property on file for more than 10
years are "prima facie evidence" of their contents.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4522 (McKinney 1992).
4. Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law section 341
provides that "any instrument more than 10 years old,
executed for the purpose of transferring title or interest
in lands of this state, which contains recitals that the
grantors or grantees, or either, or both, are the heirs at
law of a prior owner of the title or interest described in
such instrument, or a survivor of a tenancy by the
entirety or joint tenancy, shall be presumptive evidence
of said heirship or of such survivorship, as therein
recited," if the document is executed and duly recorded
in a certain manner.
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAw § 341 (McKinney 1979
& Supp. 1993).
5. Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law section 331
provides that real property sold by a sheriff for enforce-
ment of a valid lien thereon, if the sale took place at
least 10 years before trial, and if the execution or writ
by virtue of which the sale was made cannot be found,
then the recital or reference to the execution or writ in
the sheriffs certificate of sale or in the conveyance is
"prima facie evidence" of the execution or writ as
against any party whose claim of title is not accompa-
nied by peaceable possession of the premises in contro-
versy for at least three years immediately preceding the
commencement of the action.
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAw § 331 (McKinney 1979
& Supp. 1993).
VII. CIRCuMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
A. Definition: Evidence of a collateral fact from which, either
alone or with other collateral facts, the existence or nonexis-
tence of the fact in issue may be inferred.
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People v. Bretagna, 298 N.Y. 323, 325, 83 N.E.2d 537,
538 (1949) (since confession is direct acknowledgement
of guilt, it is not circumstantial evidence).
B. General Rule: All relevant circumstantial evidence is admis-
sible unless prohibited by some exclusionary rule.
1. Relevant circumstantial evidence will be excluded if its
probative value is outweighed by the danger that its
admission will unduly prejudice the adversary, or by the
danger that its admission will create a collateral issue
which will confuse the main issue, unduly prolong the
trial, or will unfairly surprise the adversary.
People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 82, 102 N.E. 546, 550
(1913).
2. Lack of means to commit a crime (e.g., D was not strong
enough to strike the blow; D did not have the money to
plan a flight to Europe) is always admissible. However,
possession of the means (e.g., D has a screwdriver which
could be used to break into a house) is generally inad-
missible unless the means are unique.
C. Evidence of Other Crimes: Evidence that a defendant in a
criminal prosecution committed another or similar crime is
inadmissible if offered solely to show a general criminal dis-
position. People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 197, 172 N.E.
466, 468 (1930). Similarly, evidence that the defendant did
not commit an uncharged crime is inadmissible. People v.
Lawson, 71 N.Y.2d 950, 952-53, 524 N.E.2d 141, 142, 528
N.Y.S.2d 820, 821 (1988). Prior uncharged crimes may not be
offered to show the defendant's bad character unless they
help establish some element of the crime under consideration
or are relevant because of some exception. People v. Lewis, 69
N.Y.2d 321, 325, 506 N.E.2d 915, 917, 514 N.Y.S.2d 205, 207
(1987).
1. The general rule is, of course, that any act of the
accused relevant to show his guilt of the crime charged
is admissible. Difficulty is encountered, however, when
proof of the relevant act will also establish or suggest
the commission of another crime. For a defendant's past
crimes to be admissible for a present proceeding:
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a. The evidence must be inextricably interwoven with
some specific material issue in the case (not crimi-
nal disposition).
People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 54-56, 535 N.E.2d
250, 258, 538 N.Y.S.2d 197, 205-06 (1988).
(1) Irrelevant or prejudicial parts of a pertinent
conversation are not admissible and should be
deleted if the essence of the event is not dis-
turbed.
People v. Crandall, 67 N.Y.2d 111, 116-17, 491
N.E.2d 1092, 1095, 500 N.Y.S.2d 635, 638
(1986).
b. The evidence's probative value must substantially
outweigh the danger of undue prejudice against the
defendant. People v. Ely, 68 N.Y.2d 520, 529, 503
N.E.2d 88, 94, 510 N.Y.S.2d 532, 538 (1986). In
view of the potential for prejudice, the prosecutor
should obtain a ruling in the jury's absence, and the
trial judge should exclude any part not directly pro-
bative to the crime charged. People v. Ventimiglia,
52 N.Y.2d 350, 356, 420 N.E.2d 59, 63-64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 261, 265-66 (1981).
2. In People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901),
the court said that evidence of the collateral crime-
that is, evidence of the defendant's relevant collateral
act which will also reveal or suggest the defendant's
commission of another crime-is admissible if it tends
to:
a. Establish a motive for the crime charged;
b. Establish intent for the crime charged;
(1) This exception is predicated on the theory that
the duplication of the inculpatory conduct
makes the innocent explanation improbable.
People v. Ingram, 71 N.Y.2d 474, 480, 522
N.E.2d 439, 441, 527 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 (1988).
(2) Evidence of past crimes to prove intent should
be precluded if intent is easily inferred from
commission of the act itself.
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People v. Crandall, 67 N.Y.2d 111, 117, 491
N.E.2d 1092, 1095, 500 N.Y.S.2d 635, 638
(1986).
(3) Issue of intent must be raised by the defendant.
People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 245, 519
N.E.2d 808, 814, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 13 (1987).
(4) Amorous design: Evidence of past sex crimes or
sexual abuse is not admissible to display
defendant's propensities or a victim's consent.
People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 55, 535 N.E.2d
250, 259, 538 N.Y.S.2d 197, 206 (1988);
c. Negate the actual or probable defense of mistake or
accident;
d. Establish the identity of the perpetrator of the
crime charged;
(1) If other crimes are to be admissible on the issue
of identity, the identity of the defendant as the
perpetrator of the other crimes, if not conceded
or previously adjudicated, must be established
by clear and convincing evidence.
People v. Robinson, 68 N.Y.2d 541, 544-45, 503
N.E.2d 485, 487, 510 N.Y.S.2d 837, 839 (1986).
(2) To invoke this exception the crimes must be
unique, e.g., "Jack the Ripper" murders.
Defendant's robbery of a store with the same
gun used in a prior robbery does not permit
proof of the details of the second crime when
defendant is tried for the prior robbery. People
v. Condon, 26 N.Y.2d 139, 143, 257 N.E.2d 615,
616, 309 N.Y.S.2d 152, 155 (1970); People v.
Kennedy, 27 N.Y.2d 551, 551, 261 N.E.2d 264,
264, 313 N.Y.S.2d 123, 123 (1970).
e. Establish a common scheme or plan. "If the court
does not clearly perceive it (i.e., the scheme), the
accused should be given the benefit of the doubt,
and the evidence rejected."
People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286
(1901).
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The categories in the Molineaux case must be
regarded as illustrative and not exclusive. Cf. UNI-
FORM RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 55 (evidence of
other crimes admissible if relevant for any purpose
other than to stigmatize defendant as bad actor).
D. Character Evidence-Defendant in Criminal Case
1. The choice is with defendant to either put his character
in issue or keep it out of the case. The prosecution may
not initially attack defendant's character.
2. Defendant puts his character in issue by calling a quali-
fied witness to testify to his good reputation for the trait
involved. Negative evidence is also permissible; that is,
the character witness may testify that he never heard
anything against the defendant in reference to the rele-
vant trait. People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 414,
82 N.E. 718, 719 (1907); People v. Colantone, 243 N.Y.
134, 139, 152 N.E. 700, 702 (1926). The character wit-
ness is limited to reputation; he may not testify to spe-
cific acts of the defendant.
a. If the defendant testifies as a witness, he puts his
credibility in issue, but not his character.
People v. Hinksman, 192 N.Y. 421, 432, 85 N.E.
676, 679 (1908); People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282,
291, 451 N.E.2d 216, 221, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462-63
(1983).
3. Once defendant places his character in issue, People v.
Jones, 121 A.D.2d 398, 399, 503 N.Y.S.2d 109, 110 (2d
Dep't 1986), the prosecution may rebut that character
evidence by reputation evidence to the contrary and by
showing previous convictions of defendant. But, N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.40 (2) (McKinney 1992) restricts
the proof to convictions of offenses relevant to the trait
in evidence. For example, if the witness states that D
enjoys a good reputation for honesty, a conviction of for-
gery could be evidenced, but not a conviction for drunk
driving.
4. Defendant's character witness may be asked on cross-
examination whether he had heard reports derogatory
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to defendant's reputation testified to by the witness.
This is permissible to affect the credibility of the wit-
ness.
People v. Laudiero, 192 N.Y. 304, 309, 85 N.E. 132, 134
(1900); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481
(1948).
E. Character Evidence-Victim in Criminal Case: Ordinarily
the character of the victim is not relevant and, therefore, the
general rule is that the victim's character cannot be shown.
There are several exceptions:
1. In a homicide prosecution where the defense is self-
defense, the defendant may show that the deceased
committed specific violent acts or had a reputation for
being violent provided the defendant knew of the acts or
reputation at the time of the homicide. It is not admissi-
ble to raise the inference that the deceased was the
aggressor.
People v. Miller, 39 N.Y.2d 543, 549, 39 N.E.2d 841,
845, 384 N.Y.S.2d 741, 745 (1976).
a. But on the issue of self-defense, and for the purpose
of raising an inference that the deceased was the
aggressor, the defendant may show that the
deceased had uttered threats against him, even
though the defendant was not aware of these
threats.
Stokes v. People, 53 N.Y. 164, 174 (1873).
2. New York has a "rape shield" law that restricts the use
of evidence regarding the chastity of a sex offense vic-
tim. In a prosecution for a sex offense, evidence of the
victim's sexual behavior is generally not admissible.
Exceptions include evidence which proves or tends to
prove instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct with
the accused or rebuts evidence of the victim's failure to
engage in sexual acts during a given period. N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992).
F. Character Evidence-Civil Case: Character evidence (i.e.,
reputation evidence) may not, as a general rule, be used in a
civil case to raise an inference that a person did or did not do
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a particular act. McKane v. Howard, 202 N.Y. 181, 185, 95
N.E.2d 642, 643 (1911); Beach v. Richtmyer, 275 A.D. 466,
469, 90 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (3d Dep't 1942). There are excep-
tions:
1. In a civil case for assault and battery where the defend-
ant pleads self-defense, defendant may show that plain-
tiff has a bad reputation for peacefulness.
Silliman v. Sampson, 42 A.D. 623, 623, 59 N.Y.S.
923, 925 (4th Dep't 1899).
2. In an action for defamation or malicious prosecution,
defendant may show that plaintiff has a bad reputation.
The purpose is to minimize damages.
Hart v. McLaughlin, 51 A.D. 411, 412, 64 N.Y.S.
827, 828 (1st Dep't 1900).
G. Evidence of Similar Acts-Civil Cases: Evidence that a party
did the same or a similar act on another occasion is excluded
unless the collateral act directly tends to establish the act in
issue.
McLoghlin v. N.M.V. Bank, 139 N.Y. 514, 523, 34
N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (1893). Contra Altman v. Ozdoba,
237 N.Y. 218, 224, 142 N.E.2d 591, 593 (1923).
1. In a negligence action, evidence of specific acts of negli-
gence to create an inference that such conduct was
repeated is excluded. Warner v. New York Cent. R.R., 44
N.Y. 465, 472 (1871); Feaster v. New York City Transit
Auth., 172 A.D.2d 284, 566 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1st Dep't
1991). However, where the issue involves "proof of a
deliberate and repetitive practice," evidence of such
habit is admissible to allow the inference of negligence
on a particular occasion. Halloran v. Virginia Chemi-
cals, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 386, 392, 361 N.E.2d 991, 995-96,
393 N.Y.S.2d 341, 346 (1977).
a. But to prove a dangerous condition or the defend-
ant's notice thereof, plaintiff may show other acts
on the property, provided he shows substantial sim-
ilarity of conditions.
Cole v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 24 A.D.2d 993, 996, 266
N.Y.S.2d 267, 272 (2d Dep't 1965), affd, 17 N.Y.2d
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761, 217 N.E.2d 144, 270 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1966).
b. Defendant may not show that plaintiff has brought
other actions for personal injury to support the
inference that plaintiff is litigious or accident-
prone.
Cf. Hartley v. Szadkowski, 32 A.D.2d 550, 550, 300
N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (2d Dep't 1969).
2. On the issue of sanity, evidence of the conduct of the
person in question on other occasions, if not too remote,
is admissible.
People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 401
N.E.2d 199, 203, 425 N.Y.S.2d 77, 81 (1980).
3. The condition or quality of an object may be evidenced
circumstantially by its prior or subsequent condition, if
not too remote. Spiegel v. Saks 34th Street, 26 A.D.2d
660, 272 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d Dep't 1966).
4. To prove the market value of a piece of property, a party
may show the sales price of other similar pieces of prop-
erty in the same neighborhood at approximately the
same time.
Village of Lawrence v. Greenwood, 300 N.Y. 231,
235, 90 N.E.2d 53, 55 (1949); Rusciano & Son Corp.
v. Roche, 70 A.D.2d 953, 955, 417 N.Y.S.2d 769, 771
(2d Dep't 1979).
5. General habits are usually not admissible to show con-
duct upon a specific occasion. However, evidence of a
particular habit may be admissible on the issue of the
performance of the habitual act on a specific occasion.
Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 386, 361
N.E.2d 991, 393 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1977). Evidence of a com-
mercial habit is admissible. Soltis v. State, 188 A.D.2d
201, 203, 594 N.Y.S.2d 433, 434 (3d Dep't 1993).
6. The custom of a trade or business is admissible, though
not conclusive, on the standard of care to be exercised in
that trade or business.
Berman v. H.J. Enterprises, Inc., 13 A.D.2d 199,
201, 214 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947 (1st Dep't 1961) (custom
for caring for terrazzo floors on rainy days).
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a. The internal safety rules of the defendant are also
admissible against the defendant if they prescribe
only an ordinary, as opposed to extraordinary,
degree of care.
Danbois v. N.Y Central R.R., 12 N.Y.2d 234, 237,
189 N.E.2d 468, 469, 238 N.Y.S.2d 921, 923 (1963).
7. In a defamation action, evidence that defendant
repeated the defamatory charge is admissible to show
malice, but only if made before the commencement of
the action. Repetition after action is excluded.
Enos v. Enos, 135 N.Y. 609, 610, 32 N.E. 123, 123
(1892).
H. Miscellaneous Doctrines:
1. Evidence that defendant made repairs subsequent to
the accident is not admissible to show negligence.
Cacaolo v. Port Authority, 186 A.D.2d 528, 530, 588
N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 (2d Dep't 1992). Such evidence is
admissible for any other relevant purpose; e.g., to show
ownership or control.
Scudero v. Campbell, 288 N.Y. 328, 328, 43 N.E.2d
66, 66 (1942).
a. However, the Court of Appeals has held that evi-
dence of manufacturer's subsequent modifications
may be introduced to establish defectivness of prod-
uct when made in strict products liability case.
Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 270, 461 N.E.2d
864, 868, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 382 (1984).
2. An offer to compromise is not admissible. Difficulty is
encountered when an admission of fact accompanies an
offer to compromise. In such a case, the general rule is
that, if the offer to compromise was made without preju-
dice or the admission of fact was made for the purpose of
compromise, the admission must be excluded.
White v. Old Dominion S.S. Co., 102 N.Y. 660, 662,
6 N.E. 289, 291 (1886).
3. Plaintiff may not show that the defendant has insur-
ance covering his loss as evidence that defendant did not
care for his property or that defendant will not be hurt
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by a judgment.
Rendo v. Schermerhorn, 24 A.D.2d 773, 773, 263
N.Y.S.2d 743, 743 (3d Dep't 1965).
a. But insurance is admissible to show that defendant
owned or was in control of the property where own-
ership or control is in issue.
McGovern v. Oliver, 177 A.D. 167, 169, 163 N.Y.S.
275, 276 (1st Dep't 1917).
b. And, under CPLR 4110(a), a party is entitled, when
selecting a jury, to inquire whether any of the
veniremen work for or have stock in a liability
insurance company.
4. Where a party destroys evidence, a jury may infer that
the evidence would have been unfavorable. Where a
defendant flees from custody, a jury may infer guilt.
People v. Yazum, 13 N.Y.2d 302, 304, 196 N.E.2d 263,
264, 246 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (1963). Where a party fails
to call an eyewitness who is available and apparently
friendly to the party, the jury is entitled to construe the
evidence most strongly against him. People v. Gonzales,
68 N.Y.2d 424, 431, 502 N.E.2d 583, 589, 509 N.Y.S.2d
796, 801 (1986). If the witness is equally favorable to
both sides, no inference may be drawn. Bromberg v. New
York City, 25 A.D.2d 885, 885, 270 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (2d
Dep't 1966); see also People v. Giallombardo, 128 A.D.2d
547, 548, 512 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (2d Dep't 1987) (no pre-
sumption against prosecution for failure to call coperpe-
trator available to both sides).
5. Evidence of the possession of money is not admissible to
raise an inference of payment. Lack of money may,
however, be shown to negate defense of payment. And if
evidence of lack of money is introduced, possession of
money may then be shown in rebuttal.
Dick v. Marvin, 188 N.Y. 426, 428, 81 N.E.2d 162,
162 (1907).
VIII. BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Nature: There are two distinct burdens:
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1. Burden of going forward: obligation of a party to create
an issue of fact for the jury. With respect to plaintiff it
means the obligation to make out a prima facie case.
This burden, though initially on the plaintiff, may shift
back and forth during the course of the trial. This bur-
den is solely for the judge's attention, and should never
be mentioned to the jury.
2. Burden of proof: sometimes called the burden of persua-
sion, this describes the obligation of a party to persuade
the jury (the trier of fact) as to the correctness of his
contentions.
a. Each issue in a case must be defined, and the bur-
den of proof assigned to a party on that issue.
b. The burden of proof must always be on someone.
Not so for the burden of going forward.
B. Effect of Right to Open and Close: If the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proof with respect to any issue raised by his complaint,
he has the right to open and close.
C. Criminal Cases: The prosecution has the burden of proof
upon the issue of guilt or innocence. But N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 25.00 (McKinney 1987) creates certain "affirmative
defenses" as to which the defendant carries the burden of
proof, although defendant need establish these only by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. If matter is described as a
"defense" in the Penal Law, the burden of disproving it
(beyond a reasonable doubt) is upon the prosecution. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 25.00(1) (McKinney 1987); People v. Butts, 72
N.Y.2d 746, 748, 533 N.E.2d 660, 662, 536 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732
(1988).
1. Affirmative defenses: entrapment, duress, renunciation
and several affirmative defenses to the crime of felony
murder, which are set forth in N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 125.25(3) (McKinney 1987).
a. The affirmative defense of insanity is not an uncon-
stitutional shifting of the burden of proof because
the prosecution still must prove all of the elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 301-02, 347 N.E.2d 898,
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907, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 581 (1976), aff'd, 432 U.S.
197 (1977).
2. Defenses: infancy and justification.
D. Will Probate Contests: The proponents have the burden of
proof with respect to the issues of due execution and testa-
mentary capacity; the contestants have the burden with
respect to all other issues. In re Eno's Will, 196 A.D. 131, 165,
187 N.Y.S. 756, 781 (1st Dep't 1921); In re Kindberg, 207 N.Y.
220, 229, 100 N.E. 789, 791 (1912).
E. Contract Cases: Under Murray v. Narwood, 192 N.Y. 172,
177, 84 N.E. 958, 959 (1908):
1. The party suing on the contract has the burden of proof
with respect to all issues pertaining to the creation of
the contract.
Paz v. Singer Co., 151 A.D.2d 234, 235, 542
N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (1st Dep't 1989).
2. Matters of defense arising subsequent to the execution
of the contract (e.g., release) place the burden on the
defendant.
Fleming v. Ponziani, 24 N.Y.2d 105, 110, 247
N.E.2d 114, 118, 299 N.Y.S.2d 134, 139 (1969); Mix
v. Neff, 99 A.D.2d 180, 182, 473 N.Y.S.2d 31, 33 (3d
Dep't 1984).
a. For the special rules as to burden of proof on the
issue of payment. See Conkling v. Weathermax, 181
N.Y. 258, 261, 73 N.E. 1028, 1029 (1905). The bur-
den of proving payment is on the person who claims
payment. In re Estate of Lurje, 64 Misc. 2d 569,
570, 315 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477-78 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.
County 1970).
F. Contributory Negligence: In an action for property damage,
personal injury, or wrongful death the defendant must prove
the plaintiffs contributory negligence or other culpable con-
duct to diminish damages. N.Y. Civ. PR~c. L. & R. § 1412
(McKinney 1976).
1. Automobile Cases: The defendant has the burden of
proving that nonuse of the seat belt increased the extent
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of plaintiffs injuries and damages.
Schrader v. Carney, 180 A.D.2d 200, 210, 586
N.Y.S.2d 687, 693 (4th Dep't 1992).
G. Insurance Cases: In an action on an ordinary life insurance
policy where the defense is suicide, the defendant-insurer has
the burden of proof to clearly establish that no conclusion
other than suicide may reasonably be drawn. Schelberger v.
Eastern Say. Bank, 93 A.D.2d 188, 191, 461 N.Y.S.2d 785,
787 (1st Dep't 1983), affd, 60 N.Y.2d 918, 458 N.E.2d 1257,
470 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1983). In an action on an accidental death
policy or for double indemnity in the case of death by acci-
dent, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that death was
produced by accidental means. But even in these cases, by
virtue of the presumption against suicide, the defendant-
insurer appears to have the burden of proof with respect to
the defense of suicide. Begley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 1 N.Y.2d
530, 533, 136 N.E.2d 839, 841, 154 N.Y.S.2d 866, 868 (1956).
H. Quantum of Burden of Proof:
1. In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The concept of "reasonable
doubt" is not susceptible to precise definition.
a. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which jurors should
be able to express or articulate.
People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 300, 434 N.E.2d
237, 238, 449 N.Y.S. 2d 168, 169, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 847 (1982).
b. However, a jury instruction requiring jurors to give
"concrete reasons" for their votes acquitting a crim-
inal defendant unconstitutionally reverses the bur-
den of proof.
People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 252, 604
N.E.2d 95, 98, 590 N.Y.S.2d 33, 36 (1992).
2. In most civil cases, the burden of proof may be described
as a fair preponderance of the evidence. People v. Mos-
ley, 112 A.D.2d 812, 814, 492 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (1st
Dep't 1985), affd, 67 N.Y.2d 985, 494 N.E.2d 98, 502
N.Y.S.2d 993 (1986).
3. In some civil cases, clear and convincing evidence, a
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higher standard of proof, is required as a matter of pol-
icy. For example, fraud, claims against estates, reforma-
tion, and causa mortis gifts.
a. In order to impress upon the fact-finder the impor-
tance of its decision, a clear and convincing evi-
dence standard is required where it is claimed that
an individual, now incompetent, left instructions to
terminate life-sustaining systems when it appears
that there is no hope for recovery.
In re Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 225, 551
N.E.2d 77, 80, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876, 879 (1990).
b. Paternity must be established by the petitioning
party through clear and convincing evidence that
creates a genuine belief of fatherhood.
In re Commissioner of Social Services v. Philip De
G., 59 N.Y.2d 137, 141-42, 450 N.E.2d 681, 683, 463
N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (1983).
4. In an action for wrongful death, the executor is entitled
to a charge that he is not held to as high a degree of
proof as where an injured plaintiff can himself describe
the occurrence.
Noseworthy v. New York City, 298 N.Y. 76, 80, 80
N.E.2d 744, 745 (1948); Pierson v. Dayton, 168
A.D.2d 173, 175, 572 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (4th Dep't
1991).
a. The court may limit this rule to the facts on which
the dead party could testify, if available.
Holiday v. Huntington, 164 A.D.2d 424, 428, 563
N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (2d Dep't 1990).
b. This lesser degree of proof is also accorded to the
amnesiac plaintiff; but the jury must be charged to
apply the lesser burden of proof only if it first deter-
mines that the amnesia is genuine, and that it was
caused by the defendant.
Schechter v. Klanfer, 28 N.Y.2d 228, 230-31, 269
N.E.2d 812, 814, 321 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101-02 (1971);
Fasano v. State, 113 A.D.2d 885, 888, 493 N.Y.S.2d
805, 807 (2d Dep't 1985).
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IX. PRESUMPrIONS
A. Definition: A rule which requires a jury to conclude that cer-
tain facts are established once other basic facts have been
proven, unless the conclusion has been rebutted.
Platt v. Elias, 186 N.Y. 374, 379, 79 N.E. 1, 2 (1906).
1. Distinguished from an inference (sometimes mislead-
ingly called a presumption of fact) which permits, but
does not require, the jury to infer that a conclusion has
been established.
2. An inference or presumption will carry the burden of
going forward. But a presumption, being stronger, will
also shift the burden of going forward to the other side
which must then rebut the presumption or suffer a
directed verdict.
B. Inferences: The following are inferences, not presumptions:
1. Res Ipsa Loquitur: An inference of negligence is permis-
sible where:
a. The event is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of negligence;
b. It is caused by an agency or instrumentality within
the exclusive control of the defendant;
c. It is not due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff.
Ebanks v. New York City Transit Auth., 70 N.Y.2d
621, 623, 512 N.E.2d 297, 298, 518 N.Y.S.2d 776,
777 (1989). Dermatossian v. New York City Transit
Auth., 67 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 492 N.E.2d 1200, 1203,
501 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788 (1986).
2. Guilty from Possession of Fruits: Recent and exclusive
possession of the fruits of the crime, if unexplained or
falsely explained, will justify inference of guilt.
People v. Adams, 163 A.D.2d 481, 481, 558
N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (2d Dep't 1990); People v. Abney,
162 A.D.2d 372, 373, 558 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494 (1st
Dep't 1990).
a. Normally the permissible inference is that the pos-
sessor is guilty of whatever crime was committed.
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People v. Colon, 28 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 267 N.E.2d 577,
580, 318 N.Y.S.2d 929, 933, cert. denied, 402 U.S.
905 (1971); People v. Donaldson, 107 A.D.2d 758,
759, 484 N.Y.S.2d 123, 125 (2d Dep't 1985).
(1) The possession of a loaded firearm is presump-
tive evidence of possessing the weapon with the
intent to use it unlawfully against another.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 265.15(4) (McKinney 1989);
People v. Bumburg, 194 A.D.2d 735, 736, 599
N.Y.S. 826, 826 (2d Dep't 1993).
(2) The Automobile Rule: Unless possession is
attributed to an individual occupant, all vehicle
occupants are presumed to possess a gun found
in an automobile.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1989);
People v. Verez, 191 A.D.2d 378, 379, 595
N.Y.S.2d 446, 448 (1st Dep't), appeal granted,
82 N.Y.2d 728 (1993).
b. But other evidence in the case may direct the infer-
ence towards another crime; e.g., may point to the
possessor as merely an accessory after the fact. Peo-
ple v. Galbo, 218 N.Y. 283, 290, 112 N.E. 1041,
1044-45 (1916); see also People v. Baskerville, 60
N.Y.2d 374, 383, 457 N.E.2d 752, 757, 469 N.Y.S.2d
646, 651 (1983) (reasonable probability that defend-
ant acquired property after theft must be reflected
in jury instructions); People v. Everett, 10 N.Y.2d
500, 508, 180 N.E. 556, 559, 225 N.Y.S.2d 193, 198
(1962) (jury may consider inference that possessor
of stolen property was merely receiver only when
there is evidence in the case that theft was commit-
ted by someone else).
c. The recent and exclusive possession may be shown
by circumstantial evidence. In such cases, how-
ever, "the circumstances must be established by
clear and convincing evidence and must be of such
a character as, if true, to exclude to a moral cer-
tainty every other inference but that of recent and
exclusive possession by defendants."
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People v. Johnson, 65 N.Y.2d 556, 562, 483 N.E.2d
120, 124, 493 N.Y.S.2d 445, 449 (1985); People v.
Foley, 307 N.Y. 490, 492-93, 121 N.E.2d 516, 517
(1954).
3. Undue influence: Where an attorney is the draftsman of
a will which makes him the principal beneficiary to the
exclusion of the natural objects of the testator's bounty,
the trier of facts may find undue influence.
In re Putnam, 257 N.Y. 140, 142, 117 N.E.2d 399,
400 (1931); In re Delorez, 141 A.D.2d 540, 541, 529
N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (2d Dep't 1988).
a. Once the contestant establishes a special relation-
ship between the attorney and the testator, the
nature of the transaction, and the position occupied
by the attorney regarding the will or trust, the bur-
den shifts to the attorney to establish that no
deception or undue influence was exerted.
In re Nicoll, 191 A.D.2d 444, 445, 594 N.Y.S.2d 296,
297 (2d Dep't 1993).
C. Presumptions: The following are presumptions:
1. Sanity: Everyone is presumed sane.
2. Continuance: Proof that a person, object or condition
existed at a given moment raises the presumption that
it continued to exist for its normal life span. In re Huss,
126 N.Y. 537, 542, 27 N.E. 784, 785 (1891). However,
proof of the existence of a state of facts does not gener-
ally raise a presumption that the same facts existed pre-
viously. Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326, 338, 130 N.E.
566, 570 (1921).
3. Death from Absence: A presumption of death from
absence arises if the following elements are satisfied:
a. Person absent for three or more years (N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.7 (McKinney Supp.
1994));
b. Not heard from by those with whom he would natu-
rally be expected to communicate;
c. A diligent search for him has been conducted in
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vain; and
d. There is no reasonable explanation for his absence
and silence save death.
Butler v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 225 N.Y. 197, 203,
121 N.E. 758, 760 (1919); Kutner v. New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 57 A.D.2d 697, 698, 395 N.Y.S.2d
540, 541 (4th Dep't 1977).
4. Mail-delivery: A properly-addressed envelope is pre-
sumed to have been delivered in due course.
Union Trust Co. v. Barnhardt, 270 N.Y. 350, 352, 1
N.E.2d 459, 460 (1936); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patrylo,
144 A.D.2d 243, 247, 533 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (1st
Dep't 1988).
5. Bailments: There is a presumption of negligence if a
bailee does not come forward with a satisfactory expla-
nation of his failure to deliver the chattel. Ellish v. Air-
port Parking Co., 42 A.D.2d 174, 176, 345 N.Y.S.2d 650,
652 (2d Dep't 1973).
6. Legitimacy: Every person is presumed to be legitimate,
and this presumption, although not conclusive, is so
strong that it "will not fail unless common sense and
reason are outraged by a holding that it abides."
In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 8, 170 N.E. 471, 473
(1930).
a. The strong and persuasive presumption of legiti-
macy may be rebutted where not to do so "would
outrage common sense and reason."
In re Estate of Fay, 44 N.Y.2d 137, 142, 375 N.E.2d
735, 737, 404 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (1978).
b. Paternity: Results of a blood-grouping test can be
admitted in evidence, but only in cases where defi-
nite exclusion of paternity is established. Results of
the human leucocyte antigen test, however, may be
received as affirmative evidence of paternity except
in cases where exclusion has already has been
established by other blood-grouping tests. FAMILY
COURT ACT § 532(a) (McKinney 1983).
7. Intestacy: When a person dies, he is presumed to die
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intestate.
a. If it be established that the decedent once made a
will, and the will cannot be found after his death,
the presumption is that the decedent destroyed the
will with the intention of revoking it. In re Ken-
nedy's Will, 167 N.Y. 163, 168, 60 N.E. 442, 443
(1901).
8. Solvency: Every person is presumed solvent and every
debt is presumed collectible.
9. Regularity: There is a presumption that when an official
does an act, he does it properly.
a. Similarly, there is a presumption that corporate
officials perform their duties.
Price v. Standard Oil Co., 55 N.Y.S.2d 890, 896
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945).
D. Operation of a Presumption: Once the basic facts are proven,
the presumption arises, calling upon the party against whom
the presumption works to rebut it by substantial evidence. If
that party rebuts the presumption by producing substantial
evidence to the contrary of the presumed fact, the presump-
tion leaves the case entirely. All that remains of it is the pos-
sibility that the jury may treat the basic facts as some
evidence pointing towards the presumed fact (as in the case
of an inference). But the conclusion will have to be reached
without the aid of any artificial crutch like the presumption.
Fleming v. Ponziani, 24 N.Y.2d 105, 111, 247 N.E.2d
114, 118, 298 N.Y.S.2d 134, 140 (1969).
1. Most presumptions are rebutted by "substantial evi-
dence" to the contrary of the presumed fact. The term
"substantial" has never been adequately defined,
although it appears to mean sufficient evidence, which if
believed, would support a finding of the non-existence of
the presumed fact.
2. There are, however, five presumptions which are not
rebutted by mere "substantial evidence," but which
abide until rebutted by a higher standard of proof. In
these cases the net effect of the presumption is to cast
the burden of proof on the party against whom the pre-
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sumption operates. The five are:
a. The presumption of innocence in a criminal case.
Rebuttable only by proof establishing guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
b. The presumption of sanity. Rebuttable only by
clear and convincing evidence.
c. The presumption in favor of legitimacy. Rebuttable
only by clear and convincing evidence.
d. The presumption against suicide. Rebuttable only
by clear and convincing evidence. Begley v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 530, 532, 136 N.E.2d 839,
841, 154 N.Y.S.2d 866, 868 (1956).
e. The presumption in favor of the validity of a mar-
riage. Rebuttable only by clear and convincing evi-
dence. In re Estate of Brown, 40 N.Y.2d 938, 939,
358 N.E.2d 883, 884, 390 N.Y.S.2d 59, 59 (1976).
E. Conflict of Presumptions: The stronger presumption prevails.
Palmer v. Palmer, 162 N.Y. 130, 133, 56 N.E. 501, 502 (1900);
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 301(b) (when two pre-
sumptions conflict, the one founded on weightier considera-
tions of policy and logic prevails.)
X. PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY
A. Powers of Judge:
1. Although the judge may (and in a complicated case
must) marshal the evidence, he may not comment
thereon.
People v. Curatalo, 7 A.D.2d 996, 996-97, 184
N.Y.S.2d 81, 81-82 (2d Dep't 1959).
2. While a judge may call a witness as the court's witness
and examine all witnesses who testify, he may not
impart to the jury the court's opinion of the facts.
People v. Mendez, 3 N.Y.2d 120, 143 N.E.2d 806,
164 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1957).
3. Requests to exclude witnesses are addressed to the dis-
cretion of the court.
People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185, 190, 54 N.E.2d 357,
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360 (1944).
a. If the witness disobeys the court's order he may,
nevertheless, testify, but his failure to leave the
courtroom as directed may be commented upon in
summation, and the witness may also be punished
for contempt.
People v. Gifford, 2 A.D.2d 634, 635, 151 N.Y.S.2d
980, 981 (3d Dep't 1956).
B. Questions of Fact Versus Questions of Law: Generally, ques-
tions of law are for the judge while questions of fact are for
the jury.
C. Exceptions--Questions of Fact for Court: The court passes on:
1. Preliminary questions of fact concerning the compe-
tency of witnesses and admissibility of evidence;
People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 75, 160 N.E.2d 26, 30,
188 N.Y.S.2d 465, 470 (1959); Peppe v. Peppe, 3
N.Y.2d 312, 315, 144 N.E.2d 72, 73-74, 165
N.Y.S.2d 99, 101-02 (1957).
2. Foreign Law;
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4511(c) (McKinney 1992).
3. Facts judicially noted;
4. Furthermore, in any civil case, if the facts are undis-
puted and only one inference can be drawn, the question
is for the court, not the jury. Thus the court may direct a
verdict in favor of one party when by "no rational pro-
cess could the trier of facts base a finding in favor of' the
adversary.
Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N.Y. 241,
245, 54 N.E.2d 809, 811 (1944); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L.
& R. § 4401 (McKinney 1992).
a. In a criminal case, the court may direct an acquit-
tal, but not a verdict of guilt.
D. Corroboration of Witness's Testimony Required in Criminal
Case:
1. Of a confession. "A person may not be convicted of any
offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission
made by him [or her] without additional proof that the
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offense charged has been committed."
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.50 (McKinney 1992);
a. This requires proof only of corpus delicti (i.e., that
said crime has been committed by someone).
Defendant's participation in the crime may be
proven by the confession.
2. Of an accomplice. "A defendant may not be convicted of
any offense upon the testimony of an accomplice unsup-
ported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the
defendant with the commission of such offense."
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.22 (McKinney 1992).
3. Of testimony of the victim in certain sexual offenses. For
example, consensual sodomy, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.16
(McKinney 1992); adultery and incest, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 255.30 (McKinney 1992); promoting prostitution, N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 230.15 (McKinney 1992).
4. Of a minor or mentally impaired individual permitted to
testify without being sworn.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20 (McKinney 1992).
5. In actions to annul marriages, admissions of the parties
must be corroborated.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 144 (McKinney 1992).
XI. OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
A. Generally: The court will ordinarily admit offered evidence,
unless there is a timely objection.
1. The objection must be made at the earliest possible
moment.
B. Forms of Objections: Objections may be general (e.g., "I
object.") or specific (e.g., "I object on the ground of hearsay.").
C. Effect on Appeal Where Objection Sustained or Overruled:
The party who argues that the trial judge erred must have
made clear to the judge precisely why he was in error. Thus:
1. If a general objection is sustained, the ruling on appeal
will be upheld if there was any ground for the objection.
Tooley v. Bacon, 70 N.Y. 34, 37 (1877).
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2. If a general objection is overruled, unless specific
grounds for said objection were given at trial, the objec-
tion is not available on appeal. This rule does not apply
where evidence objected to was by its nature incompe-
tent.
People v. Vidal, 26 N.Y.2d 249, 254, 257 N.E.2d
886, 889, 309 N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (1970).
3. Where a specific objection is sustained, the ruling on
appeal will be upheld only if the ground stated was the
correct one, unless the evidence excluded was not com-
petent and could not be made so.
Bloodgood v. Lynch, 293 N.Y. 308, 312, 56 N.E.2d
718, 719 (1944).
D. Exceptions: A party need not take exception to a ruling on an
evidentiary objection in either civil or criminal cases.
1. In civil cases, formal exceptions are not necessary so
long as "at the time a ruling or order of the court is
requested or made a party shall make known the action
which he requests the court to take or, if he has not
already indicated it, his objection to the action of the
court." Also, an objection to the charge to the jury or a
failure or refusal to charge must be made prior to the
retiring of the jury.
N.Y. Crw. PRAc. L. & R. § 4017 (McKinney 1992).
2. In a criminal case, the rule is substantially similar, with
the exception that a party need not specifically object to
the judge's failure to give a requested charge.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05 (2).
XII. CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS
A. Generally: A confession is an acknowledgment of guilt of a
crime. An admission is an inculpatory statement which does
not constitute an acknowledgement of guilt of the crime, but
from which guilt may be inferred by the jury. Both are admis-
sible as exceptions to the hearsay rule, and both create the
same evidentiary problems. The term "confession" as herein-
after used will also refer to admissions.
1. If confession alludes to other crimes for which defendant
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is not being tried, the confession must be redacted to
eliminate references to the irrelevant crimes.
People v. Chaffee, 42 A.D.2d 172, 174, 346 N.Y.S.2d
30, 32 (3d Dep't 1973); People v. Carey, 120 Misc. 2d
862, 865, 466 N.Y.S.2d 887, 890 (Suffolk County Ct.
1983).
2. Where X and Y are tried together, and X alone has con-
fessed, but such confession implicates Y, the confession
is inadmissible hearsay as to Y. The confession must be
redacted, if feasible, to eliminate all references to Y.
People v. Boone, 22 N.Y.2d 476, 484, 239 N.E.2d 885,
889, 293 N.Y.S.2d 287, 293-94 (1968), cert. denied, Bran-
don v. New York, 393 U.S. 991 (1968). If the confession
cannot be practically redacted, there must be a sever-
ance or the confession is inadmissible at the joint trial.
People v. Jackson, 22 N.Y.2d 446, 450, 239 N.E.2d 869,
871, 293 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268 (1968). The confession can-
not be admitted with the instruction that the jury is to
limit it to X. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124-
25 (1968).
a. Said rules are retroactive.
Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968).
b. The theory underlying the Bruton rule is that X has
implicated Y while Y does not have the opportunity
to cross-examine X. There is no Bruton problem
and X's confession is admissible (with the limiting
instruction) when:
(1) X testifies at trial.
Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626 (1971); Peo-
ple v. Anthony, 24 N.Y.2d 696, 249 N.E.2d 747,
301 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1969).
(2) Note: formerly, a confession by X was admissi-
ble where X testified at a pretrial hearing
though not at the principal criminal trial. How-
ever, such a policy was found to violate the con-
frontation clause.
People v. Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 417, 402 N.E.2d
1155, 426 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1980).
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Also, formerly, a confession was admissible
where Y had confessed in a manner substan-
tially similar to X's confession. This policy, how-
ever, was later changed and held to be in
violation of the confrontation clause. Cruz v.
New York, 481 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1987). See
generally People v. Jones, 139 A.D.2d 272, 276,
531 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909-10 (1st Dep't 1988); Peo-
ple v. West, 137 A.D.2d 855, 856, 525 N.Y.S.2d
319, 321 (2d Dep't 1988), affd, 72 N.Y.2d 941,
529 N.E.2d 418, 533 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1988).
B. Constitutional Issues: In addition to traditional common law
evidentiary problems generally associated with confessions,
constitutional issues have also become relevant. Constitu-
tional limitations upon the admissibility of confessions have
been imposed by:
1. XIV Amendment (due process);
2. VI Amendment (right to counsel);
3. V Amendment (self-incrimination).
C. XIV Amendment: The fundamental elements of a fair trial
are extended to state prisoners by virtue of the due process
clause, and the admission of involuntary confessions are in
violation of this principle.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936). Non-
compliance with this right requires reversal, regardless
of the extent of additional admissible evidence of guilt.
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958).
1. Under the due process test, the question is whether the
confession was voluntarily made. "If an individual's 'will
was overborne' or if his confession was not 'the product
of a rational intellect and free will,' his confession is
inadmissible because coerced." Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 307 (1963), overruled on other grounds, Keeney
v. Tomayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992). The Supreme
Court reserves the right to review the facts and make an
independent determination of voluntariness.
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941).
a. To facilitate its review, the Supreme Court will find
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certain confessions per se involuntary without con-
sidering the character of the defendant. A confes-
sion is per se involuntary when made following:
(1) Physical abuse or threats of violence by officials
or civilians.
(2) Continuous interrogation. Cf. Davis v. North
Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 745-46 (1966) (one hour
a day for sixteen days is continuous).
(3) The administration of a drug or truth serum.
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
(4) Any promise or statement by a law enforcement
officer which creates a substantial risk that
defendant might falsely incriminate himself or
herself.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.45 (McKinney
1992); People v. Keene, 148 A.D.2d 977, 978, 539
N.Y.S.2d 214, 214 (4th Dep't 1989); People v.
Hilliard, 117 A.D.2d 969, 970, 499 N.Y.S.2d
283, 284 (4th Dep't 1986).
b. In all other cases, the Court must consider the
"totality of the circumstances" to determine
whether defendant's will was overborne. This
requires consideration of numerous factors includ-
ing:
(1) Prolonged interrogations;
People v. Holland, 48 N.Y.2d 861, 862, 400
N.E.2d 293, 294, 424 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (1979).
(2) Psychological coercion;
People v. Silverman, 100 Misc. 2d 697, 700, 420
N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (Crim. Ct. Suffolk County
1979); see also People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353,
362, 98 N.E.2d 553, 558 (1951), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 918 (1953); cf Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 321-24 (1959).
(3) Lack of food and sleep;
People v. Adenon, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 39-40, 364
N.E.2d 1318, 1321, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628
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(1977).
(4) Shuttling the defendant from jail to jail;
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1957).
(5) Delay in arraignment;
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 120.90; People v.
Zehner, 112 A.D.2d 465, 466, 490 N.Y.S.2d 879,
880 (3d Dep't 1985); People v. Bernacet, 108
A.D.2d 921, 922, 485 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (2d
Dep't 1985).
(6) Failure to recognize defendant's counsel rights;
and
People v. Boodie, 26 N.Y.2d 779, 781, 257
N.E.2d 657, 658, 309 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (1970).
(7) Mental stability, age, health and education of
defendant;
People v. Brown, 63 A.D.2d 584, 585, 404
N.Y.S.2d 617, 618 (1st Dep't 1978) (mental
health of defendant relevant).
D. VI Amendment: Even though the confession is otherwise vol-
untary, it is inadmissible if obtained in violation of defend-
ant's right to counsel. This Sixth Amendment right attaches
at any "critical" stage of the criminal proceedings. Hamilton
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-55 (1961). The evolution of this
right has seen it attach progressively earlier in the criminal
proceeding. Thus, a defendant has a right to counsel at both
"the defendant stage" and "the suspect stage" of the proceed-
ing. The implications of the right, however, differ at both
stages.
The Defendant Stage-Indicted or Arraigned.
1. After defendant is indicted he may no longer be interro-
gated in absence of counsel. Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964); People v. Waterman, 9
N.Y.2d 561, 565, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70,
75 (1961). This rule does not depend upon defendant's
request for counsel. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544,
550-51, 166 N.E.2d 825, 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25 (1960)
(defendant had a lawyer, but did not ask for him during
interrogation).
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a. In this situation, it has been held that defendant
cannot waive his right to counsel and submit to
interrogation until counsel arrives.
People v. Miles, 23 N.Y.2d 527, 542, 245 N.E.2d
688, 696, 297 N.Y.S.2d 913,924 (1969), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 948 (1969).
b. But the rigid principle of non-waivability has been
rejected. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812
(1975) (a criminal defendant may reject counsel
and try his own case).
2. After the defendant is arraigned: he may no longer be
interrogated without the presence of counsel. People v.
Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 165, 182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227
N.Y.S.2d 427, 428-29 (1962).
a. In this situation, defendant cannot waive his right
to counsel and submit to interrogation until counsel
arrives. People v. Vella, 21 N.Y.2d 249, 251, 234
N.E.2d 422, 422, 287 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (1967).
3. During arraignment: Where defendant is interrogated
without counsel during arraignment, the confession is
inadmissible.
People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 284, 183
N.E.2d 651, 652, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1962).
4. An arraignment or indictment for one crime does not
bar interrogation, in the absence of counsel, about
another crime based on different acts. People v. Taylor,
27 N.Y.2d 327, 329-32, 266 N.E.2d 630, 631-33, 318
N.Y.S.2d 1, 3-5 (1971) (where defendant is arraigned for
robbery and officer notices similar pattern for other rob-
beries, officer may interrogate defendant about other
robberies without counsel present).
a. The officer must act in good faith. If defendant is
arrested and arraigned on a sham charge just to
facilitate interrogation on another charge, the
interrogation violates the right to counsel.
Cf. People v. Stanley, 15 N.Y.2d 30, 32-33, 203
N.E.2d 475, 477, 255 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76 (1964), cert.
dismissed, 382 U.S. 802 (1965).
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The Suspect Stage-Not Yet Indicted or Arraigned-Request Nec-
essary.
5. The right to counsel attaches when either the defendant
requests counsel or counsel requests to see defendant. If
this demand is ignored, any statements taken thereafter
are inadmissible.
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d
628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843 (1963) (Donovan
rule).
a. The Donovan rule applies to any person taken into
police custody, regardless of whether the police con-
sider him an accused, a suspect, or merely a wit-
ness.
People v. Sanchez, 15 N.Y.2d 387, 207 N.E.2d 356,
259 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1965).
b. The Donovan rule applies to a case where a
retained attorney, not physically present at the
place where the client is in custody, informs the
police that he represents the defendant and does
not wish him to be questioned per the Donovan
rules.
People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 231-32, 205
N.E.2d 852, 855, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 928 (1965).
c. Right to counsel attaches upon attorney's demand
to see defendant, regardless of whether defendant
has requested counsel or is aware of the attorney's
demand. Police may not question defendant absent
affirmative waiver in counsel's presence.
People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 328-29, 239 N.E.2d
537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (1968); People v.
Howland, 62 A.D.2d 1094, 1095, 405 N.Y.S.2d 131,
133 (3d Dep't 1978) (holding defendant's refusal of
counsel invalid when refusal was made in the
absence of counsel and counsel had contacted
police); People v. Settles, 40 N.Y.2d 154, 165-66, 385
N.E.2d 612, 617, 412 N.Y.S.2d 814, 880 (1978).
d. Traditionally the right to counsel has applied only
to custodial interrogations. However, it is now the
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law that one who has retained counsel specifically
on the matter under investigation may be ques-
tioned in neither custodial nor noncustodial cir-
cumstances.
People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 31, 417 N.E.2d
501, 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (1980).
6. Once suspect has requested counsel, he may not then
waive the right unless in the presence of counsel.
People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d
360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1981); People v. Hobson, 39
N.Y.2d 479, 484, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d
419, 422 (1976).
7. Statements made voluntarily and not the result of inter-
rogations are still admissible.
People v. Gonzales, 75 N.Y.2d 938, 940, 554 N.E.2d
1269, 1270, 555 N.Y.S.2d 681, 682 (1990).
8. Defendant's request to speak to family is generally not a
request for counsel within the meaning of the Donovan
rule. People v. Taylor, 16 N.Y.2d 1038, 1039-40, 213
N.E.2d 321, 265 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1965). Neither is a
request by the family to speak to the defendant. People
v. Hocking, 15 N.Y.2d 973, 974, 207 N.E.2d 529, 530,
259 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (1965). But see People v. Town-
send, 33 N.Y.2d 37, 41, 300 N.E.2d 722, 724, 347
N.Y.S.2d 187, 190 (1973) (where the court excluded a
statement because the police lied to the family about
even having defendant in custody).
E. V Amendment (Miranda rule): The Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination attaches when the defendant is
questioned "by law enforcement officers after [he] has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in
any significant way. ... ." In this situation no statements by
the defendant are admissible unless the defendant has been
warned that he has a right to remain silent; that anything he
says may be used against him in evidence; that he has a right
to the presence of counsel, and that counsel will be provided
should he not be able to afford one. After the warnings are
given, the defendant may waive such rights if done volunta-
rily, knowingly, and intelligently, but may withdraw the
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waiver at any time. The prosecution carries the "heavy bur-
den" of proving the defendant's waiver. These rules apply to
all statements by the defendant, including confessions,
admissions, and exculpatory statements. The rule forbids
questioning by police prior to such warnings, but nothing
bars the defendant from volunteering information where
there has been no questioning.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); People v.
McIntyre, 138 A.D.2d 634, 636, 526 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219
(2d Dep't 1988).
1. While Miranda warnings should be given in substan-
tially the same manner prescribed by the Miranda case,
courts hold that as long as the officer conveys to the
defendant his substantive rights as represented by
Miranda, strict adherence to the Miranda format is not
required.
People v. Evans, 162 A.D.2d 702, 702, 557 N.Y.S.2d
120, 121 (2d Dep't 1990).
a. Advising the defendant of his right to counsel
should he not be able to afford one may be disre-
garded if it is apparent that defendant can afford
counsel.
People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d 157, 160, 242 N.E.2d 830,
832, 295 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (1968).
2. The Miranda doctrine applies only to custodial interro-
gations by law enforcement officials. The rules are
applicable when:
a. Defendant has been arrested or physically
detained.
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1968); People
v. Shivers, 21 N.Y.2d 118, 121, 233 N.E.2d 836,
839, 286 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (1967) (policeman spots
defendant near scene of crime, draws gun, and calls
defendant over); see Mathis v. United States, 391
U.S. 1, 4-5 (there is custody when the defendant is
in jail for another offense); People v. Moore, 79
A.D.2d 619, 620, 433 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (2d Dep't
1980); People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 208, 213, 397
N.E.2d 733, 735, 422 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45 (1979). But
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see People v. Mack, 131 A.D.2d 784, 784, 517
N.Y.S.2d 72, 73 (2d Dep't 1987).
b. The defendant is in psychological custody. If all the
circumstances would lead a reasonable person to
believe that his freedom of movement has been sig-
nificantly restricted, there is custody. People v.
Phinney, 22 N.Y.2d 288, 291, 239 N.E.2d 515, 516-
17, 292 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (1968) (where a police-
man finds a car on the highway and then goes to a
hospital and asks defendant whether he drove the
car, there is no custodial interrogation); People v.
Rodney P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260,
286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 (1967) (no custody where
defendant is interrogated for four minutes on the
front steps of his house); People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d
318, 322, 221 N.E.2d 541, 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873,
874 (1966) (routine interrogation at the scene of the
crime is permitted); see also People v. Yukl, 25
N.Y.2d 585, 589, 256 N.E.2d 172, 174, 307 N.Y.S.2d
857, 860 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970) (if
the atmosphere is not custodial, no warnings need
be given even though the interrogation occurs
inside a police station); People v. Paulin, 25 N.Y.2d
445, 450, 255 N.E.2d 164, 167, 306 N.Y.S. 2d 929,
933 (1969) (the atmosphere may be custodial even
in the defendant's home).
3. The question as to what constitutes a valid, effective
waiver of Miranda rights has been given considerable
attention. Generally, silence alone will not constitute
waiver.
People v. Breland, 145 A.D.2d 639, 640, 536
N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (2d Dep't 1988); People v. Bretts,
111 A.D.2d 864, 865, 490 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (2d
Dep't 1985). But see People v. Norris, 75 A.D.2d
650, 651, 427 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444 (2d Dep't 1980).
a. A knowing and intelligent understanding of one's
substantive rights, combined with facts and cir-
cumstances demonstrating defendant's intent to
relinquish such rights, generally constitute an
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effective waiver.
People v. Moore, 114 A.D.2d 595, 494 N.Y.S.2d 440
(3d Dep't 1985).
b. Defendant's condition, intelligence, and capacities
are relevant factors.
People v. Zeluaga, 148 A.D.2d 480, 481, 538
N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (2d Dep't 1989).
c. Traditionally, reserving one's rights did not bar
officials from later repeating warnings to deter-
mine whether defendant had changed his or her
attitude and was willing to talk. Recently, however,
it has been held that once silence or right to counsel
rights have been reserved, presence of counsel is
required before defendant can effectively waive his
rights.
People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 400
N.E.2d 360, 361, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (1980).
d. Under Miranda the focus has shifted from whether
the confession was made voluntarily to whether the
waiver was voluntary. Thus, Sixth Amendment
inquiries are still applicable in determining the vol-
untariness of the confession. The following should
be noted:
(1) Generally, no excuse will be accepted for failure
to give Miranda warnings. But see People v.
Latshaw, 123 A.D.2d 479, 480, 506 N.Y.S.2d
489, 490 (3d Dep't 1986) (defendant, not officer,
recited Miranda rights).
(2) With respect to minors, the totality of circum-
stances, including intelligence, age, and under-
standing of defendant, a minor, may effectuate
valid Miranda warnings absent parental pres-
ence.
People v. Bevilacqua, 45 N.Y.2d 508, 513, 382
N.E.2d 1326, 1328, 410 N.Y.S.2d 549, 552
(1978); People v. Green, 147 A.D.2d 955, 957,
537 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703 (4th Dep't 1989).
(3) No trickery, deceit, or promise of leniency may
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be used to solicit a waiver.
4. Miranda does not alter the Massiah, Waterman, and
DiBiasi rules (See D.A., supra). Those rules are
independent constitutional limitations upon police
interrogation, bottomed on the sixth amendment, and
must also be complied with.
a. Accordingly, the Donovan rule (D.5., supra) is via-
ble after Miranda. People v. Sturnialo, 42 A.D.2d
721, 721, 345 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (2d Dep't 1973).
5. Miranda rules do not apply in civil cases. Terpstra v.
Niagra Fire, 26 N.Y.2d 70, 73, 256 N.E.2d 536, 537, 308
N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (1970).
6. While a statement obtained in violation of the Miranda
rules is inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief,
the statement may, nonetheless, be used to impeach the
defendant as to matters discussed by him on direct
examination.
People v. Washington, 51 N.Y.2d 214, 219, 413
N.E.2d 1159, 1161, 433 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747 (1980);
see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224
(1971).
7. The admission into evidence of a confession in violation
of the Miranda rules may be deemed harmless if there
is overwhelming proof of defendant's guilt or no reason-
able connection between the confession and conviction.
People v. Parler, 30 A.D.2d 681, 291 N.Y.S.2d 890,
891 (2d Dep't 1968); People v. Williford, 63 Misc. 2d
408, 409, 311 N.Y.S.2d 461, 461 (Sup. Ct. App. T.
2d Dep't 1970).
F. Poison Fruit Doctrine: Where a confession is obtained in vio-
lation of the defendant's constitutional rights (due process,
right to counsel, or right against self-incrimination), leads
obtained by exploiting that information are also inadmissi-
ble. People v. Robinson, 13 N.Y.2d 296, 301, 196 N.E.2d 261,
262, 246 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (1963) (where the defendant in an
inadmissible confession stated that the gun was in the cul-
vert, the gun could not be admitted); Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (confession made after an unconstitu-
[Vol. 9:289
COMPENDIUM OF NEW YORK LAW
tional arrest was inadmissible, even though Miranda warn-
ings were given).
1. And the taint is difficult to dissipate. Where the defend-
ant made a second confession after a first confession
was obtained without the Miranda warnings, the second
was excluded on the ground, among others, that it was
infected by the first one. United States ex rel. Stephen
J.B. v. Shelly, 430 F.2d 215, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1970)
(defendant was sixteen years old). Whether the taint
has been dissipated depends on whether the "accused
believes himself so committed by a prior statement that
he feels bound to make another. .. ." This is a question
of fact; but there is no rule that requires the defendant
to be told that his prior statement is inadmissible. Peo-
ple v. Tanner, 30 N.Y.2d 102, 106, 282 N.E.2d 98, 99-
100, 331 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1972).
G. Confessions & Admissions Procedure: In Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a
confession claimed by a defendant to be involuntary is not
admissible at trial unless there has been a prior determina-
tion that the confession was given voluntarily. New York
then ruled that in all future trials there must be a separate
ruling by a judge finding the confession voluntary beyond
reasonable doubt. People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 78-80, 204
N.E.2d 179, 183, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 843-44 (1965). Thereaf-
ter, N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law §§ 710.10-710.70 was
enacted to establish a uniform practice for the resolution of
all questions concerning the admissibility of a confession or
an admission. The procedure is as follows:
1. If the prosecution intends to offer a confession or admis-
sion which was given to the police, it must so notify the
defendant before trial or, if good cause is shown, at trial.
If no such notice is given, the statement is inadmissible
at trial.
People v. Ross, 21 N.Y.2d 258, 263, 234 N.E.2d 427,
429-30, 287 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379-80 (1967).
a. No advance notice is required where the statement
was made to a private person having no connection
with the police. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 710.30
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(McKinney 1992); People v. Miranda, 23 N.Y.2d
439, 448, 245 N.E.2d 194, 198, 297 N.Y.S.2d 532,
538 (1969).
b. Nor is notice required where the statement is used
only to impeach defendant
People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 177, 250 N.E.2d
349, 351, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (1969).
c. Notice is required even in nonjury cases. People v.
Artis, 27 N.Y.2d 847, 847-48, 265 N.E.2d 463, 463-
64, 316 N.Y.S.2d 640, 640-41 (1970).
2. The defendant then has the choice of making an imme-
diate motion to suppress the statement or he may wait
until trial to object to the statement. N.Y. CRIvI PRoc.
LAw § 710.70 (McKinney 1992).
3. If the defendant demands an immediate hearing (called
a Huntley hearing), the following rules govern:
a. The prosecution carries the burden of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
b. Defendant may testify at the hearing and confine
his testimony to the facts and circumstances when
the defendant gave the statement.
c. If the defendant testifies at the Huntley hearing, he
may be impeached like any other witness.
d. It is probably the rule that nothing which the
defendant testifies to at the hearing may be used
against him at the subsequent trial unless he elects
to testify at the trial.
4. If the defendant succeeds in suppressing the statement,
it may not be used against him at trial.
5. If the defendant fails to suppress the statement, it may
be admitted at trial, but the trial judge must permit the
defendant to offer evidence of inadmissibility; and the
jury must be charged that it is the final arbiter of admis-
sibility. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 710.70 (McKinney
1992). The jury may not be told that a judge has already
passed on the admissibility of the statement. People v.
Cornell, 28 A.D.2d 1166, 1168, 284 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600
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(3d Dep't 1967).
a. But if, at trial, the defendant does not offer any evi-
dence attacking the admissibility of the statement,
the issue of admissibility need not be sent to the
jury.
People v. Cefaro, 23 N.Y.2d 283, 285-86, 244 N.E.2d
42, 44-45, 296 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347-49 (1968).
XIII. LiNups
A. The Wade-Gilbert Rule: Although a defendant has no Fifth
Amendment protection against appearing in a lineup, such a
confrontation between victim and suspect may be a critical
stage at which the right to counsel attaches. If a defendant
has been indicted or arraigned, the lineup is a critical stage
and he has right to counsel. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
688 (1972); People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 335, 552 N.E.2d
608, 612, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 76 (1990), cert. denied, Chipp v.
New York, 498 U.S. 833 (1990) (right to counsel did not
attach because lineup occurred before filing of accusatory
instrument); People v. Wicks, 76 N.Y;2d 128, 131, 556 N.E.2d
409, 410, 566 N.Y.S.2d 970, 971 (1990). In such a case, if a
pretrial lineup is conducted in the absence of the accused's
counsel, evidence of the lineup identification is inadmissible
at trial. Subsequent identification of the accused at trial is
also inadmissible unless the prosecution establishes by clear
and convincing evidence that the in-court identification is not
the fruit of the improper lineup identification. People v. Bal-
lot, 20 N.Y.2d 600, 606, 233 N.E.2d 103, 107, 286 N.Y.S.2d 1,
6 (1967).
Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967).
1. The Wade-Gilbert rule is not retroactive. It applies only
to lineups occurring after June 12, 1967. A defendant
who is not entitled to the new rule is, however, entitled
to relief if the confrontation conducted in his case was
"so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepara-
ble mistaken identification" that due process of law was
denied. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); Peo-
ple v. Owens, 74 N.Y.2d 677, 678, 541 N.E.2d 400, 401,
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543 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (1989) (defendant was the only
person wearing the distinctive clothing, a tan vest and
blue snorkel jacket, which fit the description of the
clothing worn by the perpetrator of the crime).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3502 purports to eliminate the Wade-Gilbert
Rule in federal practice.
3. There is no right to counsel when the police are taking
handwriting exemplars, analyzing specimens, or taking
fingerprints because these are not critical stages.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967); Peo-
ple v. Craft, 28 N.Y.2d 274, 278, 270 N.E.2d 297,
299, 321 N.Y.S.2d 566, 568 (1971).
B. If the prosecution intends to have a witness, who has already
identified defendant at a lineup, repeat the identification at
trial, the prosecution must apprise defendant of this within
15 days after arraignment and before trial. Otherwise, no
such testimony will be permitted, unless the court, for cause,
permits notice thereafter.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 710.30 (McKinney 1984); People
v. McMullin, 70 N.Y.2d 855, 856, 517 N.E.2d 1341,
1342, 523 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (1987) (lack of prejudice to
defendant resulting from delay in serving notice did not
obviate need for People to meet statutory requirements
of good cause before they could be permitted to serve
late notice). There is a "confirmatory identification"
exception to the notice requirement of N.Y. Criminal
Procedure Law § 710.30 (McKinney 1984). In cases in
which the defendant's identity is not in issue, or those in
which the protagonists are known to one another,
"suggestiveness" is not a concern and hence N.Y. Crimi-
nal Procedure Law § 710.30 does not come into play.
People v. Rodriquez, 79 N.Y.2d 445, 449, 593 N.E.2d
268, 271, 583 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (1992); People v. Gis-
sendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 552, 399 N.E.2d 924, 930,
423 N.Y.S.2d 893, 898 (1979); see also People v. Overton,
192 A.D.2d 624, 624, 596 N.Y.S.2d 155, 156 (2d Dep't
1993).
1. Defendant must then move to suppress the identifica-
tion or waive his constitutional objection. N.Y. CRIM.
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PROC. LAw § 710.40 (McKinney 1984); People v. Rivera,
73 A.D.2d 528, 529, 422 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (1st Dep't
1979) affd, 53 N.Y.2d 1005, 425 N.E.2d 863, 442
N.Y.S.2d 475 (1981).
2. At the hearing the prosecution carries the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the iden-
tification is not tainted by a prior unconstitutional
lineup.
Cf People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 411, 417, 259
N.E.2d 727, 731, 311 N.Y.S.2d 292, 297 (1970); Peo-
ple v. Archer, 155 Misc. 2d 601, 604, 589 N.Y.S.2d
987, 990 (Bronx County Ct. 1992).
XIV. ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-EAVESDROPPING
A. Constitutional Safeguards: the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
B. Unconstitutional Search and Seizure: Evidence obtained by
or through an unreasonable search and seizure by a state or
federal officer is inadmissible.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961).
1. The Mapp rule is not retroactive.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
C. Poison Fruit Doctrine: Any testimony or other evidence
obtained by exploiting evidence which was unconstitutionally
seized is equally inadmissible.
People v. Rodriquez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 357, 183 N.E.2d
651, 653, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 356 (1962); People v. Oneill,
11 N.Y.2d 148, 153, 182 N.E.2d 95, 98, 227 N.Y.S.2d
416, 420 (1962) (subsequent arrest based upon illegal
seizure cannot be the basis of a search incident to a law-
ful arrest; arrest must be validated without any resort
to fruits of search); see also People v. Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d
578, 582, 607 N.E.2d 1050, 1051, 592 N.Y.S.2d 945, 946
(1992), cert. denied, 123 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1993); People v.
Lifrieri, 157 Misc. 2d 598, 602, 597 N.Y.S.2d 580, 583
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(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993) (only where constitution-
ally protected right is implicated that violation of stat-
ute warrants suppression of fruits of that violation).
1. The fruit of the poisonous tree will be inadmissible as
long as its connection to the illegal search and seizure is
not too remote or attenuated. People v. Dentine, 21
N.Y.2d 971,971, 237 N.E.2d 361, 361, 290 N.Y.S.2d 199,
200 (1968). However, not all evidence illegally obtained
will be inadmissible. The exclusionary rule's basic goal
is to deter unlawful police activity. People v. Chennault,
20 N.Y.2d 518, 521, 232 N.E.2d 324, 325, 285 N.Y.S.2d
289, 291 (1967) (fruits of poisonous tree rule designed to
punish law enforcement officers rather than having any
bearing on guilt or innocence). Therefore, where sup-
pression will have little or no deterrent benefit, the evi-
dence will not be excluded. People v. Drain, 73 N.Y.2d
107, 109, 535 N.E.2d 630, 632, 538 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502
(1989) (defendant's perjury before grand jury concerning
illegally obtained evidence did not warrant suppres-
sion).
2. The burden of proving that the evidence was not
obtained from the tainted source rests upon the prosecu-
tion.
People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 286-87, 183
N.E.2d 651, 653-54, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 356-57
(1962).
3. The taint is dissipated if the prosecution shows that it
discovered the evidence through independent inquiry or
that it would inevitably have discovered the evidence
even without the poisonous source. Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 442 (1984); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S.
533, 537 (1988) (federal agents became aware of the
presence of marijuana in a warehouse because of an
unlawful entry. Subsequently, the agents obtained a
search warrant without mentioning prior entry. The
Court held that the evidence obtained through the use
of the warrant was admissible, notwithstanding the fact
that initially the evidence was obtained through unlaw-
ful means); People v. Alexander, 189 A.D.2d 189, 195,
[Vol. 9:289
COMPENDIUM OF NEW YORK LAW
595 N.Y.S.2d 279, 284 (4th Dep't 1993); People v. White,
190 A.D.2d 768, 769, 593 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (2d Dep't
1993). However, had the knowledge unlawfully obtained
been used as a basis for obtaining the warrant, the evi-
dence obtained might be suppressed. See People v. Burr,
70 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 514 N.E.2d 1363, 1366, 520
N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 989
(1988).
a. The independent source rule applies only to secon-
dary evidence indirectly discovered. Primary evi-
dence initially seized must be suppressed even if it
would have been inevitably discovered. Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963); People v.
Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313, 318, 506 N.E.2d 911, 914, 514
N.Y.S.2d 201, 204 (1987).
4. Where a witness, whose identity is discovered through
an illegal wiretap, voluntarily agrees to testify, the evi-
dence is admissible. People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12,
27, 385 N.E.2d 541, 548, 412 N.Y.S.2d 801, 808 (1978);
People v. Mendez, 28 N.Y.2d 94, 100-01, 268 N.E.2d 778,
781-82, 320 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44-45, cert. denied, 404 U.S.
911 (1971).
D. Private Searches: Because the Fourth Amendment bars only
official search and seizure, evidence obtained by a private
person through an illegal search is admissible in both civil
(Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 41, 203 N.E.2d 481, 483,
255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (1964)) and criminal cases (People v. Car-
lisle, 187 A.D.2d 319, 319, 589 N.Y.S.2d 879, 879 (1st Dep't
1992); People v. Crank, 155 Misc. 2d 762, 766, 590 N.Y.S.2d
149, 151 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1992)). However, where
the police actively participate in assisting the private person,
this creates the type of custodial atmosphere that calls for the
observance of a suspect's constitutional rights, and such evi-
dence would thus be inadmissible. People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d
528, 533, 393 N.E.2d 443, 445, 419 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (1979).
1. In civil cases (which are not quasi-criminal, or in which
penalties or forfeitures are not sought) evidence illegally
obtained by a public official is admissible when the vic-
tim of the search makes an affirmative claim for relief
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against the government body. Herndon v. City of Ithaca,
43 A.D.2d 634, 635, 349 N.Y.S.2d 227, 231 (3d Dep't
1973). But see Terpstra v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 26
N.Y.2d 70, 74, 256 N.E.2d 536, 538, 308 N;Y.S.2d 378,
381 (1970); contra United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
446 (1976) ("silver platter" doctrine applies in civil liti-
gation but not in criminal cases).
E. Protected Areas: The Fourth Amendment protects "persons,
houses, papers, and effects." While it has been held that the
amendment "protects people, not places" (Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)), it is traditional to refer to
the areas which are protected by the Fourth Amendment.
1. These include homes and their appurtenances (e.g., a
garage), hotel rooms, hospital rooms, stores, and
automobiles. The protection of privacy extends to com-
mercial buildings as well as private residences. How-
ever, open-ended or general warrants are constitution-
ally prohibited. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 (1979)
(a warrant to search a place cannot normally be con-
strued to authorize a search of each individual in that
place). Accordingly, a warrant to search an automobile
does not authorize breaking into a garage to get it. Peo-
ple v. Sciacca, 45 N.Y.2d 122, 127, 379 N.E.2d 1153,
1155, 408 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1978); see also People v.
Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689, 696, 422 N.E.2d 531, 535, 439
N.Y.S.2d 871, 875 (1981) (where undercover officer was
brought into a house by an informer, the purchase of
contraband therein did not justify the warrantless entry
by other officers to search other parts of the premises);
People v. Caruso, 174 A.D.2d 1051, 1051, 572 N.Y.S.2d
216, 217 (4th Dep't 1991) (search of shed at defendant's
residence exceeded the authorized scope of search war-
rant which authorized search of residence).
a. Where there is no expectation of privacy which soci-
ety considers reasonable, governmental intrusion
does not constitute a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, and thus there is no con-
stitutional violation.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984);
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People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 162, 505
N.E.2d 586, 588, 513 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (1987); see
also People v. Reed, 148 Misc. 2d 539, 541, 561
N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1990).
F. Standing: Only a victim of the illegal search and seizure has
standing to move to suppress or to object on that ground.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969); People
v. Henley, 53 N.Y.2d 403, 408, 425 N.E.2d 816, 818, 442
N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (1981) (movant must show a personal con-
stitutional infringement); People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159,
161-62, 505 N.E.2d 586, 587-88, 513 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77-78
(1987). To have standing, the defendant must own, occupy, or
control either the place searched or the objects seized. See
People v. Varacalli, 154 Misc. 2d 805, 808, 596 N.Y.S.2d 346,
348 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993).
1. The place searched. It is "sufficient that (the defendant)
be legitimately on the premises when the search
occurs."
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390
(1968); People v. Reid, 148 Misc. 2d 539, 542, 561
N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1990);
People v. Bandera, 166 A.D.2d 657, 658, 561
N.Y.S.2d 81, 81 (2d Dep't 1990).
2. The objects which are seized. If A's goods are seized
from B's home, both A and B have standing. If A's goods
are seized from A's home, only A has standing.
People v. Estrada, 23 N.Y.2d 719, 720, 244 N.E.2d
57, 57, 296 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 953 (1969).
3. Doctrine of "automatic standing," which allowed a
defendant charged with a possessory offense to have
standing without demonstrating an interest in the
premises searched or the property seized, has been
abrogated. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 89
(1980) (overruling Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960)); People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 165, 429
N.E.2d 735, 737, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (1981) (abrogating
People v. Hansen, 38 N.Y.2d 17, 339 N.E.2d 873, 377
N.Y.S.2d 461 (1975)).
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4. Defendant has the burden of demonstrating sufficient
privacy interest. The relevant factors include: (1)
number of times person stays in place, (2) length and
nature of stay, (3) indicia of connectedness to place and
of privacy, such as changes of clothes or sharing house-
hold expenses and burdens. People v. Rodriguez, 69
N.Y.2d 159, 162, 505 N.E.2d 586, 588, 513 N.Y.S.2d 75,
78 (1987); People v. Whitfield, 81 N.Y.2d 904, 906, 613
N.E.2d 547, 548, 597 N.Y.S.2d 641, 642 (1993) (mere
surrender of property to a third party will not always
terminate legitimate expectation of privacy, for pur-
poses of standing to contest search or seizure).
G. Suppression Procedure: N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 710
(McKinney 1984) states that a defendant's pretrial motion to
suppress any evidence, which he is aware has been unconsti-
tutionally seized, must be made after the commencement of
the criminal action and within the time for pretrial motions
generally. People v. McCall, 19 A.D.2d 630, 631, 241 N.Y.S.2d
439, 441 (2d Dep't 1963); see also People v. Woodward, 156
A.D.2d 225, 228-229, 548 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491 (1st Dep't 1989);
see also People v. Allen, 146 Misc. 2d 701, 702, 550 N.Y.S.2d
997, 999 (Sup. Ct. Seneca County 1990).
1. The defendant bears the burden of proving by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the Fourth Amendment
has been violated. People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 367,
270 N.E.2d 709, 712, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (1971); Peo-
ple v. Merola, 30 A.D.2d 963, 964, 294 N.Y.S.2d 301, 305
(2d Dep't 1968); The prosecution bears the initial bur-
den of going forward with the evidence. Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342 (1939); People v. White-
hurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 254 N.E.2d 905, 906, 306
N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (1969); People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d
86, 91, 209 N.E.2d 694, 698, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71, n.2
(1965); People v. Sanchez, 151 Misc. 2d 431, 433, 579
N.Y.S.2d 825, 827 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1991).
a. However, if the prosecution contends that the
search was legal due to defendant's consent, then
the burden of going forward with the evidence and
the burden of proof rests on the prosecution.
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People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 254
N.E.2d 905, 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (1969).
2. Nothing which the defendant says at the suppression
hearing may be used at trial. Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968). However, such testimony is
admissible for impeachment purposes if the defendant
testifies at trial. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226
(1971); People v. Faulkner, 195 A.D.2d 384, 385, 600
N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (1st Dep't 1993).
H. Unreasonable Searches: The Constitution permits a reason-
able search. Whether a search and seizure by a state officer is
reasonable is to be judged by the same standards as are
applied to a federal officer. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34
(1963). A search and seizure is reasonable if conducted:
1. Pursuant to a properly issued search warrant;
2. As an incident of a lawful arrest;
3. As a limited frisk for a weapon;
4. With consent;
5. As an incident of hot pursuit.
I. Search Warrants: A search warrant may not be issued except
"upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and . . .
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend XIV. The statutory
requirements must be complied with for the search warrant
to be valid. People v. Taylor, 73 N.Y.2d 683, 688, 541 N.E.2d
386, 388, 543 N.Y.S.2d 357, 359 (1989).
1. An application for a search warrant must contain "a
statement that there is reasonable cause to believe that
property [which may be seized] may be found in or upon
a designated or described place, vehicle or person. .. "
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 690.35(3)(b) (McKinney 1984).
a. "Personal property is subject to seizure pursuant to
a search warrant if there is reasonable cause to
believe that it (1) is stolen, or (2) is unlawfully pos-
sessed, or (3) has been used, or is possessed for the
purpose of being used, to commit or conceal the
commission of an offense, or (4) constitutes evi-
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dence or tends to demonstrate that an offense was
committed or that a particular person participated
in the commission of an offense." N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAw § 690.10 (McKinney 1984).
b. Probable cause may be supplied by an informer.
People v. Hayes, 191 A.D.2d 644, 644, 595 N.Y.S.2d
239, 239 (2d Dep't 1993). But, unless informer him-
self executes the affidavit, the police may not act
thereon without corroboration. Corroboration may
be supplied either by proof that the informer has
proven reliable in the past or by independent verifi-
cation of the information supplied by him. People v.
Roberson, 186 A.D.2d 1014, 1015, 588 N.Y.S.2d
469, 470 (4th Dep't 1992).
(1) Where an informer is involved, the search war-
rant may not be issued unless the magistrate is
apprised of some facts from which the inform-
ant concluded that the things to be seized are
located in the premises and some of the facts
upon which the police based their conclusion
that the informant was reliable. People v. Han-
lon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 556, 330 N.E.2d 631, 635,
369 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682 (1975); see also People v.
Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 488 N.E.2d 451,
455, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 634 (1985).
c. The Fourth Amendment requires the suppression
of evidence seized pursuant to the warrant if a pre-
ponderance of the evidence shows perjury or reck-
less disregard of the truth on behalf of the officer,
and a determination that, without the false state-
ment, the affidavit fails to establish probable cause.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155 (1978); see
also People v. Tambe, 71 N.Y.2d 492, 504, 522
N.E.2d 448, 454, 527 N.Y.S.2d 372, 378 (1988).
d. The Supreme Court now uses a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" analysis. The magistrate must make a
practical decision whether, given all the facts and
circumstances found in the affidavit, including the
"veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons sup-
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plying the hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that evidence of the crime will be found
in a particular place.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
e. If a reliable informer is lying, there may be prob-
able cause if the evidence shows that the police
relied in good faith on credible information.
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967). But
where the officer who seeks the warrant is lying,
there is no probable cause. People v. Alfinito, 16
N.Y.2d 181, 186, 211 N.E.2d 644, 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d
243, 246 (1965).
2. The place to be searched and the things to be seized
must be described with particularity. People v. Rothen-
berg, 20 N.Y.2d 35, 38, 228 N.E.2d 379, 380, 281
N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (1967); People v. Guerrero, 181 A.D.2d
1030, 1031, 582 N.Y.S.2d 576, 577 (4th Dep't 1992).
Here, the officer has no discretion. Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), overruled by Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled by Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
a. The right to search for and seize an item does not
allow an inference that there is probable cause to
search for or seize another. People v. Baker, 23
N.Y.2d 307, 320, 244 N.E.2d 232, 237, 296 N.Y.S.2d
745, 752 (1968); see also People v. Sciacca, 45
N.Y.2d 122, 127, 379 N.E.2d 1153, 1155, 408
N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1978).
b. If the place to be searched is a multiple dwelling,
the warrant is void if it describes the entire build-
ing. People v. Rainey, 14 N.Y.2d 35, 37, 197 N.E.2d
527, 529, 248 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (1964); People v. Hen-
ley, 135 A.D.2d 1136, 523 N.Y.S.2d 258 (4th Dep't
1987); People v. Lawrence, 31 A.D.2d 712, 714, 296
N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (3d Dep't 1968).
c. The things to be seized may be contraband, fruits of
a crime, instrumentalities of a crime, or the evi-
dence of a crime.
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N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAw § 690.10 (McKinney 1993);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967).
3. Where the search warrant lists one thing (e.g., a gun)
and the officer executing the warrant discovers another
thing (e.g., narcotics), the second object may be seized if
it is contraband (cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1968)) or if the defendant is immediately arrested
for the crime of possessing it (People v. Schwartz, 54
Misc. 2d 34, 37, 281 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1967)). But if the collateral object is merely evi-
dence of another crime, and no contemporaneous arrest
is made, the object may not be seized.
People v. Baker, 23 N.Y.2d 307, 320, 244 N.E.2d
232, 237, 296 N.Y.S.2d 745, 753 (1968).
4. When executing a warrant, an officer must give or make
a reasonable effort to give notice of his authority and
purpose to an occupant thereof upon request, unless it is
a "no knock" warrant. If the officer is refused admit-
tance, he may forcibly enter. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw
§ 690.50. However, if there is a danger that the objects
he is to seize may be destroyed or if there is a danger to
himself, the warrant may expressly exempt him from
the notice requirement. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 690.40.
5. It may be the rule that if there is time to get a search
warrant, one must be gotten. United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318; People v.
Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 81, 315 N.E.2d 792, 795, 358
N.Y.S.2d 743, 747 (1974); see also People v. Knapp, 52
N.Y.2d 689,694, 422 N.E.2d 531, 534, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871,
874 (1981). But see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 423 (1976) (may arrest without a warrant even if
there is time to get one); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
112 (1975); People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 558, 330
N.E.2d 631, 636, 369 N.Y.S.2d 677, 684 (1975).
J. Incident to Arrest: A complete search of the person arrested
(United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973)) and of
the immediate vicinity where the arrest took place may be
made as an incident to a lawful arrest. Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 765-768 (1969); People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d
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351, 353, 320 N.E.2d 636, 638, 361 N.Y.S.2d 897, 898 (1974);
People v. Brenfield, 188 A.D.2d 477, 478, 590 N.Y.S.2d 536,
537 (2d Dep't 1992). A lawful arrest may be made pursuant to
an arrest warrant (N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 120 (McKinney
1984)) or, in proper instances, without an arrest warrant
(N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1984)).
1. A search incidental to a justifiable arrest, with or with-
out a search warrant, must be confined to the defendant
and his immediate surroundings. Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 754-760 (1969); Von Cleef v. New Jersey,
395 U.S. 814, 814-815 (1969); Matter of Marrhonda G.,
151 Misc. 2d 149, 153, 575 N.Y.S.2d 425, 429 (Family
Ct. N.Y. County 1991). However, the Supreme Court
expanded the scope of the permissible search allowed in
a house pursuant to a valid arrest. Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (search of basement from
which defendant came from was permissible; police may
search an area of the house if there is reasonable suspi-
cion based on specific evidence that the area harbors an
individual posing danger to the police). The Court stated
that the search, in this case, was more limited than the
one in Chimel, which was a full blown search of a house.
2. A policeman may never arrest without a warrant unless
there is probable cause that the defendant has commit-
ted an offense.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949);
Veras v. Truth Verification Corp., 87 A.D.2d 381,
384, 451 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (1st Dep't 1982), aff'd,
57 N.Y.2d 947, 443 N.E.2d 989, 457 N.Y.S.2d 241
(1982).
a. There is no probable cause where the police receive
an anonymous tip that the defendant will be found
at a certain location in possession of the fruits of a
crime.
People v. Horowitz, 21 N.Y.2d 55, 58, 233 N.E.2d
453, 454, 286 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (1967); see also
People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 238, 406 N.E.2d
471, 475, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 660 (1980).
b. The constitutional requirements for a search with-
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out a warrant are even more stringent than the
requirements for a search with a warrant.
People v. Verrecchio, 23 N.Y.2d 489, 492, 245
N.E.2d 222, 224, 297 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (1969); see
also United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir.
1981).
c. People on probation exception. The Supreme Court
held that a search of a probationer's home where
the officer had his supervisor's approval and "rea-
sonable grounds" to believe there was contraband
in the house did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987).
d. Probable cause for a warrantless arrest may be
supplied through hearsay information.
People v. Roberson, 186 A.D.2d 1014, 1015, 588
N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (4th Dep't 1992).
e. If a radio bulletin or fellow officer provides probable
cause for arrest, police may act on it and arrest the
suspect. People v. Lypka, 36 N.Y.2d 210, 213, 326
N.E.2d 294, 296, 366 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (1975); Peo-
ple v. Allen, 146 Misc. 2d 701, 709, 550 N.Y.S.2d
997, 1003 (Seneca County Ct. 1990). However, pre-
sumption of probable cause disappears once defend-
ant challenges the police action, and the People
must then demonstrate that the sending agency
possessed the requisite knowledge to justify police
conduct. People v. Weddington, 192 A.D.2d 750,
750, 596 N.Y.S.2d 179, 179 (3d Dep't 1993).
3. If the probable cause for the arrest is obtained unconsti-
tutionally, the arrest is poisoned and any incidental
search is void.
People v. Perlman, 12 N.Y.2d 89, 95, 187 N.E.2d
550, 552, 236 N.Y.S.2d 945, 948 (1962); People v.
Corley, 91 Misc. 2d 255, 257, 397 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1977). Evidence is
inadmissible if obtained pursuant to an invalid
search warrant under circumstances that do not
justify seizure without a warrant. People v. Fino, 14
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N.Y.2d 160, 163-64, 199 N.E.2d 151, 153, 250
N.Y.S.2d 47, 51 (1964); People v. Williams, 37
N.Y.2d 206, 207, 333 N.E.2d 160, 371 N.Y.S.2d 880,
881 (1975).
4. With the exception of collateral objects seized under a
search warrant, the arrest must be valid before the
search is made. The arrest cannot be a pretext to justify
the search.
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); People
v. Melendez, 195 A.D.2d 856, 857, 600 N.Y.S.2d
776, 777 (3d Dep't 1993).
5. If the arrest is valid and the search produces evidence
revealing the commission of other crimes, the fact that
the defendant is acquitted of the crime for which he was
arrested does not bar the use of the evidence in a prose-
cution for the other crimes.
People v. Molloy, 17 N.Y.2d 431, 433, 213 N.E.2d
801, 801, 266 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (1965).
6. The search is limited to arrestee's body and the area
from which he might obtain a weapon or evidence that
could be destroyed. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
764-65 (1969); see also People v. Blasich, 73 N.Y.2d 673,
678, 541 N.E.2d 40, 43, 543 N.Y.S.2d 40, 43 (1989)
(where the circumstances give rise to probable cause for
the police to believe that the car contains contraband, a
weapon, or evidence of a crime, the police may conduct a
warrantless search of the car pursuant to the "automo-
bile exception").
7. If defendant is arrested on the street, the police may not
enter an apartment to conduct a search. Vale v. Louisi-
ana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1970); People v. Williams, 37
N.Y.2d 206, 208, 333 N.E.2d 160, 161, 371 N.Y.S.2d 880,
881 (1975).
8. Where there is no expectation of privacy which society
considers reasonable, the requirement that the search
be incidental is relaxed. See People v. Natal, 75 N.Y.2d
379, 383, 553 N.E.2d 239, 241, 553 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652
(1990). Under the "open fields" doctrine, an "individual
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may not legitimately demand privacy for activities con-
ducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immedi-
ately surrounding the home." Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984); see also People v. Reynolds, 71
N.Y.2d 552, 558, 523 N.E.2d 291, 294, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15,
18 (1988). But see People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 484,
593 N.E.2d 1328, 1334, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1992)
(where landowners post "no trespassing" signs or indi-
cate that entry is not permitted, the expectation that
their privacy rights will be respected and that they will
be free from unwanted intrusion is reasonable).
9. Although New York has held that there may be no
search of defendant or his automobile when the defend-
ant is arrested for a traffic infraction unless there is rea-
sonable grounds to suspect that the policeman is in
danger of assault with a weapon, (People v. Marsh, 20
N.Y.2d 98, 101, 228 N.E.2d 783, 785-86, 281 N.Y.S.2d
789, 792-93 (1967)), the Supreme Court has held that
the person of the defendant may be searched even when
arrested for a traffic violation. United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U.S. 218, 230-36 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260, 263-66 (1973). Although under Robinson
defendant's constitutional rights may not have been vio-
lated, states may apply stricter standards. A search is
allowed of a person in a traffic violation case to seize
fruits, instrumentalities and other evidence of crime in
order to prevent their destruction or concealment or to
remove weapons a defendant may use to resist arrest.
People v. Gonzalez, 109 Misc. 2d 448, 452, 439 N.Y.S.2d
970, 973 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1980); see also
People v. Jackson, 111 A.D.2d 412, 413, 489 N.Y.S.2d
375, 376 (2d Dep't 1985).
a. In some situations, New York seems to follow
Robinson. See People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d 476,
478, 323 N.E.2d 183, 184-85, 363 N.Y.S.2d 943,
944-45 (1974) (court sustained the frisking of a
motorist when arrested for the misdemeanor of
driving after the forfeiture of his license, on the
ground that one who is taken into custody loses
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whatever interest of privacy he had before the
arrest). But see People v. Adams, 32 N.Y.2d 451,
454, 299 N.E.2d 653, 655, 363 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231
(1973) (court denied policeman's right to search an
automobile driver arrested for traffic misde-
meanor).
b. When defendant is arrested in his car for a crime,
the car may generally be searched under the
Chimel doctrine. Because of the mobility of cars,
the requirement that the search be contemporane-
ous is relaxed. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 755 n.1 (1969); People v. Bacalocostantis, 121
A.D.2d 812, 815, 504 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (3d Dep't
1986) (where defendant was stopped and arrested
while driving a vehicle, and there was probable
cause for his arrest as a suspect in shooting inci-
dent, police could conduct warrantless search of
defendant's vehicle for evidence of that crime at
scene of arrest, or police could secure vehicle in
their custody and take it back to police station for
search). But see People v. Adams, 32 N.Y.2d 451,
454, 299 N.E.2d 653, 655, 346 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231
(1973).
c. And even if defendant is not present and no arrest
is being made, a car may be searched when police
have probable cause to believe that there is some-
thing in the car which the police have the right to
seize, at least when there is no time to get a search
warrant. Compare Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970) with Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971).
d. If there is a police regulation which requires that
the contents of an impounded car be "inventoried,"
the search conducted pursuant thereto is constitu-
tional. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
372-73 (1976).
10. Objects that fall in plain view of police officer who is
rightfully in such position that provides that view are
subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence.
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Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983); Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); People v.
Rowell, 27 N.Y.2d 691, 262 N.E.2d 217, 314 N.Y.S.2d 10
(1970); In re Marrhonda G., 151 Misc. 2d 149, 154, 575
N.Y.S.2d 425, 429 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1991). How-
ever, the object must have fallen into view "inadver-
tently." People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 80, 315 N.E.2d
792, 794, 358 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747 (1974).
K. Stop and Frisk: a police officer has the right to take investi-
gatory action and frisk a person by patting his outer gar-
ments for a dangerous weapon as an incident to lawful
inquiry, where (1) he suspects that such person-abroad in a
public place-is committing, has committed or is about to
commit a felony or a class A misdemeanor and (2) he suspects
that he is exposing himself to danger of life or limb when he
stops to question such person. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 140.50
(McKinney 1984); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59-62
(1968); People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, 270, 414 N.E.2d
645, 647, 434 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (1980); People v. Marine, 142
A.D.2d 368, 370, 536 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (1st Dep't 1989).
1. The police officer must point to "specific and articulable
facts which taken together with rational inferences from
those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); People v. Tag-
gart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 337, 229 N.E.2d 581, 582, 283
N.Y.S.2d 1, 3-4 (1967); People v. Cornelius, 113
A.D.2d 666, 670, 497 N.Y.S.2d 16, 19 (1st Dep't
1986).
2. See People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562,
386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976) for a complete summary of a
policeman's powers in face-to-face street encounters.
L. Consent: A defendant may waive his constitutional protection
and consent to a search. The prosecution has the burden of
proving consent by clear and convincing evidence.
United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657, 663 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963); People v. Whitehurst,
25 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 254 N.E.2d 905, 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d
673, 674 (1969); People v. Pena, 156 Misc. 2d 791, 792,
594 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587 (Schenectady County Ct. 1993).
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However, consent by coercion or duress is not consent.
People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 124, 347 N.E.2d 575,
577, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (1976).
1. If A and B have equal right of possession, either one
may permit police to search the premises.
United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542, 549 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967); People v.
Winograd, 68 N.Y.2d 383, 390, 502 N.E.2d 189,
193, 509 N.Y.S.2d 512, 516 n.2 (1986) (police
officers obtained permission from landlord to
install video surveillance); People v. Overton, 24
N.Y.2d 522, 525, 249 N.E.2d 366, 368, 301 N.Y.S.2d
479, 482 (1969) (high school principal may permit
search of student's locker).
a. A search is considered reasonable where a mother,
aunt, wife, paramour or other person who shares
premises with the suspect permits the police to
enter and conduct a search.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 167 (1974);
People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 290, 397 N.E.2d
1319, 1321, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654 (1979).
b. A hotel manager does not have an equal right with
a guest to possession of a hotel room.
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
c. Where the owner of an automobile consented to its
search, evidence seized during the search could be
used against a passenger. People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d
347, 353, 179 N.E.2d 339, 340, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197,
198 (1961).
d. There is no requirement that a Miranda warning
be given before defendant consents to the search or
that he be aware of his right to refuse to consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231
(1973); People v. Bennet, 70 N.Y.2d 891, 894, 519
N.E.2d 289, 291, 524 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (1987)
(officer's investigatory questioning of suspect con-
cerning plastic baggies and black pouch observed in
suspect's car did not constitute "custodial interro-
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gation," for purposes of determining necessity for
Miranda warnings); People v. Baker, 188 A.D.2d
1012, 1012, 592 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (4th Dep't 1992).
M. Hot Pursuit: When the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect
who has entered a house, they may search the house to locate
the suspect and to seize any weapons which might be used to
effect an escape. Evidence seized during such a search is
admissible even though the evidence is not a weapon.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967); People
v. Henderson, 107 A.D.2d 469, 470, 487 N.Y.S.2d 425,
427 (4th Dep't 1985).
1. Where police enter private premises because it is their
duty to do so, they are privileged to seize any evidence of
crime which is in plain view. People v. Gallmon, 19
N.Y.2d 389, 393, 227 N.E.2d 284, 287, 280 N.Y.S.2d 356,
361 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 911 (1968); People v.
Hanley, 188 A.D.2d 423, 423, 591 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1011
(1st Dep't 1992) (drugs found after officer placed himself
in position to peer into safe and remove money inadmis-
sible).
2. Fire officials may remain in building without a warrant
for a reasonable time or return the next morning to
investigate the cause of the fire. Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 509-510 (1978). However, the official's return
must be a continuation of the earlier entry. Michigan v.
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984).
3. The hot pursuit doctrine is not limited by Chimel. Peo-
ple v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 507, 300 N.E.2d 139,
142, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797 (authorized warrantless
search of a closet after suspect had already been hand-
cuffed), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1050 (1973).
N. Eavesdropping: Eavesdropping includes both bugging (use of
an instrument to overhear a nontelephonic communication)
and wiretapping (use of an instrument to overhear telephonic
communication). N.Y. Penal Law § 250.05 forbids unlawful
wiretapping or mechanical overhearing of a conversation.
Both are felonies if there is neither consent from one party to
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the conversation nor a properly issued eavesdropping war-
rant.
1. Private Eavesdropping: is done by a private person, who
is not a working government agent. Private eavesdrop-
ping creates no constitutional problems. However, it is a
crime, and all evidence obtained through or as a result
of a violation of N.Y. PENAL LAw § 250.05 (McKinney
1989) is inadmissible.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4506 (McKinney 1992)
a. The evidence obtained is admissible where one
party to a conversation conceals a microphone on
himself and transmits or records what is said.
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966);
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437 (1963);
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 752 (1952).
Notice need not be given to the other party of the
conversation. People v. Hickey, 182 A.D.2d 883, 582
N.Y.S.2d 517, 518 (3d Dep't 1992). A third person
with permission by one party to the conversation
may record conversation without notice to the other
party. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750
(1971).
b. A subscriber has the right to record his own tele-
phone conversations in which he participates, and
such recordings are admissible in evidence. N.V.
Simons' Metaalhandel v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 7
A.D.2d 840, 841, 181 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (1st Dep't
1959); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 250.00(2) (McKinney
1989).
2. Official Eavesdropping: is done by a government agent.
Official eavesdropping invades the right of privacy.
Although there is no general constitutional protection of
privacy, there is a Fourth Amendment violation where
the government unreasonably eavesdrops upon a
defendant's words thereby intruding "upon the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied .....
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)
(attaching an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of a public telephone booth,
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enabling federal agents to listen to and record
defendant's end of telephone conversation, held as
a Fourth Amendment violation, even though device
did not penetrate the booth); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (bugging of home or office
violates the Fourth Amendment; former CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 813-a, authorizing court
order for eavesdropping, was invalid because it did
not comply with requirements of Fourth Amend-
ment); People v. Basilicato, 64 N.Y.2d 103, 110, 474
N.E.2d 215, 217, 485 N.Y.S.2d 7, 9 (1984) (wiretap
warrant did not authorize use of nontelephonic con-
versations which police were able to overhear
whenever the receiver in suspect bookmaking oper-
ation was left off hook so as to hold off incoming
calls).
3. The use of a "pen register," which reveals numbers
called but intercepts no conversation, does not involve
Fourth Amendment rights. People v. Guerra, 65 N.Y.2d
60, 64, 478 N.E.2d 1319, 1321, 489 N.Y.S.2d 718, 720
(1985); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 700.05 (McKinney 1984)
("eavesdropping" does not include the use of a pen regis-
ter or trap and trace device). The regulations regarding
the use of such devices are proscribed by N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAw § 705. However, pen register having the
capacity to monitor conversations would be treated as
an eavesdropping device under N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw;
People v. Bialostok, 80 N.Y.2d 738, 744, 610 N.E.2d 374,
377, 594 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704 (1993).
a. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-59 (1967),
recognizes that under proper circumstances, and
with appropriate safeguards, a warrant may be
issued authorizing eavesdropping.
(1) The court in Katz also cautioned that "whether
safeguards other than prior authorization by a
magistrate would satisfy the fourth amendment
in a situation involving the national security is
a question not presented by this case." How-
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ever, in United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-21 (1972), the Court
held that in domestic (as distinct from interna-
tional) security cases, a warrant must be
obtained.
4. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 700 permits a Supreme Court,
County or Appellate Court judge to authorize an eaves-
dropping warrant for either a bug or a wiretap based
upon the showing of reasonable cause to believe that the
eavesdrop will produce evidence of the commission of a
particular offense. The application must be made by a
district attorney, or the State Attorney General, or the
official designated by such officer to act during his
absence or disability. It must also appear that normal
investigatory procedures would be futile or too danger-
ous. Particularity is required in the application, includ-
ing the facts establishing probable cause, identity of
persons, description of the premises, and the type of
communication sought.
a. The warrant is good for thirty days but the eaves-
dropping must stop upon hearing the desired con-
versation. Extension orders up to thirty days may
be obtained upon a new showing of probable cause.
b. Within ninety days after termination of the war-
rant, the person whose conversations were seized
must be informed thereof. This can be extended.
c. The relationship between the New York statute
and the subsequently enacted federal eavesdrop-
ping statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520) is obscure.
The statutes are inconsistent in some respects.
5. N.Y. Crv. PAc. L. & R. § 4506 (McKinney 1992) prohib-
its the admission of all evidence and leads obtained by
an illegal official eavesdrop.
6. Suppression Procedure: in a criminal case, intercepted
communication may not be admitted into evidence
unless the prosecution gives the defendant notice
thereof within fifteen days after arraignment unless the
judge decides otherwise; defendant then must make a
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pretrial motion to suppress the evidence. In a civil case,
if the defendant knows about the illegal eavesdrop, he
must also make a pretrial motion to suppress. If no
motion is made, the defendant waives his right to object
to its admission at trial. N.Y. CRrM. PROC. LAw
§§ 700.70, 710.10-.70 (McKinney 1984); N.Y. Crv. PRAc.
L. & R. § 4506 (McKinney 1992).
a. Where there has been an unconstitutional eaves-
drop, the transcript of all obtained conversations
must be turned over to the defendant to help him
prepare his defense. Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969).
b. Only a person whose rights have been invaded has
standing to complain. Illegally or unconstitution-
ally seized conversations are admissible except
upon objection by a party to the conversation or by
a person whose privacy was invaded. Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171, 175 (1969).
c. Where conversation between A and B incriminates
C, the evidence is generally admissible against C.
People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66, 79, 233 N.E.2d
705, 712, 286 N.Y.S.2d 657, 667 (1967); People v.
Dolan, 172 A.D.2d 68, 72, 576 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903
(3d Dep't 1991).
XV. SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. In General: No witness, party or nonparty, may be compelled
to answer a question which will tend to expose him to a crimi-
nal prosecution or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; applicable to states resultant of
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964); N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 6; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 4501 (McKinney 1993);
Levine v. Bornstein, 13 Misc. 2d 161, 163, 174 N.Y.S.2d
574, 576 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. Kings County), affd, 7
A.D.2d 995, 183 N.Y.S.2d 868 (2d Dep't), affd, 6 N.Y.2d
892, 160 N.E.2d 921, 190 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1958) (ordering
that, because plaintiff refused to answer pertinent ques-
tions after bringing action for affirmative relief, plaintiff
could claim privilege against self-incrimination).
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1. A party or nonparty may assert the privilege against
self-incrimination in civil proceedings, as well as in
criminal prosecutions.
In re Kenneth M., 130 Misc. 2d 217, 218-20, 495
N.Y.S.2d 131, 132-33 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1985) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1966)).
B. Incrimination: The forfeiture or penalty must be punitive or
concern a criminal intent for the privilege to be applicable.
The witness may not refuse to answer a question on the
ground that it would tend to subject him to civil liability.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4501 (McKinney 1993); McDer-
mott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d
20, 28, 203 N.E.2d 469, 474, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 72 (1964).
1. Privileged information does not have to directly incrimi-
nate the accused. The privilege also extends to answers
which may indirectly lead to evidence as to the witness's
guilt in the commission of a crime. Such evidence is
often referred to as providing a "link in the chain of evi-
dence."
People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N.Y. 219, 230,
38 N.E. 303, 306 (1894) (privilege must be asserted
in cases of good faith fear of personal incrimination,
not that of friends or associates); Doyle v. Hof
stader, 257 N.Y. 244, 251, 177 N.E. 489, 491 (1931)
(stating that questions suggesting extraordinary
fees are for purposes of bribery and corruption
imply "chain of guilt" against which privilege may
be asserted); see also Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (holding that series of ques-
tions leading to inference of involvement in racke-
teering, in aggregate, may allow assertion of
privilege).
2. The fear of conviction cannot merely be a remote possi-
bility, but it must be a real danger.
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-75
(1951) ("mere imaginary possibility of prosecution"
is insufficient to invoke privilege against self-
incrimination (citing Mason v. United States, 244
U.S. 362, 366 (1917))); Slater v. Slater, 78 Misc. 2d
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13, 15, 355 N.Y.S.2d 943, 945 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T.
Queens County 1974) (holding that right to inquire
about former spouse's financial status overrides
witness's fear of being found guilty of perjury
regarding tax returns).
a. The claim of privilege will be upheld unless the
answer could not possibly incriminate the witness.
Basically, a witness is the judge as to whether or
not the answer could incriminate him, unless the
court finds his claim to be without substance.
People v. Arroyo, 46 N.Y.2d 928, 930, 388 N.E.2d
342, 343, 415 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (1979); Flushing
Nat'l Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 135 A.D.2d
486, 487, 521 N.Y.S.2d 727, 728 (2d Dep't 1987)
("when the danger of incrimination is not readily
apparent, the witness may be required to establish
a factual predicate").
3. Records, Books, and Documents: The privilege against
self-incrimination may be extended to the witness's
books and papers.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 406-07 (1975)
(tax returns); People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 172,
176 N.E.2d 571, 578, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647, 656
(accounts receivable ledger), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
104 (1961); Henry v. Lewis, 102 A.D.2d 430, 433,
478 N.Y.S.2d 263, 266 (1st Dep't 1984) (acknowl-
edging potential application of privilege to sole
practitioner psychiatrist's business records and
patient's personal documents).
a. The privilege may not be asserted in response to a
request for records, unless the papers are the pri-
vate property of the one asserting the right.
In re Cappetta, 42 N.Y.2d 1066, 1067, 369 N.E.2d
1172, 1173, 399 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (1977) (holding
that school records are property of board of educa-
tion, and employee may not assert privilege);
Norkin v. Hoey, 181 A.D.2d 248, 253, 586 N.Y.S.2d
926, 930 (1st Dep't 1992) (stating that if personal
financial information of loan applicant is in posses-
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sion of bank, applicant cannot assert right).
b. The privilege may not be extended to records which
are required to be kept by law.
People v. Doe, 59 N.Y.2d 655, 656, 450 N.E.2d 211,
212, 463 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (1983) (medical records
not privileged).
c. The privilege is not applicable when a person is
ordered by the government to produce an object
(does not apply to real or physical evidence).
Baltimore City Dep't of Social Services v.
Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 554 (1990) (in child abuse
case mother cannot assert privilege when
requested to produce child).
C. Parties and Witnesses: There are two branches to the privi-
lege-the defendant privilege, and the witness privilege,
which includes that of the plaintiff.
1. Defendant Privilege: A defendant cannot be compelled to
testify in a criminal case. One defendant cannot compel
a codefendant to take the stand.
DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 141 (5th
Cir. 1962).
a. If the testimony of the codefendant is necessary to
defendant, a severance should be granted.
People v. Owens, 22 N.Y.2d 93, 97, 238 N.E.2d 715,
718, 291 N.Y.S.2d 313, 316 (1968) (must be show-
ing of intent and need to call codefendant as wit-
ness).
2. Witness Privilege: Any witness, party or nonparty, in a
civil or criminal action, can be compelled to take the wit-
ness stand and then invoke his privilege as the incrimi-
nating questions arise.
Levine v. Bornstein, 13 Misc. 2d 161, 163, 174
N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. Kings County),
affd, 7 A.D.2d 995, 183 N.Y.S.2d 868 (2d Dep't),
affd, 6 N.Y.2d 892, 160 N.E.2d 921, 190 N.Y.S.2d
702 (1958) (since plaintiff refused to answer perti-
nent questions after bringing action for affirmative
relief, plaintiff could claim privilege against self-
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incrimination).
D. Assertion of the Privilege:
1. When the privilege must be asserted: The privilege must
be asserted when the question is asked.
Figueroa v. Figueroa, 160 A.D.2d 390, 391, 553
N.Y.S.2d 753, 754 (1st Dep't 1990); 8 JOHN WIG-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2268, at 402-03
(McNaughton rev. 1961) ("Privilege... is merely an
option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry.").
a. The privilege can also be asserted when the docu-
ments are to be produced or contents revealed.
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Langemyr,
25 A.D.2d 534, 534-35, 267 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (2d
Dep't 1966).
2. How the privilege must be asserted: The privilege must
be asserted in good faith.
Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N.Y. 219, 231, 38 N.E 303,
306 (1894) (stating that privilege must be asserted
in case of good faith fear of personal incrimination,
not that of friends or associates); see also In re
Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 433, 26 N.E.2d 963, 966 (1940)
(determination of good faith usually left to wit-
ness's discretion unless flagrantly uncooperative);
Agnello v. Corbisiero, 177 A.D.2d 445, 446, 576
N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (1st Dep't 1991) (holding that
petitioner in action for harness owner's license can-
not testify if he refuses to answer questions on
adversary's case).
3. Point in proceedings when privilege may be asserted:
This privilege may be asserted throughout pretrial
stages, as well as during the trial itself.
Garcia v. New York City Transit Auth., 121 Misc.
2d 1012, 1014, 469 N.Y.S.2d 843, 845 (Sup. Ct.
Spec. T. N.Y. County 1983) (privilege asserted to
avoid pretrial disclosure).
4. Who may assert the privilege: The privilege is a personal
right that may only be asserted on one's own behalf.
In re Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66, 75, 439 N.E.2d 378,
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383, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 668 (1982) (attorney cannot
assert privilege on behalf of client if documents in
attorney's possession are subpoenaed).
a. To assert the right in response to a request for doc-
uments, the person asserting the privilege must
have possession of the materials requested.
Big Apple Concrete Corp. v. Abrams, 103 A.D.2d
609, 613, 481 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (1st Dep't 1984);
see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 333
(1973) (constructive possession may be sufficient).
5. Corporations: A corporation cannot invoke the privilege.
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988);
Big Apple Concrete Corp. v. Abrams, 103 A.D.2d
609, 613, 481 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (1st Dep't 1984)
(holding that particular employee cannot answer
on behalf of corporation because of own right to
privilege against self-incrimination, corporation
must produce someone who can respond).
a. Test of applicability: The test to determine the
applicability of the privilege by noncorporate
associations or entities, such as partnerships, is
discretionary for the court. If the character and
nature of the organization is deemed of a more
impersonal nature, the privilege may apply to the
organization as an entity. But if the organization is
deemed more personal in nature, the privilege may
not apply to the organization.
Sigety v. Hynes, 38 N.Y.2d 260, 268, 342 N.E.2d
518, 523, 379 N.Y.S.2d 724, 731-32, cert. denied,
425 U.S. 974 (1975) (allowing assertion of privilege
by organization only when organization's character
is so impersonal in scope, not in the case of a family
run nursing home, that it could not be said to
embody private, personal interests of members).
b. Even a corporation with a sole shareholder may not
assert the privilege.
Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1913);
New York v. Carey Resources, Inc., 97 A.D.2d 508,
508, 467 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877 (2d Dep't 1983).
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c. If the custodian of a corporation's custodial records
would incriminate himself by producing the
records, he may assert the privilege against self-
incrimination.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena v. Kuriansky, 69
N.Y.2d 232, 242, 505 N.E.2d 925, 930, 513 N.Y.S.2d
359, 365, cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987).
(1) However, the corporation is still under an obli-
gation to produce such subpoenaed records, and
must appoint another employee to perform such
production.
Kent Nursing Home v. Office of Special State
Prosecutor for Health & Social Servs., 49
A.D.2d 616, 616, 370 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (2d
Dep't), affd, 38 N.Y.2d 260, 342 N.E.2d 518,
379 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
974 (1976); Big Apple Concrete Corp. v. Abrams,
103 A.D.2d 609, 613, 481 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (1st
Dep't 1984) (holding that if particular employee
cannot answer on behalf of corporation because
of own right to privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, corporation must produce someone who
can respond).
d. This applies to one-man corporations, and one-man
organizations for which the privilege is inapplica-
ble.
Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1913);
People v. Carassavas, 103 Misc. 2d 562, 563, 426
N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (Saratoga County Ct. 1980).
E. Immunity: If the witness is already protected from potential
incrimination; or liability based on any testimony he may
give, the privilege against self-incrimination disappears.
In re Anonymous, 121 A.D.2d 417, 417, 504 N.Y.S.2d 6,
7 (2d Dep't 1986).
1. If the witness's existing protection is in the form of an
immunity statute, he may only be compelled to testify if
the statute's protection is as extensive as the constitu-
tional protection against self-incrimination.
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 253 n.8
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(1983).
2. If there is an immunity statute applicable, the witness
must first claim his privilege against self-incrimination.
Then, if he is ordered by "competent authority" to testify
or produce evidence, he must do so. If the witness com-
plies with the order and if, but for the immunity statute,
he would have been privileged to withhold the evidence,
he obtains immunity.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 50.20 (McKinney 1992).
3. Anyone subpoenaed before a grand jury automatically
gets immunity, unless it is waived effectively.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 1993).
4. A witness testifying under immunity may, nonetheless,
be prosecuted for perjury.
People v. Tomasello, 21 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 234
N.E.2d 190, 192, 287 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1967).
a. A witness may be prosecuted for contempt commit-
ted before a grand jury. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 50.10 (McKinney 1992); People v. Ianiello, 21
N.Y.2d 418, 421, 235 N.E.2d 439, 441, 288 N.Y.S.2d
462, 465, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968).
b. And his testimony may be used against him in a
subsequent civil action. In re Beck, 24 N.Y.2d 839,
840, 248 N.E.2d 599, 599, 300 N.Y.S.2d 850, 850,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 850 (1969).
5. The witness must be informed, when he is offered
immunity, that it is in the place of his right against self-
incrimination. People v. Masiello, 28 N.Y.2d 287, 291,
270 N.E.2d 305, 308, 321 N.Y.S.2d 577, 581 (1971).
F. Testimonial Compulsion: The privilege protects a person
"only from being compelled to testify against himself, or
otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature" and has no application to "compul-
sion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or
physical evidence.'"
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967) (taking of
handwriting exemplar from defendant not violation of
privilege); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761
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(1966) (taking blood sample from defendant not viola-
tion of privilege).
G. Waiver of the Privilege
1. Waiver by Criminal Defendant: When a criminal defend-
ant voluntarily takes the witness stand on his own
behalf, he waives the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155 (1958);
People v. Bagby, 65 N.Y.2d 410, 413, 482 N.E.2d 41,
43, 492 N.Y.S.2d 562, 564 (1985).
2. Waiver by Witness: Once a witness, party or nonparty,
has voluntarily disclosed incriminating matters, he
waives his privilege against self-incrimination.
Southbridge Finishing Co. v. Golding, 208 Misc.
846, 850, 143 N.Y.S.2d 911, 915 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T.
N.Y. County 1955) (stating that voluntary testi-
mony is not enough, unless incriminating informa-
tion is actually disclosed), affd, 2 A.D.2d 882, 157
N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1956); People v. Bell, 127
Misc. 2d 43, 47, 485 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420 (N.Y.C.
Crim. Ct. Queens County 1985), affd, 131 A.D.2d
859, 517 N.Y.S.2d 219 (2d Dep't 1987); see also
Taber v. Herlihy, 174 A.D.2d 777, 779, 570
N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (3d Dep't 1991).
3. Once a witness discloses incriminating matter, he must
complete the story even though this further incrimi-
nates him.
Southbridge Finishing Co. v. Golding, 208 Misc.
846, 850, 143 N.Y.S.2d 911, 915 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T.
N.Y. County 1955), aff'd, 2 A.D.2d 882, 157
N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1956).
H. Penalties for Invoking Privilege: Various statutes and char-
ters require public officers to waive the immunity they would
ordinarily get when testifying before the grand jury. If they
refuse, they may be removed from office or lose their jobs.
Such penalties, inflicted for the mere invocation of a constitu-
tional privilege, are unconstitutional.
Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner, 392
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U.S. 280, 284 (1968).
1. If a public officer executes the waiver of immunity out of
fear of losing his position, the testimony given under
this waiver may not be used against him in any criminal
proceeding.
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496-98 (1967).
2. If the official refuses to waive immunity, he cannot be
removed from office solely for invoking his rights.
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-79 (1968).
a. If the officer is then offered immunity and he
accepts it, his testimony may not be used against
him in a criminal prosecution; but it may be used
as the basis of a proceeding to remove him from
office.
Gardner, 392 U.S. at 277-79.
b. If the officer is offered immunity and he still
refuses "to answer questions specifically, directly,
and narrowly relating to the performance of his
official duties," he may be removed from office.
Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278.
3. An attorney cannot be disbarred for invoking his privi-
lege.
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967).
a. If an attorney is accorded immunity from criminal
prosecution, he may then be forced to testify. And
his testimony may thereafter be used to disbar him.
Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 438, 231
N.E.2d 718, 721, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968).
L Comment by Prosecution: The defendant need not testify at
the trial; his failure to do so creates no inference of guilt; and
no comment to the jury may be made on his failure to testify.
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981); People v.
Forte, 277 N.Y. 440, 441, 14 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1938);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 300.10(2) (McKinney 1993)
(only if defendant requests, judge must charge jury that
silence does not create inference of guilt).
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1. The no-comment rule is not retroactive.
Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 419 (1966).
XVI. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
1. Any confidential communication made between an
attorney (or his employee) and the client, which is inci-
dent to the professional legal relationship, is privileged
information not to be disclosed.
N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4503(a) (McKinney 1992);
People v. Mitchell, 58 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 448 N.E.2d
121, 123, 461 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269-70 (1983); Spec-
trum Sys. Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 78 N.Y.2d
371, 377, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1059, 575 N.Y.S.2d 809,
814 (1991).
a. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to
promote candor between the client and his attorney
by guaranteeing confidentiality of disclosures made
between them.
People v. Mitchell, 58 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 448 N.E.2d
121, 123, 461 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (1983).
2. Elements of the Attorney-Client Privilege:
a. There is no attorney-client privilege unless there is,
in fact, an attorney-client relationship.
People v. Mitchell, 58 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 448 N.E.2d
121, 123, 461 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (1983).
b. The communication has to have been made for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice.
Hoopes v. Carota, 74 N.Y.2d 716, 717, 543 N.E.2d
73, 73, 544 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (1989) (holding that
information regarding whether attorney was con-
sulted and who paid legal fees not privileged); Rossi
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater New York,
73 N.Y.2d 588, 593-94, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705-06, 542
N.Y.S.2d 508, 510-11 (1989) (communications
regarding imminent litigation generally privi-
leged).
(1) Although business advice is not usually
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included in the privilege, if such advice is
predominantly legal in nature, the privilege
will still apply.
Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater
New York, 73 N.Y.2d 588, 594, 540 N.E.2d 703,
706, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (1989) (holding that
business advice for purpose of facilitating legal
advice privileged).
c. The communication has to have been confidential,
or intended to have been confidential.
People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 343, 442 N.E.2d
1205, 1208, 456 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697, cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1047 (1982) (holding that spontaneous state-
ments not product of interrogation not privileged).
d. Underlying factual information, not included in a
confidential communication, is not protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
Niesig v. Team 1, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 372, 558 N.E.2d
1030, 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493, 497 (1990) (finding
that disclosures made by attorney to adversary or
adversary's counsel not privileged); Miranda v.
Miranda, 184 A.D.2d 286, 286, 584 N.Y.S.2d 818,
818 (1st Dep't 1992) (finding that information
about relationship with prior attorney not privi-
leged).
3. Determination of whether attorney-client privilege
applies is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater New
York, 73 N.Y.2d 588, 593, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705, 542
N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (1989) ("fact-specific" determina-
tion); WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2296, at 566-67.
a. The attorney-client privilege applies to communica-
tions of the attorney as well as to those of the client.
Spectrum Systems v. Chemical Bank, 78 N.Y.2d
371, 377, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060, 575 N.Y.S.2d 809,
814 (1991) (investigative facts included in report as
foundation for legal advice privileged); Rossi, 73
N.Y.2d at 593, 540 N.E.2d at 706, 542 N.Y.S.2d at
511 (holding entire memorandum, which included
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attorney's conversations with adversary's counsel
and third parties, privileged because attorney's
purpose in conducting conversations was to convey
legal advice to client).
b. The privilege extends after termination of the
attorney-client relationship.
In re Hof, 102 A.D.2d 591, 595, 478 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42
(2d Dep't 1984) (holding that attorney cannot
breach duty to former client in interests of current
client).
c. The scope of the privilege is measured by the cli-
ent's reasonable expectations of confidentiality
under the exigent circumstances.
People v. Osorio, 75 N.Y.2d 80, 84-85, 549 N.E.2d
1183, 1185, 550 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614-15 (1989) (state-
ments made by codefendants in each other's pres-
ence not privileged unless for purpose of common
defense).
d. Corporations in New York are entitled to the attor-
ney-client privilege.
Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater New
York, 73 N.Y.2d 588, 591-92, 540 N.E.2d 703, 704-
05, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509-10 (1989); Vincent C.
Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege:
A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
191, 220-66 (1989).
4. Exceptions to Attorney-Client Privilege:
a. Legal advice given or sought in furtherance of a
criminal act is not privileged.
People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of Cty. Jail, 150
Misc. 714, 720, 720 N.Y.S. 362, 370 (1934) (disclo-
sure of name of client suspected of criminal act not
privileged); In re Stewart, 144 Misc. 2d 1012, 1020,
545 N.Y.S.2d 974, 979 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989)
(attorney's accounts regarding fees of client sus-
pected of narcotics offense not privileged); see also
Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to Com-
munication Privileges, 77 I4Hv. L. REv. 730, 731
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(1964).
b. In any action involving preparation, execution, or
revocation of any will or instrument concerning the
probate, validity or construction of a will, the attor-
ney-client privilege is not granted.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4503(b) (McKinney 1993).
c. Communications made in the presence of a third
party whose presence serves no legal purpose are
not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 343, 442 N.E.2d
1205, 1208, 456 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (statements
made by defendant over phone to her attorney,
heard inadvertently by third party, not privileged),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1982).
d. Clients who jointly seek legal counsel, and subse-
quently are involved in litigation against each
other involving a related matter, do not obtain the
benefit of the attorney-client privilege.
Cardinale v. Golinello, 43 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 32
N.E.2d 26, 29, 401 N.Y.S.2d 191, 195 (1977) (set-
ting forth test that current litigation must concern
"matters related to the subject matter of the second
representation"); Hazlett v. Fusco, 177 A.D.2d 813,
814, 576 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (3d Dep't 1991) (holding
that if all interested parties in contract dispute
present at time of contract, information disclosed at
meeting not privileged). But see People v. Osorio, 75
N.Y.2d 80, 85, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1186, 550 N.Y.S.2d
612, 615 (1989) (stating that coparty's presence
does not necessarily indicate joint consultation).
5. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege: The attorney-client
privilege may be waived if the holder of the privilege
voluntarily discloses a significant portion of the privi-
leged information (People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 458,
126 N.E.2d 559, 561 (1955)), or if he fails to object to the
introduction of such privileged evidence (Jones v. Gelles,
167 A.D.2d 636, 639, 562 N.Y.S.2d 992, 995 (3d Dep't
1990)).
19931
424 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
a. The privilege belongs to the client and cannot be
waived by anyone representing him.
People v. Ali, 146 A.D.2d 636, 637, 536 N.Y.S.2d
541, 542 (2d Dep't 1989) (defendant did not waive
privilege by his attorney contacting officials about
defendant's anticipated surrender or confession).
But see Rosenzweig v. Bank of New York, 64 A.D.2d
599, 600, 407 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (1st Dep't 1978)
(holding that conservator may waive privilege for
client).
b. The privilege may also be waived by the client if
good faith reliance on his attorney is asserted as a
defense for the client's actions.
Village of Pleasantville v. Rattner, 130 A.D.2d 654,
655, 5i5 N.Y.S.2d 585, 586 (2d Dep't 1987).
B. Doctor-Patient Privilege
1. The basis of the doctor-patient privilege is that the pre-
vention of embarrassment resulting from disclosure will
keep people from hesitating when seeking medical
advice and treatment. In addition, the privilege pro-
tects the privacy interests of the patient.
Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 284, 536 N.E.2d
1126, 1130, 539 N.Y.S.2d 707, 711 (1989).
a. The confidential disclosures of both the physician
and the patient are considered privileged communi-
cations.
Hughson v. Francis Hosp. of Port Jervis, 93 A.D.2d
491, 498, 463 N.Y.S.2d 224, 229 (2d Dep't 1983).
But see Williams v. Roosevelt Hosp., 66 N.Y.2d 391,
396, 488 N.E.2d 94, 97, 497 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351
(1985) (general medical history not privileged).
2. Anyone licensed to practice medicine shall not be per-
mitted to disclose any information, which was necessary
for treatment, and was obtained from the patient while
attending to such treatment.
N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4504 (McKinney 1993);
Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 280, 536 N.E.2d
1126, 1128, 539 N.Y.S.2d 707, 709 (1989) (privilege
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granted unless particular medical condition, which
is subject of information sought to be protected, at
issue); People v. Figueroa, 173 A.D.2d 156, 156, 568
N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (1st Dep't 1991), appeal denied,
78 N.Y.2d 1075, 583 N.E.2d 951, 577 N.Y.S.2d 239
(1991) (privilege is creature of statute and may be
abrogated by other statutes).
a. Since the privileged information must have been
necessary for the physician's treatment of the
patient (People v. Bostic, 121 A.D.2d 459, 459, 503
N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (2d Dep't 1986)), basic facts of
the patient's general medical history are not cov-
ered by the privilege (Williams v. Roosevelt Hosp.,
66 N.Y.2d 391, 396, 488 N.E.2d 94, 97, 497
N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1985)).
3. Facts which would be plain to a lay person, not only
those with medical training, are not privileged.
Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 284 n.4, 536
N.E.2d 1126, 1130 n.4, 539 N.Y.S.2d 707, 711 n.4
(1989) (applications of privilege in negligent auto-
mobile accident situation); People v. Beneway, 148
Misc. 2d 177, 178, 560 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (Columbia
County Ct. 1990) (hospital records concerning
defendant's intoxication not privileged in "driving-
while-intoxicated" negligence situation).
4. For any communication between doctor and patient to
be privileged, it must have been intended to be confiden-
tial.
People v. Christopher, 101 A.D.2d 504, 513, 476
N.Y.S.2d 640, 646 (4th Dep't 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 65 N.Y.2d 417, 482 N.E.2d 45, 492
N.Y.S.2d 566 (1986).
5. Waiver: If a patient fails to object to a physician's testi-
mony regarding allegedly privileged communications,
he is presumed to have waived his physician-patient
privilege.
Steinberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 263 N.Y. 45, 50,
188 N.E. 152, 153 (1933).
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a. Any communication which is privileged remains
privileged until it is waived by the patient.
Yaron v. Yaron, 83 Misc. 2d 276, 284, 372 N.Y.S.2d
518, 525 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y. County 1975).
b. Disclosure to third parties constitutes waiver of the
physician-patient privilege.
People v. Hawkrigg, 138 Misc. 2d 764, 765, 525
N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (Suffolk County Ct. 1988) (medi-
cal condition publicly disclosed not privileged).
c. Death of the patient does not terminate the physi-
cian-patient privilege.
Prink v. Rockefeller Ctr., Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 309, 314,
398 N.E.2d 517, 520, 422 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914 (1979)
(psychiatrist's communications to medical exam-
iner in presence of decedent's spouse not privi-
leged).
6. Psychologist-Patient Privilege
a. Any disclosure made by a patient to his psycholo-
gist, while the psychologist is engaged in the diag-
nosis or treatment of the patient's condition, is also
privileged information.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4507 (McKinney 1993);
People v. Wilkins, 65 N.Y.2d 172, 178, 480 N.E.2d
373, 376, 490 N.Y.S.2d 759, 762 (1985) (no privilege
unless particular medical condition at issue). See
generally Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 250
N.E.2d 857, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1969).
7. Social Worker-Client Privilege
a. A certified social worker may not disclose commu-
nications made by clients to him in the course of his
employment as a social worker.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4508 (McKinney 1993);
People v. Tissois, 72 N.Y.2d 75, 77, 526 N.E.2d
1086, 1086, 531 N.Y.S.2d 228, 228 (1988). But see
People v. Alaire, 148 A.D.2d 731, 737, 539 N.Y.S.2d
468, 474 (2d Dep't 1989) (no privilege if communi-
cation made in presence of third party).
b. Under statute a confidential communication
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exchanged between a "rape crisis counselor" and
"client" who is seeking counseling or assistance
concerning any sexual offense.
N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4510 (McKinney 1994);
see also N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4510 (commen-
tary).
c. An individual's privilege may not be asserted by a
party suspected of having committed a crime
against the individual.
Application to Quash a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 56
N.Y.2d 348, 352, 437 N.E.2d 1118, 1120, 452
N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (1982) (hospital suspected of
committing crimes against patients may not assert
privilege of patients).
8. Exceptions:
a. No privileges are recognized in cases involving
crimes against children.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4504(b) (McKinney 1993);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 (McKinney 1993); Perry
v. Fuimano, 61 A.D.2d 512, 518-19, 403 N.Y.S.2d
415, 416 (2d Dep't 1985) (no privilege in child abuse
cases); People v. Easter, 90 Misc. 2d 748, 751, 395
N.Y.S.2d 926, 929 (Albany County Ct. 1977).
b. If the medical condition of the patient is in issue as
an element of a legal claim or defense, no privilege
will be recognized.
People v. Al-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260, 264, 307
N.E.2d 43, 44, 351 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971 (1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 916 (1974) (no privilege for infor-
mation on sanity when insanity is asserted as
defense for murder). But see Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73
N.Y.2d 278, 280, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1128, 539
N.Y.S.2d 707, 709 (1989) (privilege existed because
defendant did not affermatively place her medical
condition in issue).
C. Privileged Confidences to Clergy
1. Confessions or confidences made to clergymen in their
professional capacity are privileged.
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N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4505 (McKinney 1993);
Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 166, 390 N.E.2d
1151, 1154, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229 (1979) (recogniz-
ing urgent need for people to confide in clergymen
for spiritual guidance), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887
(1979); Ziske v. Luskin, 138 Misc. 2d 38, 39, 524
N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1987)
(marriage counseling from spiritual leader privi-
leged).
a. Such communications must be voluntary to be priv-
ileged.
In re N & G Children, 176 A.D.2d 504, 504, 574
N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1st Dep't 1991).
b. For communications to be privileged they must be
made with the purpose of seeking religious counsel,
advice, solace, absolution, or ministration.
People v. Johnson, 115 A.D.2d 973, 973, 497
N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (4th Dep't 1985) (conversation
motivated by Muslim brother not privileged); In re
Fuhrer, 100 Misc. 2d 315, 320, 419 N.Y.S.2d 426,
431 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1979) (communica-
tions with rabbi concerning future criminal act not
privileged).
D. Spousal Privilege
1. Conversations between husband and wife during their
marriage are privileged. The communication must have
been made in confidence and induced by the marital
relation.
People v. Fediuk, 66 N.Y.2d 881, 883, 489 N.E.2d
732, 734, 498 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (1985) (phone con-
versation by husband regarding loving feelings
toward wife after he killed her lover held privi-
leged).
a. In order for these communications to be privileged,
they must be prompted by the affection, confidence,
and loyalty derived from the marital relationship.
People v. DAmato, 105 Misc. 2d 1048, 1051, 430
N.Y.S.2d 521, 523 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1980) (no
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privilege in poor or abusive marital relationship);
People v. Edwards, 151 A.D.2d 987, 987, 542
N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (4th Dep't 1989) (threats made
between spouses not privileged communications),
appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 808, 545 N.E.2d 880, 546
N.Y.S.2d 566 (1989).
2. Exceptions:
a. The spousal privilege is eliminated if the communi-
cation is made in the presence of a third party.
People v. McCormack, 278 A.D. 191, 193, 104
N.Y.S.2d 139, 143 (1st Dep't 1951) (confessions to
wife in front of wife's cousin not privileged), affd,
303 N.Y. 782, 103 N.E.2d 895 (1952).
(1) For the privilege to be inapplicable, the sub-
stance of the communication, and not the mere
fact of its occurrence, must be revealed to a
third party. In re Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66, 74,
439 N.E.2d 378, 383, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 667
(1982).
b. There is no spousal privilege in child abuse or
neglect proceedings.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 (McKinney 1993).
c. No spousal privilege is recognized in civil actions in
which the spouses are adversaries.
Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d 312, 314, 144 N.E.2d 72,
73, 165 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (1957).
d. No spousal privilege will be recognized if the com-
munication sought to be protected was made in the
furtherance of crime.
People v. Watkins, 89 Misc. 2d 870, 874, 393
N.Y.S.2d 283, 286 (Sup. Ct. Crim. T. Suffolk
County 1977) (conspiracy through phone conversa-
tions not privileged), affd, 63 A.D.2d 1033, 406
N.Y.S.2d 343 (2d Dep't), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984
(1978); People v. Mohammed, 122 Misc. 2d 504,
505, 470 N.Y.S.2d 997, 998 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1984) (husband's letters to wife threatening to kill
her if she did not lie to officials about his actions
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not privileged).
3. Waiver of Spousal Privilege: The spousal privilege may
be waived only if both spouses waive the privilege.
People v. Fediuk, 66 N.Y.2d 881, 883, 489 N.E.2d
732, 734, 498 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (1985); People v.
McCormack, 278 A.D. 191, 193, 104 N.Y.S.2d 139,
142 (1st Dep't 1951), affd, 303 N.Y. 782, 103
N.E.2d 895 (1952).
E. Governmental Privilege
1. Balancing Test: The governmental privilege permits the
courts to prohibit disclosure of official information if
they find that the public interest in maintaining confi-
dentiality outweighs the need for disclosure.
Cirale v. 80 Pine Street Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 113, 117,
316 N.E.2d 301, 303, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1974) ("offi-
cial information" includes confidential communica-
tions to and between public employees in
performance of their duties).
F. Communications Heard Through Eavesdropping: Evidence
obtained by illegal eavesdropping as defined in sections
250.00 and 250.05 of the New York Penal Law is privileged
information.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4506 (McKinney 1993); Pica v.
Pica, 70 A.D.2d 931, 931, 417 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (2d
Dep't 1979) (information obtained by wiretaps privi-
leged).
G. Library Materials: Any library materials, which would reveal
the user of such materials, is confidential and shall not be
disclosed.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4509 (McKinney 1993).
XVII. PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AFFECTING WRITINGS
A. In General: The parol evidence rule precludes a party from
introducing prior or contemporaneous extrinsic evidence for
the purpose of altering unambiguous terms of a valid written
agreement.
Happy Dack Trading Co. v. Agro-Industries, Inc., 602 F.
Supp. 986, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Adler & Shaykin C.
[Vol. 9:289
COMPENDIUM OF NEW YORK LAW
Wachner, 721 F. Supp. 472, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Mas-
trangelo v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 722 F. Supp. 1126,
1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Thomson McKinnon Sec. Inc. v.
Harris, 139 B.R. 267, 273 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (defin-
ing "integrated writing" as writing which completely
and accurately embodies all mutual rights and obliga-
tions of parties).
1. The main purpose of the rule is to avoid potential mis-
evaluation of extrinsic evidence by the jury.
W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162,
566 N.E.2d 639, 642, 565 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (1990)
(several objectives of parol evidence rule presented
as stability of commercial transactions against
fraudulent claims, perjury, death of witness, infir-
mity of memory, and fear of jury error).
2. The determination of whether an ambiguity exists is a
question of law for the court to decide.
Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d at 162, 566 N.E.2d at 642,
565 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
B. When Parol Evidence Rule Applies:
1. The parol evidence rule applies if the writing or instru-
ment causes a change in legal relations and obligations
of the parties. See DiCostanzo v. Allstate Ins., 68 A.D.2d
834, 835, 414 N.Y.S.2d 517, 518 (1st Dep't 1979) (change
in insurance policy), affd, 50 N.Y.2d 832, 407 N.E.2d
1347, 430 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1980); Matthew Bender & Co. v.
Jaiswal, 93 A.D.2d 969, 970, 463 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (3d
Dep't 1983) (change in "return policy" of sales contract);
Battista v. Radesi, 112 A.D.2d 42, 42, 491 N.Y.S.2d 81,
82 (4th Dep't 1985) (change in time of payment in sales
contract); Lazansky v. Lazansky, 148 A.D.2d 501, 502,
539 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (2d Dep't 1989) (change in amount
agreed upon for maintenance and child support); Nei-
man v. Backer, 167 A.D.2d 403, 404, 561 N.Y.S.2d 811,
813 (2d Dep't 1990) (change in partnership agreement).
2. If an agreement is partly oral and partly written, parol
evidence may only be admitted to complete the written
portion of the agreement as long as it does not contra-
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dict the original writing.
Laskey v. Rubel Corp., 303 N.Y. 69, 71, 100 N.E.2d
140, 141 (1951) (oral portion of employment con-
tract provided for one year's employment at weekly
salary and expenses; and written portion provided
terminable at will, held that oral portion permissi-
ble, but not to extent duration provision contra-
dicted written agreement).
3. The rule protects the rights of all who depend on the
writing, even those who were not a party to the contract.
Oxford Commercial Corp. v. Landau, 12 N.Y.2d
362, 365-66, 190 N.E. 230, 231, 239 N.Y.S.2d 865,
867 (1963) (corporate settlement in which director
specifically agreed not to sue "any person except
. .. ," and proceeded to list the people in the corpora-
tion he could sue, protected all those unlisted as
protected beneficiaries).
4. Evidence which shows that a written agreement was
made upon an oral condition precedent to its legal effec-
tiveness is admissible unless it contradicts the express
terms of such writing.
Hicks v. Bush, 10 N.Y.2d 488, 491, 180 N.E.2d 425,
427, 225 N.Y.S.2d 34, 36-37 (1962).
C. When Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Apply:
1. The Parol Evidence Rule does not apply to subsequent
modifications that are supported by new consideration.
Backer v. Lewit, 180 A.D.2d 134, 138, 584 N.Y.S.2d
480, 482 (1st Dep't 1992).
2. Parol evidence rule does not apply in criminal proceed-
ings.
People v. Dean, 56 A.D.2d 242, 251, 392 N.Y.S.2d
134, 142 (4th Dep't 1977), affid, 45 N.Y.2d 651, 384
N.E.2d 1277, 412 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1978).
3. The Parol Evidence Rule does not apply to a collateral
parol contract which is "distinct from and independent
of the written agreement" unless it contradicts the writ-
ing.
Mitchell v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 380, 160 N.E. 646,
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646 (1928).
D. Complete Integration: If a writing constitutes a complete inte-
gration, the entire agreement of the parties, and the parol
evidence sought to be introduced would have naturally been
included, this evidence is inadmissible.
Potsdam Cent. Sch. v. Honeywell, 120 A.D.2d 798, 800,
501 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (3d Dep't 1986).
E. Oral Modifications
1. Oral modifications are ineffective if a writing is required
by the Statute of Frauds.
Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc.,
24 N.Y.2d 372, 379-80, 248 N.E.2d 576, 580, 300
N.Y.S.2d 817, 823 (1969).
2. "No oral modification" clauses are enforceable in con-
tracts.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 15-301(1) (McKinney 1993);
N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-209(2)(3) (McKinney 1993); Cliffs
Management Corp. v. Great Eastern Management
Corp., 85 A.D.2d 584, 585, 445 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462
(1st Dep't 1981).
F. Invalidation of Written Instruments
1. If the issue is whether the parties in fact intended to
form a legal relationship, the parol evidence rule does
not apply.
Arner v. Arner, 89 A.D.2d 899, 899, 453 N.Y.S.2d
716, 716 (2d Dep't 1982).
2. Parol evidence is always admissible in order to show
fraud, (GTE Automatic Elec. Inc. v. Martin's Inc., 127
A.D.2d 545, 546, 512 N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (1st Dep't 1987))
even if the instrument includes a disclaimer or merger
clause (Lee v. Goldstrom, 135 A.D.2d 812, 813, 522
N.Y.S.2d 917, 918 (2d Dep't 1987)). But see Mayer v.
Rabinowitz, 114 A.D.2d 357, 357, 493 N.Y.S.2d 877, 877
(2d Dep't 1985) (merger clause was specific to particular
matter of alleged fraud).
G. Interpretation of Writings
1. Parol evidence is inadmissible unless needed to clarify
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an ambiguity.
American Express Bank Ltd. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 164
A.D.2d 275, 277, 562 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (1st Dep't
1990); Marrus v. AUI Indus., Inc., 171 A.D.2d 549,
549, 567 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (1st Dep't 1991).
2. The determination of an ambiguity is based on whether
the words are susceptible to more than one meaning.
Campanile v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 161 A.D.2d
1052, 1054, 558 N.Y.S.2d 203, 204 (3d Dep't 1990),
affd, 78 N.Y.2d 912, 577 N.E.2d 1055, 573 N.Y.S.2d
463 (1991).
3. Trade or custom usage is admissible even if contrary to
the ordinary meaning of the words.
New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Cruise Shops, Inc., 67
Misc. 2d 60, 61, 323 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1971).
a. However, such extrinsic evidence may not be used
to create an ambiguity when the intent of the par-
ties is clear.
British American Dev. Corp. v. Fay's Drug Co., 178
A.D.2d 801, 577 N.Y.S.2d 528, 529 (3d Dep't 1991).
H. Exceptions (When Parol Evidence is Admissible):
1. Parol evidence is admissible to show the illegality of the
consideration, or of the subject matter.
Atkin v. Union Processing Corp., 90 A.D.2d 332,
334, 457 N.Y.S.2d 152, 154 (4th Dep't 1982), affd,
59 N.Y.2d 919, 453 N.E.2d 522, 466 N.Y.S.2d 293
(1983), cert. denied, Union Processing Corp. v.
Atkin, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
2. In the case of a mistake, parol evidence is also admissi-
ble.
Marine Midland Bank-Southern v. Thurlow, 53
N.Y.2d 381, 387, 425 N.E.2d 805, 807, 442 N.Y.S.2d
417, 419 (1981); Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers' Trust
Co., 160 A.D.2d 520, 521, 554 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515
(1st Dep't 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 77 N.Y.2d
517, 571 N.E.2d 641, 569 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1991).
3. Parol evidence is admissible to show the lack of, as well
[Vol. 9:289
COMPENDIUM OF NEW YORK LAW
as the failure of, consideration.
Hahn v. Mills, 72 A.D.2d 958,
251, 252 (4th Dep't 1979).
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